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INTRODUCTORY
OF late the interest of the British public has been
centred on the internd problems of the Indian
Empire, and chiefly those connected with the
Hindu portion of the population. As a result
of the alarming wave of sedition that swept over
Bengal, accompanied by Brahmanical revivals in
the two Presidencies, the affairs of the NorthWest Frontier, together with the problems connected with the Mahommedan subjects of the
Icing-Emperor, have gradually been relegated to
a hazardous obscurity, and have not received the
attention they deserved. The crisis on the frontier
in the autumn of 1910, as a direct result of the
suppression of the arms traffic in the Persian Gulf,
has had the effect of switching the limelight once
again on to this most interesting quarter. People
are a t last beginning to realize that if the arming
of the Pathan belt continues, a fiontier rising in
the future will be an affair of infinitely more gravity
than heretofore. But in spite of this the operations of the blockadiilg squadroil in the Persian
Gulf are not sufficieiltly recognized as ail integral
part of frontier policy, r~11Ci have attracted attenxi
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tion more from the hazardous nature of the undertaking than from any bearing that the ultimate
suppression of the traffic may have on the trancpillity of the frontier. It is with this object,
namely, of emphasizing the connection betweell
the operations of the blockading squadron and
the preservation of peace on the Pathan border,
that I have ventured on the publication of this
book. Though it in no sense aims at bringing
the history of the frontier up to date, yet so
little has been written on this subject since the
publication of Mr. Chirol's " Middle Eastern
Question " and Mr. Angus Hamilton's cc Afghanistan" (to both of which I am indebted as well for
the interest I have felt in the subject as for the
information therein contained) that I have thought
it worth while to devote a chapter to a prdcis of
the Zakka Khel and Mohmand Expeditions.
But it is not only against the independent tribes
that anxiety is felt. For a long while now the
attitude of the Amir has given cause for anxious
speculation as to the real motives that have
actuated his policy. Authorities on the frontier
would be puzzled to give a dogmatic answer to the
question, " What is the true policy of t h e Amir ?"
Many would say that he was bonestly anxious
to fulfil his treaty obligations with the British, but
that he was dcbarred from doing so in an open
manner through fear of the loss of influence with
his subjects which would result from the maintenance of too close relations with the Govern -
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ment of India. A sinaller number would tell you
that this ~vasmerely a pretext for n inore f a seeing policy which aims at the complete indepei~deilceof tlie Afghan kingdom of both Great
Britain and Russia. Many circumstances point to
the idea that the Amir is contemplating a coup
of some sort in the near future. Not; least among
these is the feverish activity which characterizes
the training of the Afghan army. A t the review
a t Agra during his visit to India in January, 1907,
the Ainir is said to have reviled his Sirdars for
having led him to believe in the efficiency of his
army as a fighting machine. Turkish officers are
now engaged in training the Afghan sepoys;
modern guns and ammunition are manufactured
in Kabul; great attention is paid to the mobility
of the force as a whole, and to the clothing
(especially boots) and comfort of the individual
soldier. Armed with modern iifles, the Afghan
army would no doubt prove a formidable fighting
machine in war. But the danger lies in the fact
that when the Amir takes it into his head that
he is in a position to throw off our control he will
probably make the attempt, and though we may
be sure of the issue in the end, we shall not escape
a lengthy campaign and a vast expenditure of
treasure, coupled with the anxiety of seditious
risings in India at any moment.
The account of the operations of the Mekran
Field Force may have a certain interest, seeing that
this cdrner of the Persian domillions has beell so
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rarely visited by Europeans. But the narrative
must necessarily be rather bare of incident, for
the cogent reason that ('a inan armed" is not so
likely to be admitted illto the family circle of those
against whom he is marching, or to see '(the little
savages at play," as a traveller of more peaceable
intentions. On the march t o Bint hardly a soul
was seen, and what few villages we passed were
deserted. I t was the same story in Biyaban,
though here we had the good-fortune to fall
in with the gun-runners, my account of which I
liope will compare with the account they gave of
themselves.
I am indebted to the Times for permission to
make use of articles of mine contributed from the
scene of the operations, as well as for the one contained in the second half of the chapter on the
Autumn Crisis on the Frontier. Much of the
subject-matter has been rearranged to suit the
lapse of time which has occurred. I am also
indebted to t l ~ eproprietors of the Or~lookerfor
peri~issionto reproduce photographs of the expedition, taken by myself, which appeared in that paper.
ARNOLD KEPPEL.

QUIDENDHAM,
NORFOLK.
October 7, 1911 .
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GUN-RUNNING AND THE
INDIAN NORTH-WEST FRONTIER
CHAPTER I
PESHAWAR AND T H E KHAIBAR PASS
w h e n the spring-time flushes the desert grass,
Our Kafilas wind through the Khyber Pass.
Lean are the camels, but fat the frails ;
Light are the purses, but heavy the bales,
As t h e snow-bouncl trade of the North comes down
To the market square of Peshawar Town."
Bn~rack-RoomBallnds.

THE rapidity with which, on the North-West
Frontier of India, events develop into a crisis, and
the latitude that must in consequence be allowed
in dealing with them to the Political Officer in
charge on the spot, led to the formation, by Lord
Curzon in 1901 of the North-West Frontier
Province, out of the trans-Indus districts of the
Punjab, under a Chief Colnmissioner directly in
touch with the Government of India in the Foreign
Department. A similar scheme had already been
formulated and approved by Lord Lytton in 1877,
1

2
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which would have placed the political control of
the frontier under the Foreign Department, the
internal administration remaining, as before, under
the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab. The
outbreak of the second Afghan War, however,
prevented this scheme being carried into effect,
and it was not till after the close of the Tirah
Campaign that it was again revived under the
viceroyalty of Lord Elgin. It remained, nevertheless, to Lord Curzon to point out the weak
spot, and to insist on the transfer of both political
and administrative departments to the Government of India as the only practical means of
insuring a successful grappling with the frontier
problem. By this masterstroke of constructive
statesmanship Lord Curzon succeeded at one
stroke in giving to the affairs of the frontier their
proper place and true significance in the foreign
policy of the Indian Empire. It was inevitable in
a huge district like the Punjab, one of the richest
in the whole of India, that the affairs of a few
small hill-tribes should receive inadequate if conscientious attention, and that their petitions should
be shelved and their legitimate aspirations misunderstood.
The Lieutenant-Governor of the
Punjab had more than enough to do in superintending the economic development of the district
under his care, in staving off the insistent claims of
famine, disease, and pestilence ; and questions which,
owing to the pressure of ordinary administrative
routine work, had to be held over to await their
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turn were found on examination to have assumed
such dimensions and to wear such a tl~seateniiig
aspect as t o leave nothing t o be done but t o
entrust the matter to the tender mercies of the
Punjnb Frontier Force. Moreover, the LieutenantGovernor of the Punjab might be an Indian civilian,
wit11 Indian civilian modes of thought, and the
politics of the frontier might be to him the merest
Greek. The task of coping with the innumerable
little pitfalls of Pathan or Afghan statecraft requires
a more than usually firm grasp of the working of
the Pathan or Afghan mind, and more than a
nodding acquaintance with the broad lines of
frontier policy. Never did the personal equation
enter more into the successful management of the
people of India than it does with the wild and
lawless tribes of the Afghan marches-wild and
lawless through sheer wanton savagery, but capable
of being schooled and led little by little and
step by step into the paths of righteousness by
a firm hand, and by the knowledge that their
~ e t i t i o n sare read and considered by someone who
is interested in their welfare, just in his dealings, and, above all, who is in constant personal
touch with the headmen, or c6malilrs,J'of their
tribe.
A mere glance at the map is totally inadequate
t o coilvey t o the reader the tribal dispositions, the
natural divisions, the artificial frontiers, and the
character of the country of wliich the North-West
Frontier is made up. In its extraordinary coln-
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plexity, both politically and geographically, t h e
serrated sharb's -tooth line which bisects t h e
province, forming what is known as the "Independent Border," cannot be better understood
than by clasping the two hands together and
interlacing the fingers, so that those of the right
harid may represent the roads running up through
independent territory to the British outposts or
political agencies at their heads, and the fingers
of the left hand the long spurs of mountainous
independent territory that run down into the rich
level plains of Peshawar and the Derajat. T h e
knuckles of the right hand will then represent the
five district centres of Hazara, Peshawar, ICohat,
Bannu, and Dera Ismail Khan. I n each of these
districts settled government exists, and the administration does not differ in essentials fiom that
of other provinces. I n independent territo~y,however, we do not attempt any administration i n
the ordinary acceptation of the word. No taxes
are collected, and justice is meted out, not according to the Indian penal code, but by the "jirga,"
or assembly of the elders of the tribe. A mass
meeting of the elders of the whole of the Afridi
tribe, for instance, would correspond very much
to the old '' Shiremote" of the Saxon heptarchy ;,
and, indeed, there is more in the simile than one
would expect at the first glaace, for the democratic
spirit that is so characteristic a feature in t h e
gradual growth of English customs finds its
counterpart in the spirit of liberty and right of free
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action that is one of the most cherished prerogatives of the Pathan tribesman, be he never so
humble. This spirit finds its chief expression in
the manly bearing, open countenance, and almost
indefinable dignity of this hardy race of hillmen,
whose life is one long struggle for the barest
existence on the outskirts of a "promised land"
of unsurpassed richness, and is one of the qualities
that most inevitably endears him to the Englishman who has spent his life among them, and has,
in consequence, acquired an almost native love for
the wild and forbidding highland glens and theis
lawless denizens.
The Pathan has been dubbed cruel, treacherous,
miserly, and, in fact, every epithet of an opprobrious nature has been showered on his devoted
head at one time or another by men who were
either incapable of seeing things from the Pathan
point of view, and of making allowances for his
shortcomings, or who were so hidebound by the
humanity-mongering sentimentality which passes
to-day for the hall-mark of a liberal mind that
they shudderingly dismissed the Pathan from their
thoughts (presumably with pious ejaculations) as
a n unreclaimable savage. And yet the same man,
in all probability, would reserve a corner in his
heart for Cesar Borgia, Louis XI., or King John,
and even find an excuse for the atrocities of " Jack
the Ripper" under the plea of crime passio~znel.
Here it may be as well to point out that the vast
majority of murders committed on the NorthR

6
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West Frontier, for which the unlucky perpetrator
would in all probability receive a sentence of death
from the horrified Pharisee, are actuated by
jealousy; that the vast majority of raids into
British territory are committed out of sheer
hunger and desperation; and that nearly every
attack on British officers or civilians has been
carefully planned by bigoted and fanatical priests,
who hold out to their ignorant and only too willing
tools the prospect of paradise and salvation as the
reward for the killing of a hated '(unbeliever."
As to his miserliness, it is the miserliness of him
from whom bas been taken even that which he
had; and though the Pathan is undoubtedly
acquisitive, yet he lacks the cunning to turn this
trait to good account, and the moneylenders of
Peshawar and Kabul, who grow fat on the duller
wits of the Semitic Afghan and Pathan, are the
Hindu c c bannias," who are tolerated in the midst
of the Mahommedan community on account of
their business capacity, but who are, however,
compelled to wear a distinctive headgear on
account of their religion, consisting either of a
red or yellow puggaree or a small skullcap.
These are the colours of the Hindu religion, and
for this reason the Mahommedan dons with
the greatest reluctance the scarlet livery of the
But if the Pathan is unable to turn to advantage
his miserly propensities, he knows full well how
to dip his hook into the flesh-pots of the wealthy
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Hindu bannias of Peshawar. Raids on Peshawar City itself in the old days were by no means
an uncommon event, the last recorded being that
which occurred early in 1908, when a band of from
sixty to eighty Zalcka Ichel Afridis looted the
Hindu quarter, always the first point to be made
for, killing two policemen, wounding a score of
men, and carrying off booty to the value of at
least one lakh of rupees. It was this raid that
heralded the despatch of an expedition against the
Zakka Khel into the Bazar Valley. Since then
the probability of successfully carrying out a raid
on Peshawar has been materially reduced by the
careful patrolling of the Peshawar border, and the
immediate notification to all fortified posts, from
Michni to Bara Fort, of the presence of any band
of marauding tribes-people that may justly be
suspected of being on the war-path. The opportunity of wrecking the Hindu quarter does,
however, occur at certain intervals, when the
coincidence of a Hindu and a Mahommedan
festival causes racial feeling, and a riot ensues.
Such a scene took place in March, 1910, when
the Hindu festival of rejoicing (the " Holli ") fell on
the same day as the Mahommedan feast of mourning (((Barawafat"), when the mourners went about
the streets, only to be pelted with bricks from the
upper windows. The demise of one Mahommedan,
who had been hit by one of the missiles, was the
signal for a general rush to the Hindu quarter,
which was incontinently stripped bare, the carpet-

8
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dealers losing practically the whole of their store
of carpets, which had just arrived from Penjdeh.
A t such a time Peshawar is full of Musalmans
Ghilzais,
from every part of Central Asia-l'athans,
Hazaras, Bokharans, Turcomans, ICabulis, and
Heratis-and
presents a curiously cosmopolitan
aspect, so that it is truly said that when you have
crossed the Indus you are no longer in India, but
in Central Asia.
Situated as it is at the very mouth of the
~ h a i b a rPass, and forming as it does the connecting link between Central Asia and Hindustan, it is
natural that Peshawar should constitute the chief
entrepSt for Central Asian trade, and therefore the
political centre for frontier intrigue. Dera Ismail
Khan, in the south of the province, fills the same
position with regard to Waziristan and Southern
Afghanistan, since it constitutes the point on which
the pass-roads through the Suleirnan Range converge. I n a minor degree Icohat fulfils the same
office for the Rurram and Tochi Valleys. But
it is in Peshawar itself that the trained hand may
keep its finger on the pulse of trans-border feeling,
and in its bazaars that the first throb of unrest gives
vague presage of trouble.
The city of Peshawar lies in a semicircular
valley surrounded on all sides by mountains, low a t
first to the eastward, where the Kabul River and its
muddy tributaries make their way to the Indus,
but rising gradually as they sweep round to the
north and to the south, until at length they
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culminate due west in the massive peak of Lalcka,
t h e highest point in the Tartarra or Ilhaibar Range,
which stands sentinel over the most historic pass in
t h e history of the world. From tlie Gorlcatri, the
palace of the Governor of the old Silrh province,
situated in the centre of the town, a magnificent
view can be obtained towards sunset of the encircling panorama, and on a clear day to the northwest may be descried the mountains of Bajaur, and
i n winter, perhaps, a glimpse of the snows on
t h e summit of the far-away Lowari Pass, which
for four solid months divides the little garrison of
Chitrd from the outside world. It was in this
palace that the terrible Sikh Governor, General
Avitiibile, an Italian by birth, lmown to his subjects
and to posterity as Abu Tabela, seated on a suinptuous divan, and attired in a flowing garment of
red silk, dispensed a summary and somewhat
primitive justice to the turbulent populace of
Peshawar. It was his boast -that he lrept Peshawar in order by the simple expedient of hanging
every week four of the most promineilt citizens.
Round the foot of this palace, and extending some
way t o the southward, lie the intricate and tortuous
alleys, the mud hovels of the poor, the briclc houses
of the well-to-do, the bazaars of the coppersmiths
and silversmiths, the leather-workers, the carpetsellers, the silk - merchants, the tea - merchants,
and a host of others, and in this labyrinth of
filth and evil odours dwell 100,000 mystel-ious
Orientals, here to-day and gone to-morrow, the

10
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places of those who leave for the passes always
being filled by the constant stream of those that
arrive. To stand at the western gate of the city
and to watch the long files of camels as they
dawdle past on their way to the " kafila-serai," gurgling and bellowing under their loads, is a liberal
education in itself. Here a confused mass of longhaired, two-humped Bactrian camels, supporting
enormous bales of carpets, block the way, and
behind them comes a long string of the one-humped
Arabian variety, with a contribution of old rags and
malodorous asafetida, to the general discomfiture
of a mixed flock of " dumba," or fat-tailed Afghan
sheep, long-eared goats, and small brown cattle.
These are goaded on by lanky youths armed with
stout sticks, and ancient white puggarees wound
round their heads. Presently will come a buffalo
moving stolidly forward under at least a ton of
sugar-cane, while an Afghan, with pointed a culla,"
henna-dyed beard, a drab-coloured Poshtin coat
embroidered with yellow silk, baggy white trousers
caught in at the ankle, and curly-toed Peshauri
shoon, all complete, jogs by on a mouse-coloured
trotting donkey. All this vision of the teeming life
of the fkontier town is seen through a dense veil of
dust, from out of wllich issues the raucous voice
of invisible Jehus, bidding the unwary "Batchka !
garhiwallah !" " Batchka ! Apridiah !" (0Afridi),
each in turn being apostrophized with unerring
accuracy, according to the calling or the tribe to
which his appearance indicates that he belongs ;
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while in the neigl~bouringcaravanserai the longsuffering camel subsides like a collapsing suspension
bridge, to the muttered exhortation of the camelman, Ush 1 Ush ! be imana I" (Kneel 1 kneel l 0
dishonourable one I)
The Ichaibar Pass itself is, of course, one of the
principal places of pilgrimage for the traveller in
India, attracting him from down-country wanderings with an almost hypnotic influence. I, too, was
no stranger to these feelings, as in response to an
invitation from Major Bickford, Commandant of
the Ichaibar Rifles, I hired a bazaar tum-tum "
(two-wheeled cart) and drove out through the long
avenue of Peshawar Cantonment to spend a couple
of days at Landi Kotal. Passing the lines of
t h e Munsters and the 51st Sikhs, and the Guard
House surrounded with barbed-wire entanglements
as a precaution against rifle-stealers, we debouch
upon the broad military road that leads straight as
an arrow to the old Sikh fort of Jamrud. Parallel
to us and on our left runs the single line of the
Peshawar-Jamrud Railway, along which daily the
Flying Afridi " clanks and groans. Presently we
reach Icacha Garhi, railway-station and fortified
post, where the Kabul River Railway branches off
northwards t o its unknown terminus among the
Mullagori Hills. Here I pick up my host, and we
drive on to tiffin at Jamrud. On the way he
points out to me the different landmarks in the
surrounding country. T o the north and northwest among those hills is the country of the Moh6'
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mands ; to the west-south-west, behind a high ridge,
the Bazar Valley ; to the south lies Tirah and the
Bara Valley, and a little farther to the eastward the
low neck of the Icohat Pass. Among those low
foothills on our left dwell two septs of the Icuki
IChel Afridi, at deadly feud with one another.
Their fortified villages may just be descried in a fold
of the hills. This feud is carried on by means
of artillery. Each village has an old muzzleloading cannon, but between them they can only
muster thirteen or fourteen cannon-balls, the remainder being presumably embedded in the mud
walls of the strongholds. These cannon-balls are
solemnly fied backwards and forwards whenever
the feud breaks out. The " game," of course, is to
make a " corner in cannon-balls, when terms may
be dictated for the time being by the successful
collector. But, like blackmail, the power which
the possession of the cannon-balls gives is only
efficacious as long as they remain unexpended.
This never lasts for long, as the childish folk
cannot long resist the intense pleasure of firing
the cannon. From time to time we pass evillooking scoundrels, who eye us with fierce and
lowering brow, or perhaps their faces light up in
answer t o the cheery Pushtu salutation, "May you
never be tired!" to which the invariable reply
is, " May you never be poor !" The fact remains
that the Afridi is poor--abjectly poor, though he is
never tired.
The entrance to the Khaibar lies some two and
"
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a half miles beyond Jamrud,and the change from the

perfectly flat plain to the rocky, mountainous defile
is very abrupt. Up and up leads the road in serpentine convolutions, doubling, twisting, writhing,
until the Chargai IZota1 is reached, with the Chalxai
Post perched on the top of an unscalable rock lilre
a pinnacle of the temple. Here a gradual descent
begins, and a little farther on the road up to the
Chura Pass into the Bazar Valley is passed. I t
was close here that Sir Havelock Allan lost his life,
shot by Afridis. And now the gorge begins t o
narrow, and the road sweeps down to Ali Masjid,
situated at the narrowest and most forbidding
portion of the pass. The ancient Sikh fortress,
surmounted by the British fort, towers above,
completely dominating the defile. Formerly the
road lay along the bed of the streamlet, and one
can well imagine the difficulties of its passage
during the first Afghan War, and the awful reputation which it then gained. But since 1851
it runs along the northern scarp, though even now
one can hardly repress a shudder at its dark and
sombre aspect, so pregnant with disaster.
Between Ali Masjid and the first Zakka IChel
village that announces the end of the pass, we had
the misfortune to pass one of the longest kafilas
that I saw, either here in subsequent visits
to the Khaibar, or in the Icurram, or crossing
the bed of the Indus at Dera Ismail Khan. There
must have been fully 800 camels, peacefully
plodding along on their way to Kabul, with what
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peak of Sikaram above Parachinar in Kurram, full
15,000 feet high.
U p here it was quite chilly, the month being
December, and we returned to the warm fire in the
mess-room of the Khaibar Rifles in the fort, zfter
paying a visit to the men's quarters and watching
them prepare their evening meal of chupatties,
curried dal, and rice. Chupatties are merely
unleavened pancakes made of flour, water, and ghee
(clarified butter), baked on ail iron girdle. Dal
is a kind of lentil. W e also entered the hospital
in the fort, in which at the time there were no
sepoys. There were, however, a few sick tribesinen
from tlie surrounding villages, suffering from bronchitis, cataract, and o t h e ~diseases, and a Laghmal~
Afghan, who bad sustained a severe wound in
some trans-border affray. H e was being nursed by
his own father, who had brought him in. The
surest way to the heart of an Afghan or a Pathan
is the ability to heal him, and this certainly accounts for the personal immunity with which the
famous " dalctar-sahib " of Bannu, the Rev. Mr.
Pennell, can move about in independent tribal
territory, ail ccunbeliever" in a Muslim country,
and for tlie respect in which he is held by the
usually so fanatical mullas.
On the following day, in company with Major
Biclrford and Captain Galbraith, 55th Colce's
Rifles, P.F.F., I walked down to the Afghan
frontier at Torkham, past the enormous mudwalled kafila-serai just outside Landi ICotal, and
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past the block-house at Michni IZandao, which was
attacked by an Afghan " lashkar " during the
Mohmand rising of 1903. Beyond this is the
first Afghan post of Paindi Icakh. The boundary
here has never been properly delimited, and the
Afghans in consequence lay claim to the watersupply a t Landi IChana, between Tor Kham and
Michni Kandao, with the object of gaining control
over the stream which rises here and drains into the
Kabul River below Dalcka Fort. The question of
water-supply is always a very important one in a
country where practically every crop depends on
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The inhabitants of the villages round Landi
Kotal live chiefly by carrying firewood into
Peshawar, and this also is the principal occupation
of the poorer cave-dwelling Afridis, whose caves
we had passed on our way up the Ichaibar. To me
it is a mystery where the wood comes from, as I
never saw a tree of any kind, or even a, sh~sub
capable of producing firewood, except the sorry
scrub that occasionally crops up in barren and unexpected places. As a second string to his bow,
when firewood fails, the resourceful Afridi can
always support life by raiding.
To the north of L a i d ICotal lies the littleknown territory of the Shilmanis and Mullagoris,
dwelling on the right bank of the Kabul River.
These two tribes inhabit the natural cul-de-sac
formed by the great northerly bend that the
Kabul River takes below Dakka Fort. Through
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this country runs the Mullagori Road and the
almost legendary Icabul River Railway, as altenlative strategic routes from Peshawar. From the
walls of Landi Rota1 one may see the road
stretching away to the north-east as far as the
kandao which forrns the southern barrier of the
ICam Shilman Valley. What lies beyond is veiled
in mystery. Torkamr-the point to which the
Kabul River Railway was sanctioned by Parliament-is a mere geographical expression as far
as the outside world is concerned. The difficulty
of railway constl*uctionin the ilarrow gorge of the
Kabul E v e r may be apprehended from the heated
discussions that took place over the selection of the
route. We know that the railway never reached
Torkamr, although the " flying Afridi " runs as
far as Warsak,* the last station in the Peshawar
plain.
The reasons for the construction of the Kabul
River nailway are to be found in the inadequacy
of the IChaibar roads for the rapid despatch of
a large army into Afghanistan, and for provisioning it when there. Supposing we ever had occasion
t o send an army into Afghanistan, this one avenge
is easily interrupted, flanked as it is on both sides
by presumably hostile Afridi tribes. In any case
this road would never be sufficient for supplying a
body of, say, froin 60,000 to 100,000 men, and so it
was thought advisable to have alternative lLoutes. In

* This Warsak must not be confused with the Warsalr in the
h e Shilman Valley.
3
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pursuance of this line of policy the Mullagori Road
was constructed, and the Loe Shilman or Kabul
River Railway sanctioned as far as Torkamr. I n
a later chapter we shall see what trouble arose out
of its construction. Beyond Torkamr a discussion
arose as to the best route to be followed to the
Afghan frontier. Lord ICitchener, then Commander-in-Chief, advocated a direct route westward up the Loe Shilman Valley, thence tlwough a
tunnel to the west of Warsak to the village of
Smatsai, below Dakka Fort. But, principally on
account of the expense that the construction of this
tunnel would have entailed, it was eventually
decided to follow the course of the Kabul River
upstream along the big northerly bend past Palosi,
a route which presented fewer engineering difficulties. Ultimately further construction was postponed. It is to be hoped that this decision was
dictated by consideration of real policy, and not by
the wave of economy which from time to time
seems t o sweep over the India Office, like a plague
of locusts, blighting every progressive or expedient
measure it may happen to encounter.
Though by no means so frequented by former invaders of India as the Khaibar Pass, this route was
undoubtedly known to the ancients, and would, indeed, be a more rational route to follow than the
narrow and tortuous Khsibar, inhabited by the
warlike Aparytz (Afridi), as Herodotus calls them.
Though a portion of Alexander's troops made the
passage of the Khaibar, the majority are supposed
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t o have gone by the more northerly route. The
old camel-road of ihe Buddhist pilgrims exists
also, which was, and, I believe, still is, used on
occasion by the Amir's "dak-runners" as an
alternative to the Khaibar.
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CHAPTER I1
'I'HE ZAKKA KHEL AND hiO1lMAND EXPEDITIONS
'Tis N'ar, red War, I'll give you then,
War till my sinews fail ;
For a wrong you have dorie to a Chief of Men,
And a Tliief of the Zokka Kheyl."
KIPLIXG
: Lament o f f h e Borila
Catlle TlrieJ:

1

Srsc~:the fi~ialquelling of the revolt of 1897 in
'Sir:il~,t l ~ rlfridi
c
border had rernni~iedcomparatively
I~e:'odul,but for the spasmodic raiding of various
barids of outlnws, ~zxltiliri 1004 it again began to
rosporid to tlie secret n-iachin:~tionsof the fanatical
R~iglopliobeparty in Ilabul. I n that year large
~luliibersof Afridis visited the Afghan metropolis,
being well received by tlie Amir, and sent away
with prcsents of money, after liaving purchased
co~isiclcrl~blequantities of arms and ammunition.
Friendly relatiorls with Kabul were still further
cemented wit11 the assistance of one I<l~awwas
IClian, a ~ex-malik
l
of the Zakka Khel and a former
citizen of Peshawar, through whose instrumentality
the Afiidi clans were enabled more and more t o
cou~lton the support of a powerful faction among
the counsellors of t h e Arnir. In fact, to such a
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degree did this inan gain an ascendancy over the
mind of the A ~ n i that
r
the latter was wholly unable,
when the time came, to prevent the insurrection
which the Afridis were emboldened to make, relying on the support which his actions had given
good cause for anticipating. Through Ilhawwas
IChan and his myrmidons it was that the Afridis
and the Mohmands, and even the Shinwaris, were
gradually worked up to the belief that the time
had come when the English should be driven back
over the Indils by a general uprising of the independent tribes, in which Afghan lashkars would
play no inconspicuous part. All through the year
1904 raids were frequent, and the Afridi allowances
were stopped for a time. But though this had a
salutary effect on the majority of the clans, the
Zaklca IChel continued to be the ringleaders in the
raiding, and when the allowances were once more
mnewed, the Zakka Khel were excluded from the
number. The defiant and uncompromising attitude
of the Zakka IC11el was no doubt due to the constant assurances of Khawwas Khan that they had
nothing to fear, as well as to the fact that the
Zakka Khel are the poorest and most " jungly " of
all the Afridi clans, and have come least into
contact with British rule. Situated as they are at
t h e farthest point of Tirah from British territory,
and the nearest to Afghanistan, they would be
more susceptible to Afghan influences, and less
likely to appreciate the probable consequences of
their temerity. Their territory would also afford
4
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to the outlaws the surest sanctuary, and having
already forfeited their allowances, they would as
soon be hung for a sheep as for a lamb. Among
the chief of the outlaws may be mentioned Dadai,
Usman, and Multan, all of whom were notorious
for the number of their crimes and the daring with
which they were carried out. These three went
constantly to Kabul, where they listened eagerly to
the rash and malignant scheming of Khawwas
Khan, returning to Tirah only to confirm the
Zakka IChel more surely in their folly. The
Shinwari mullas were also untiring in their efforts
to bring about a crisis in Tirah and among the
Mohmands, who were also at this time showing
signs of disaffection on account of the coilstruction
of the Loe Shilman or Kabul River Railway, which
they regarded as a prelude to the taking over of
their country. I n this connection, Alam Gul, the
cc Sufi Sahib " of Batikot, was the most indefatigable,
dividing l i s attention equally between Tirah and
the Mohmands. This gentleman, like the " Gud
Mulla" (or Lame Mulla) of Inzari, was a disciple
of the well-known Hadda XSulla, a native of the
Jellalabad district, who in 1897, with a following of Afghans, had raided Shankargarh on the
Blohmand border, and attacked the fort of Shabkadr. His anti-British propaganda had begun
some years before, when in 1902 a new allowance
had been granted t o the Musa Khel Baezai
3/Iohmands, which afforded him an excellent opportunity of denouncing the recipients as "kafirs,"
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wit11 the result that the Musa Ichel and other
Mohmand clans did not come in to receive their
due.
Another principal cause for the suspicion and
mistrust with which we were regarded at this time
by the Mohmands was the proposed Mohmand
Boundary Commission, which was intended to
do away with the facility with which Afghan
Mohmands could raid into what, strictly speaking,
had been laid down as British territory by the
Durand Agreement. Major (now Sir George)
Roos-Keppel was deputed as the British Representative, and it was arranged that he should meet
the Afghan Commissioners at the Nawa Kotal in
Mohmand territory on February 1, 1903, and
mark out the boundary, as far as the crest of the
Sofaid Koh a t the Peiwar Kotal in the ICurram, to
the south of the Khaibar. But owing to the
obstructive measures of the Amir, the Boundary
Commission never started. If it had, it is quite
possible that the British members of it would never
have returned. During the construction of the
Loe Shilman Railway the Tarakzai and Halimzai
Mohmands, as well as the Mullagoris on the
southern bank, who had undertalcen to protect the
line from attack, were repeatedly subjected to
annoyances from the Afghan Mohmands. The
Sarhang of Dakka especially showed a particular
desire to pick a quarrel at any price and on any
pretext, with the object of impeding the progress of
the work. A dispute arose as to the ownership of
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logs and driftwood which the inhabitants of Smatsai,
a small village on the right bank of the Kabul
River a little below Dakka, had been accustomed
to collect for fuel. The Sarhang attacked the
village, and, on a remonstrance from the British
Government, claimed Smatsai as lying in Afghan
territory. Whatever the justice of this claim, and
it appears that the words of the Durand Agreement admit of a considerable elasticity of interpretation, we, a t any rate, were perfectly justified in
not recognizing the claim, seeing that it was through
t h e obstructionist attitude of the 'Amir that the
boundary had remained undemarcated. Thus in
1905 for the second time the question of demarcation was raised, only t o come again to the same
infructuous end. Meanwhile attacks on the Kabul
River Railway, under the instigation of Sahib Haq,
Akhundzada, son of the Mulla IChalil, occurred as
before, and numerous raids were committed by such
notorious outlaws as Mahazil, Khoda Khel Baezai,
and Hakim Khan,'%n the unprotected villages of
the Mohmand border. The reinforcement of the
frontier posts at this point led, however, t o a
temporary cessation of these annoyances.
During 1907 the Zakka Khel, in spite of the
genuine efforts of the maliks of the remaining
Afkidi clans t o restrain them, adopted a yet more

* The notorious outlaw Hakim Khan, with a following of
twenty-nine, was taken near tlie village of Char Sadda on
February 28, 1911. Hakim and twenty of his accomplices
were killed, and the rest were captured and suffered death by
hanging.
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defiant attitude towards the British Government,
and an Afiidi jirga met at Landi Rota1 in that
year to deliberate on what steps should be taken
to abate the nuisance. During this meeting and
while the Afridi maliks were urging on the
Government the advisability of occupying the
Bazar Valley, a Zakka IChel jirga made its appearance, professing itself willing to come to terms.
Not content with offering an unconditional surrender, the Zakka I<hel in their turn made such
preposterous and absurd demands, conditions, and
stipulations, that the insincerity of their professions
was made only too apparent, aiid they were iinmediately dismissed.
All this time the progress of the unrest was being
watched with jealous care in Kabul, and secret
agents continued to send in their quota of information to the leaders of the Anglophobe party. It is
probable that at this time the Amir began to realize
the nature of the whirlwind that was about to be
reaped from the insignificant wind that had been
sown by the presence of Khawwas Khan in Kabul.*
Early in 1907 the Sufi Sahib, accompanied by Abdul
ICarim, a Shinwari of Deh Sarak, was preaching a
"jehad" in Tirah, while Lala Pir, a secret agent
from Kabul, was engaged in stirring up the tribes
in I<liost and Waziristan, and holding communication with the Mulla Powindah and the Hamzullah

* The Pioneer had repeatedly urged on the Government of
India the advisability of obtaining the dismissal of Khawwas
Khan from Kabul.
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Mulla, with the intent to incite the Wazirs and
Mahsuds to revolt. Unsuccessful in Waziristan,
he turned his attention to Hhost, where, on the
outbreak of hostilities, he raised a lashkar, which
was to have co-operated with a Ghilzai lashkar
from the Ghazni district in an attack on the
Kurram Valley. Among the Mohmands and Ningraharis the Hazrat Sahib " of Chaharbagh, Pidai
Masun Jan, succeeded, with the help of the Sufi
Sahib and the Gud Mulla, in raising a lashkar,
principally composed of Afghan Mohmands and
Shinwaris.
The Afridi maliks having proved themselves
utterly incapable of exercising any influence over
the Zakka IChel, the Government, after clutching
at every straw that seemed to hold out a possibility
of a settlement, suddeilly sanctioned an expedition,
as the result of a determined raid on Peshawar City
undertaken by Multan and other outlaws on the
night of January 28, 1908. This raid occurred
in spite of the fact that the whole of the Jamrud,
Bara, and Kohat Pass roads were being patrolled
at the time. Three constables were wounded, two
of wbom died, and the raiding-party escaped over
the city wall before any reinforcements could be
brought up.
As soon as the intelligence was received by the
Zakka Ichels that punitive operations had been
sanctioned against them, they began moving their
families and flocks and herds through the passes
into Ningrahar, whither also the outlaws Multan,
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Dadai, and Usman also repaired, returning, however,
to take p a ~ in
t the fighting. The Chief Commissioner of the North-West Frontier Province,
colonel Deane, summoned the Afridi malilts to a
jirga in Peshawar, where he made it plain to them
that the object of the expedition was merely to
punish the Zakka IChel, and that no annexation of
territory was in any way contemplated. This very
timely declaration of our intentions had the veTy
beneficial effect of securing to us the co-operation of
the Afridi inaliks throughout the campaign, in
spite of the untiring efforts of Mulla Saiyid Akbar,
Aka IChel, one of the ringleaders in 1897, to raise
them. They were, in fact, induced to maintain a,
blockade of the passes from the Bazar Valley into
Tirah, so that the passes into Afghanistan were the
only avenues of supply for the leaguered Zaltka
IChel. It was proposed to take up two brigades
into Bazar, and to hold one brigade in readiness at
Nowshera. Major-General Sir James Willcocks
was given full military and ~oliticalcontrol of the
expedition, and Lieutenant-Colonel Roos-Iceppel
acted as Political Officer. The value to the Zakka
Ichel of one, at least, of the passes into Ninpahar
was largely discounted by the rapidity with which
this latter officer led a flying column into Bazar by
way of the Bazar Pass, which opens out of the
IChaibar a little short of Ali Masjid. By sending
part of his baggage animals back from Ali Masjid
to Jamrud, the Zakka Khel were led to believe that
no entry was intended by way of the Bazar Pass ;
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consequently the column was enabled to make the
passage unopposed, and thus get between the Zakka
Khel and their bolt-holes into Afghanistan, at the
same time gaining possession of the village of China,
commanding these exits. The second brigade
entered the valley by the Chura Pass through
Malikdin Ighel country, and advanced to Walai,
while the first brigade occupied Chura.
Mountain warfare, as carried on on the NorthWest Frontier, does not lend itself to impassioned
descriptions of bloody fields of battle, of cavalry
charges and heroic actions done in the limelight
before the astounded gaze of two armies. The
Afridi does not rush down into the open to certain
death, but retires gracefully before a stronger force
sent against him, slculking along the sky-line, and
ready to take advantage of the smallest mistake on
the part of his opponents, or to cut off any straggler.
H e has been described as the finest natural skirmisher in the world. It is when the retirement of
the British troops begins that he is at his best, and
then i t is that those deeds of heroism are committed
by our British and Indian troops alike, when there
is none to mark how those battery mules were got
safely across that open nulla-bed, swept as it was,
by a hail of bullets, or how So-and-so held on t o an
almost isolated position, at the risk of being cut off,
for three minutes more than was necessary, in order
to enable a wounded comrade or two to get a good
start down the hill. At night, too, worn out and
dog-tired by the constant hill-climbing, the soldier
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must cool<and eat his food in the dark, as no lights
are allowed, for fear of attracting the fire of the
snipers. Then he must dig himself into a narrow
trench ill the ground, and hope for sleep, wl~ilefrom
the hills around an incessant firing is kept up till
daylight. Those who by repeated experience of
this kind of warfare may be considered competent
judges declare that nothing is more nerve-mcking
or more demoraliziilg to troops than to have to
undergo night after night this constant sniping,
coupled with the apprehension of a night attack at
any moment. Tlle first indication of a night attack
is like the rustling of the wind through autuinn
leaves, as the " chaplis " of the silent-footed foe
slitl.er over the rocky ground ; the11 follows the
confused, half-audible jingle of accoutrements, steel
upon steel, and jangling neck ornaments, and the
final rush and the blood-curdling pandemonium
that is let loose as the wave of savagery breaks on
the bristling perimeter of the camp. Occasionally
one of those little incidents occurs which serve to
relieve the tension and raise a smile aH round, even
though it be but a false alarm in the middle of the
night, caused by an inconsiderate sepoy falling
asleep with his shoulder against the firing-button
of a machine-gun.
A t the beginning of the operations the Amir had
issued a declaration to his subjects forbidding them
t o join in the hostilities, but in spite of this and of
his presence so close to the scene as Jelldabad,
large numbers of Sangu IChel Shinwaris, Afghan

n
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Mol~mandsand Wingraharis of every description,
entered the Bazar Valley by the Tsatsobi Pass,
where they openly sold ammunition to the rebels,
aided them in fighting, and proved particularly
obnoxious by militating in every possible manner
against the resumption of peaceful relations with
the Zakka IChel. With fanatical zeal, they exhorted them not to conclude peace with us at any
price, with the consequence that negotiations were
conducted with the greatest difficulty, and our
occupation of the valley was much longer than it
need have been. A t their instigation, too, the
Zaklra IChel sent messages to the Mohmands
urging them to rise, and the Hazrat Sahib and the
Sufi Sahib did everything that could be done to
bring about a combined insurrection. But at
length the Zaklra IChel, having exhausted ammunition, supplies, and means alilre, and having seen
their fortified villages disappear skywards in a cloud
of dust, were brought to their knees, and terms
were at length agreed to through the mediation
of the Afridi jirga. These latter undertoolr to
punish the outlaws, to guarantee each a section
of the Zdclra Khel, and to deposit so many rifles
until the Political office^ should consider that the
Zakka Khel had sufficiently expiated their folly.
The outlaw Dadai died of the wounds he had
sustained, cursing IChawwas Khan and his own
folly in bringing desolation on his clan.
The difficulties attending the satisfactory terrnination of the Zakka Khel rising were enhanced by
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the necessity of keeping a watchful eye simultaneously on other parts of the frontier. Hardly a
month elapsed before it again became necessary to
send a punitive force into independent territorythis time against the Rfohmands. All throuigh
February and the first fortnight in April, raiding
had been increasing on the Abazai border, and the
Shinwari lashlrar that had collected in Ningrahar
at the close of the Zaklra IZhel Expedition crossed
the Kabul River at Lalpura and went off to throw
in their lot with the Mohmands. The constant
influx from the Afghan side led to reinforcements
being early sent to the forts of Michni and Shankargarh. After telegraphic coinmunications had been
twice interrupted, villages raided, and posts fired
on, it was at length decided to mobilize :L seconcl
expedition under the command of General Twillcocks. Brigadier-General Anderson, Major-General
Barrett, and Major-General Ramsay, had command
of Brigades, the Third Brigade being held in reserve.
0
1
1 April 24 two columns attacked the enemy's
position west of Shanka~garh,and the enemy were
driven back with heavy loss. This defeat greatly
discouraged the mullas, who were trying to raise
Dir and Swat. A t the same time every effort
made to gain the co-operation of the Zakka Khel
and the Loargai Shinwaris proved unsuccessful,
and many mullas retired in consequence into
Afghanistan. The Mohmands' supplies were now
running short, and many combatants availed themselves of the dead or wounded among their relations

1
I
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to accompany them back into Ningrahar, whence
they were careful not to return. The Hazrat Sahib,
however, doggedly remained in Mohmand country,
though with a greatly reduced following, gradually
retiring into the more remote valleys of that
district. I n Tirah the malilrs had been successful
in counteracting the efforts of Mullah Saiyid Akbar
to raise the Afridis, in spite of the latter's invitation
to the Sufi Sahib to join him in the Lower Bara
Valley, whilst in the Bazar Valley what Zakka
Khels yet remained-the majority having gone up
into Maidan for the summer-intimated that they
would oppose the Sufi's lashlrar, if necessary, wit11
force. The Mollmand trouble appeared to be
dying a natural death, and the Government of India
had already intimated to General Willcocks that
no advance should be made into Mohmand country
if it coyld possibly be avoided, when a diversion of
a dangerous nature suddenly arose in the Khaibar.
On April 29 the Mian Sahib of Tsappar arrived at
Peshbolak in Ningrahar with a Khugiani lashlrar
some 6,000 strong. A junction with the force
already assembled under the Sufi Sahib and other
mullas brought the total of the combined lashkars
up to nearly 20,000.
This formidable gathering, which was composed
entirely of Afghans, moved up to Landi Iqhana, part
of it, under the Sufi Sahib, entering Bazar. The
fortified post of Michni Icandao, just below Landi
Kotal, was attacked on the nights of May 2 and 3,
and General Willcocks moved up t o Landi Kotal
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with reinforcements, with which on the followiiig
day he drove the Sufi's lashkar across the Afghan
boundary.
A s a result of this sudden and unexpectcd
reverse to the Afghan supporters of the &Iohmands,
the Hazrat Sahib's following suffered a further
decrease in numbers, and the voice of thc Ainir,
which had been raised in half-audible protestations
to which nobody paid any attention, now thundered
forth in an authoritative recall of all subjects of
His Majesty from independent territory. But by
this time no such coin~nandwas needed to insure
the rapid exodus of Afghans from the Mohmand
borders, though, no doubt, the Amir congratulated
biinself on his (somewhat tardy) loyalty to his
treaty engagements with the English.
U p till this time only two of the Moliinxnd
clans-namely, the I-Ialiinzai and the Pandi:~li
Mohmands-had
ventured t o come in. The
remainder had been deterred from following this
example, probably by the fear that the Government contemplated an annexation of Mohmand
territory." These two clans undertook to induce
the remaining sections to come in, and May 9 was
fixed as the date by which their submission should
take place. W i t h the exception of the Musa Ichel
section of the Baezai, the Baezai and Khwaezai
+ The EIJirnzni and ~ a r d i Mohmands,
~d
as well as the Sl~ilmanis and Mullagoris who live on the southern bnlllc of the
Kabul River, remained loyal to t h e Government throughont the
campaign.

5
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are considered as Afghan subjects. The remaining Mohmand clans consisted of the Utmanzai,
Dawezai, Isa Ichel, Burhan Hhel, and the Musa
IZhel Baezai. Nothing having occurred by May 9,
the First and Second Brigades advanced into Mohmand territory. On May 15 the column arrived
a t the IZharappa and Nahaki li'asses, in the Gundab
Valley, without opposition.
The enemy were,
however, found in considerable force in the IChapak
Pass, having been joined by Baezai and IZhwaezai
Afghan Mohmands. The efforts of the First Brigade
were directed against the Handahari Sufis, while
the Second Brigade ascended the valley of the Bohai
Dag towards ICargha and Mulla Killai, in Utrnan
IZhel territory. By May 27 all the clans, with the
exception of the Musa Khel Baezai, had tendered
their submission, and, the latter having been
punished on the following day, the troops began
t o evacuate Mohmand territory, which was effected
by June 1.
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CHAPTER I11
THE POLICY OF THE AMIR

FORclose on half a century the nightmare of n
Russian invasion of India througll the passes of
the Hindu Hush, or by way of Herat and the Parapomisus, has held the mind of the Biitish public,
clogging our foreign policy and forcing the hand of
our diplomacy. I n spite of the fact that since
1873 British statesmen have from time to time
attempted t o reassure the nation on this point, in
no field of politics have alarmists and scayeinongers
obtained such a ready hearing as in this one of the
Russian advance in Central Asin.
It is not necessary at this distance of time, and
in view of our present relations with Russia, to
rake up old scores, too higllly coloured for the
inost part with the hues of national animus, but
i t may not be irrelevant to the subject to recall
a few of the less liasty views of those British
statesmen who, in the midst of the alinost
universal panic, still kept their heads.
I n 1873 the Tsar had already intimated to the
British Government, through Prince G~~tchakoff,
that he considered Afghanistan as lying altogetller
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outside the Eussian sphere of influence, an assurance which Lord Granville saw no reason for not
accepting. But in 1868 the capture of Samarliand
had caused such an ebullition of feeling in England
that Lord Clarendon felt constrained to inform
Baron Brunnow that "although Her Majesty's
Government feel neither suspicion nor alarm at
these movements, yet something must be done
to allay the uneasiness of the British and Indian
public." A scheme was then discussed for the
establishment of a neutral zone in Central Asia,
resembling somewhat the present so-called neutral
zone in Persia : a scheme which was afterwards
abandoned when the object for which it had been
broached-namely, the pacification of the English
public-had been for the time being attained."
When in 1878, after the Treaty of San Stefano,
we sent Indian t.roops to the Mediterranean,
Skobeleff's plan, in the event of war breaking out
between England and. Russia, and provided he
could gain the support of Shere Ali, was to make
an invasion of India through the passes of the
Hindu Icush. But it may be reasonably doubted
that he would ever have contemplated such a
step had he not fully believed that the whole
of India was ready, at the mere approach of the
Russians, to break out into a blaze of insurrection
resembling the Mutiny of 1857.
It is a noticeable fact that, with one exception,

* Wheeler's "Life of Abd~irral~man,"practically the only
really impartial review of the Russian question.
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fiiction between Russia and England in Central
Asia had n1w:zys been preceded by strained relations between tlie two countries in Europe. This
one exception was the c'Penjdeh Incidenl;" of 1885,
when Gladstone's Parliament voted :£11,000,000
for war preparations, The incident might easily
have been avoided had we shown a little more
firinness at the outset, and it is not at all clear
that tlie Russians were prepared t o back their
views by resorting to extreme measures. Sir Wrest
Ridgeway, who succeeded Sir Peter Lumsdeil in
command of the Boundary Commission, was of
opinion that the Russians could not possibly have
risked a war in view of the disturbed condition of
the Mahommedan population under Russian rule
at that time.*
To look for a moment at the Russian side of
the questiou, a ;Fact too often overlooked by the
partisan historians of this period is that from
1868-1873 we, too, had caused the Russians considerable anxiety by our attempts, culininating in
the Forsyth Mission, t o establish commercial
relations with Y8koub Beg of Icashgar. W e had,
in fact, ourselves been setting the example in what
we afterwards .complained so much of in Russia.
But to return to the question of the Russian
invasion. Sir Donald Wallace, in his book
G c Russia,"
sums up the whole question in one
pithy sentence :
Wheeler's "Life of Abdurrahman," practical.1y the only
really impartial review of the Russian question.
+

6
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" W h a t had been seriously entertained, not only
in the official world, but by the (Russian) Goveminent itself, is the idea, strongly advocated by
General Skobeleff, that Russia should as quickly
as possible get within striking distance of our
Indian possessions, so that she may always be able
t o bring strong diplomatic pressure to bear on the
British Government, and, in the event of a conflict, immobilize a large part of the British army."
This places the whole matter in a much more
reasonable and probable light, and is a strong
argument against the notion that Russia ever
harboured designs pe?- se for the invasion of India.
Lastly, Lord Hardinge of Penshurst, a t a
banquet given for hitn on the eve of his departure
for India by the county of Kent, said in reference
t o this question : " I have grave doubts as to
whetbey such projects were ever seriously contemplated in those days by the Russians."
The elimination of the Russian question for the
present from the sphere of practical politics on the
North-West Frontier of India, if it cannot be said
to have simplified the problems with which we are
called upon to deal, a t any rate must have the
effect of modifying our policy in many of its
hitherto most important aspects.
The situation now resolves itself into the threecornered problem ofI. Our relations with the Amir.
2. Our relations with the independent tribes.
8. Tribal relations with the Amir.
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For the first t i n ~ esince the Vienna Congress of
1815, England is found acting in harinony with

Russia, and the immediate consequence of this is
that Afghanistan finds herself coinpletely isolated.
Hitherto the Amir's chief weapon has been his
power to hold the bdance between the two
countries, and to play off England against Russia.
H e can now no longer count 011 the moral support
of Russia in any situation where the interests of
Great Britain and Afghanistan clash. We are,
of course, still bound by our defensive treaty of
alliance in the event of a foreign invasion of
Afghanistan ; and Russia, within the last t w o
years or so, has renewed her assurances to us tliat
she considers Afghanistan as lying altogether
outside the sphere in which she may be called
upon to act. At the same time, as long as the
Amir observes the treaty negotiated in ICabul
in 1905 by Sir Louis Dane, in which Habibullah
undertook to be bouiid by the engagements that
his father made with the Goverilment of India,
we are also bound to fulfil our side of the bargain,
and to respect the independence of Afghanistan
as a kingdom. By one of the Articles of the
Durand Agreement of 1893 the Amir undertook
no-t to exercise ally interference ill the independent
territories on our side of the Durand line; but so
often have risings among the border tribes been
directly traceable to Afghan machinatioiis as to lay
Habibullah open to the charge of having violated, by
corninission or omission, this clause of his agreement.

THE POLICY O F THE AMIR
W h a t conceivable circumstances can be urged
in defence of the following, or in what way can
Hsbibullah seek t o justify them? The reception
of tribal jirgas in Icabul, either by the Amir or
by Nasrullah, and their dismissal with gifts of
money and arms ; the presence of the proscribed
ex-malik, IChawwas Khan, in ICabul, who attained
such influence in the Amir's councils as ultimately
to bring about a rising in the Bazar Valley; the
open sale of rifles and ammunition to the Zalrka
Khel during the ensuing expedition, in direct
defiance of the Amir's orders, and in spite of his
presence not twenty miles away, at Jellalabad;
finally, that a nest of outlaws should be permitted
to exist in IChost, upon our very borders, and that
no measures should be taken to put a stop t o their
depredations, until the capture of a native officer
of a frontier militia rendered unpleasant complications with the Government of India an immediate
possibility.
Whether personally guilty or not guiltyo it is
with Habibullah, as ruler of Afghanistan, that responsibility must ultimately rest. That such things
should be possible calls for measures that shall
arrest, once and for all, this gradual stultification
of the Durand Agreement. The time has, in fact,
come when we should intimate to him in no
equivocal manner tlmt relations of ally political
nature, either directly or indirectly, cannot longer
be tolerated in independent territory. For, in the
absence of the fanatical emissaries of the Icabul
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Anglophobe party, the maliks have shown themselves, on the whole, capable of loolcing after the
tribes under their charge, and inclined to discourage
close relations with Afglmnistail.
The exact attitude of the Amir towards us is n
subject on which considerable difference of opinion
exists. Whilst full of protestations of good-will
towards us, he is sometimes so backward in giving
practical effect to them as to furnish legitimate
cause for doubting his sincerity. No doubt he is
saddled with a difficult task in properly fulfilling
his treaty obligations, and at the same time preserving his character among the Afghans as an
uncompromisiilg upholder of Afgl~anintegrity and
independence. To this and to the fact that his
brother, Nczsrullah I<han, has ever evinced the most
thoroughgoing antagonism to everything British,
may be attributed his waning popularity. It may
even be doubted whether his popularity at any time
since his visit to Hindustan would have been sufficient t o keep him upon the throne but for the
loyalty of his brother, who exercises by far the
greater iilfluence of the two, and who would probably be received with the greatest acclamation by
the people did he choose to proclaim himself. However, at his accessioi~he at least had the foresight to
will over the soldiery by the sirrlple expedient of
increasing its pay, an operation which he has repeated at intervals since, although compelled to
disband the inferior portioil of his troops in order
t o defray tllc increasing cost of upkeep. But since
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Nasrullah is Commander-in-Chief, it seems improbable that Habibullah could count on the undivided loyalty, except against an external foe, of
any but the Kabul garrison.
Habibullah has been described as too easy-going
t o attempt any curtailmelit of Nasrullah's influence,
relying, no doubt, on the Government of India to
see him through any family crisis ; and though
Nasrullah has a great affection for his brother, he is
said to have been much displeased at the nomination of Inayatullah, the Amir's son, as successor
to the throne. It is also rumoured that Nasrullah
is physically afraid of the Amir, and that when
circumstances of a sufficiently peremptory nature
have decided the latter on a definite course, the
remonstrances of the Commander-in-Chief are swept
away as chaff before the storm.
As Commander-in-Chief of the army, and at the
same time spiritual head of the community and chief
prop of the State, Nasrullah is t o all outward appearances a dictator. Like the warrior-bishop of the
Middle Ages, he is keenly alive to the advantages of
combining the spiritual with the temporal power,
and it is t o the acquisition of supreme spiritual
power that all his stealthy energies have been
directed. Well he knows that in a countiy like
Afghanistan, where the fanatical zeal and warlike
propensities of the population are shrewdly turned
t o account by the mullas, whose only principles
are subordinated to motives of political expediency
and t o the preservation of their own influence, the
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acquisition of such power is the passport to ulti~~late
supremacy. I n this he 112s been aided by circumstances. According to A4usalmnn l:nv anyoile
who, having prayed after the " chief' imam" or
preacher in tlie mosque, afterwards acts contrary
t o his commands, is counted an infidel, and ceases
to belong to the company of the faithful. Most
Afghans at one time or another have pl~lyedafter
Nasrullali in his capacity of chief imam in the large
open-air Masjid-i-pul-i-Pukhtu in Icabul, a mosquc
capable of' accommodating several thousand people.
Among these are sure to have been inany tribcspeople from our side the border, and hence it is
not too inuch to say that it is only necessary for
Nasrullah to despatch a body of mullas to pre:icll
a holy war against the Britisli to cause in yesponse
a movement of unrest along the whole length of
the frontier.
The first instinct of an Oriental monarch on
ascending the throne is to get rid of all superfluous
members of his family who lnay be suspected of
any leanings towards the purple. 'I'his is effected
b y banishment or by harsher methods. At his
death in 1823 Timur Shah left twenty-three sons,
dl of whom, during tlie disputed successiorl wlzich
followed, gradually disappeared, until only Shah
Shujah and Dost Mahommed were left. Forty
years later, on the death of the Dost, there was
another disputed succession, many of the actors in
which are still living in exile in either Russia or
British India, On his accession Habibullah was
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spared the inconvenience of asserting his right to
the throne, owing to the thoroughness with which
his father, the lamented Abdurrahman, had previously cleared the country of all possible claimants.
Yakoub Khan and Ayoub Khan, the sons of Shere
dli, who fled from Afghanistan in 1879, are now at
Lahore, and, though both are over sixty years of
age, probably still have some adherents among
the Afghan Mohmands, their mother having been
a lady of that tribe, a sister of Sa'adat Khan of
Lalpura. . A still more ancient link wit11 the past
survives in the person of Is'hak IChan, now over
seventy years of age, if, indeed, he still lives, and an
exile in Samarkand, Habibullah's birthplace. In
fact, with the exception of his brother Nasrullah
and of his half-brother, Mohammed Umar, a grandson of Shere Ali, a quarrelsome and irascible youth
from all accounts, there has been no one who could
show any pretence to the throne. For some years
Bibi Halima, the mother of Mohammed Umar, was
the cause of considerable friction at Kabul, but
since Mohammed Umar (who never participated in
,the . ambitious schemes his mother entertained for
his future) slew the Amir's Master of Horse in a
fit of passion, and on another occasion wounded
Nasrullah in a quarrel, he has been allowed to go
his own way, which does not differ in essentials
from that of other ne'er-do-weels. H e is no longer
to be reckoned with as a possible claimant at
Inayatullah's accession. p n e other there is who, if
any credence may be given t o the tales of ICabuli
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merchants in Peshawar, is causing T-Iabibullal~a succession of nzaz~vaisquarts d'l~ezsre. The Shahgassi
Mulki, Sirdar Yahya Khan, the brothcr of the first
Queen, who was driven from Afghanistan by
Abdurral~inan,has now been bad< in Afghanistan
for about four years. Saving Nasrullah's priestly
following, he commands the sympathy, so 'tis said,
of all the tribes to the south and east of Kabul.
The Ghilzais, moreover, are known to have procured many rifles during the recent gun-running,
and, inspired by the Icnowledge that they are well
armed, have been showing signs of restlessness ;
whilst only the other day the Amir despatched
the Hazrat Sahib Charbagh (one of the disciples of
the well-known Hadda Mulla) to pacify the Sangu
Bhel, a Shinwari clan in the vicinity of Jellalabad,
which had become intractable.
So long as Nasiullah retains his position at the
head of the mullas he has nothing to fear. As a
Durani, he evidently prefers to pull together with
Habibullah than to risk the loss to his fainily of
the legacy of subject tribes - Hazaras, Hafirs,
Ghilzais, Usbegs, and Turcomans-that
Abdurrnhman bequeathed to the present Arnir a; the
independent kingdom of Afghanistan, a kingdoin
that requires a firm hand if the unruly elements of
which it is composed are to be held together.
Vexed by internal movements and hampered by
the Anglophobe party in his dealings with us, the
position of the Amir is certainly not an enviable
one, nor is the administration of the country all
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that can be desired. What government there is
in Afghanistan is conducted in the most haphazard
fashion-at least, in the outlying districts, which for
the most part are farmed out to governors or
" hakims." The collection of the revenue is
usually deferred to some two years after the expiry
of their terms of office, when the hakims receive a
summons to ICabul, and the major portion of their
property is unceremoniously confiscated to supply
the deficits in the exchequer. Corruption is rife.
Under these circumstances it is not to be wondered
at that the affairs of remote districts do not always
come to the notice of the central Government as
promptly as might be desired, in spite of the fact
that in 1906 telephonic communication was established between ICabul and the principal provincial
capitals. I n many instances the first intimation of
disorderly conduct on the part of his subjects
reaches the Amir though the Government of India.
I n this way Habibullah has made out a very
plausible case for himself, and the sympathetic
British lion has been within an ace of being caught
napping. To all outward appearances, the Amir
is merely an Oriental monarch, bound to Great
Britain by certain treaty obligations, which he is'
honestly trying to fulfil, even at the risk of the
allegiance of his subjects. H e hears with regret
(from the Government of India) that raids into
British territory are being made from his side the
Durand line. H e replies that he has not yet
been informed of the matter by his ow11 officials,
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but that he will do d l in his power to put an end
to the raiding. H e receives jirgas in Kabul, and,
true to his engagements, he counsels them against
any unfi-iendly attitude towards the British. They
are then handed over to the chief imam. . . . H e
forbids the sale of rifles and ammunition to the
independent tribes, but not the sinallest attention
is paid to this injunction. H e pays a fiiendly
visit to the Viceroy in India, wliere we are careful
to inform him that we oilly wish to consolidate his
position in his own kingdom, and to see Afgl~anistan able to defend herself. H e accepts our assurances of friendship, and the howitzers presented t o
him by Lord Curzon, some of which, metaphorically,
he mounts pointing towards Russia, some towards
India. H e spends the "allowance" granted t o
him on the defences of the Khurd Kabul Pass, and
as soon as we propose building, as an earnest of
our defensive treaty of alliance, a railway that shall
facilitate the throwing of troops into Afghanistan
in the event of a foreign invasion, he bares his
teeth. Even while Sir Louis Dane was yet in
Kabul, it was known in India that the Mission of
I905 was a complete fiasco. The proposals we had
t o make, according to the Times of January 26,
1905-the linking up of Peshawar and Jellalabad
by rail and telegraph, the training of Afghan
troops by British officers, the purchase of war
material from England alone-Habibullah refused
t o discuss, substituting in their place Nasrullah's
pet scheme, advocated as far back as 1897,

'
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during the latter's visit to England, for a legation
in London wllicll should transact business with the
India Office over the head of the Viceroy, and an
even more impossible request for a strip of land to
the Baluch coast fos the purpose of founding an
Afghan seaport. Other instances could be cited
for illustrating the insincerity of the Amir's
professions, notably his obstructive policy with
regard to the Mohmand Boundary Commission.
As to the clauses agecting Afgllanistan in the
Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907, the Ainir has
not yet signified his assent to them.
Utilizing every excuse that ctLn be urged in
extenuation of the Arnir's attitude towards us, it
can hardly be claimed that we have succeeded in
malung Afghanistan either a strong or a friendly
kingdom. The very fact of our requiring a friendly
attitude on the part of the Amir only contributes
to his unpopularity among his subjects, and is one
of the causes of his weak government.
Realizing all this, as he must, it is only natural
that he should do something to reinstate himself
in the eyes of his people. H e is no longer content
to remain merely the huger State between. Great
Britain and Russia, and, with the intention of
making himself altogether independent of Great
Britain, it is not likely that he should despise the
weapon that lies readiest to his hand in 1;lle shape
of the impressionable independent border tribes,
who are only too ready to follow his lead as long
as we refrain from making our power felt.
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BEFOREproceeding to an account of the crisis of
September and October, 1910, on the frontier, it
will be necessary to trace briefly the rise of the
arms traffic in the Persian Gulf.
U p till the year 1897-that is to say, the year
of the great revolt in Tirah-the trade in arms
through Muscat and Bushire had been chiefly
confined to Persia and the countries at the head
of the Gulf and on its southern shores. As
" guardians of the Gulf" we had done what lay hi
our power to put a stop to this traffic. I n 1891
we had been instrumental in inducing the Sultan
of Muscat to prohibit the importation of arms
into Gwadar and its dependencies, over which he
lays a claim of suzerainty. I11 1892 we were
successful in obtaining a similar undertaking from
the 1;rucial chiefs of the Pirate Coast. For inany
years, however, Bushire continued to absorb the
greater part of the trade, and the arming of the
Bakhtiari tribesmen in the mountainous southwestern corner of Persia went on apace. A t the
same time we may be sure that large quantities
49
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of rifles found their way into the possession of the
semi-independent nomad tribes of the Arabian
interior, especially among those chiefs who feared
the aggressive designs of their powerful neighbour,
Turlcey.
After the Afridi revolt of 1897, the course of
trade in arms veered round to the North-West
Frontier, and large numbers of rifles began gradually to filter in, replacing the obsolete and homemade " jezail" with which the Afiidis had hitherto
for the most part been armed. It was at about this
time that the Sultan of Muscat issued a proclamation granting to British and Persian men-of-war the
power to search in Muscat waters vessels flying the
flags of the three countries. The first-fruits of this
agreement was the capture by H.M.S. Lapwing
of 220 cases of arms and ammunition, destined for
Bushire, on board the Anglo-Persian Steam Navigation Company's S.S. Bc~luchista?z. The shippers
afterwards hailed the Sultan and British Government into court, but on appeal to the House of
Lords the principle on which the captain of the
L a p i n g had acted was upheld, and a verdict was
returned in favour of the defendants. But in spite
of this blow to the arms traffic, at least as far as
it concerned Persia, by 1902 the trade through
Persian and British Baluchistan had assumed such
proportions that the Political Agent, Icalat, felt it
his duty to come to some arrangement with the
Governor-General of Icerman with a view to
putting some check upon the traffic, which was
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already threatening the preservation of law and
order on the Berso-Baluch frontier. It had, in
fact, been found necessary in 1901 to send an
expedition into Melaan to dislodge certain outlaws under Mahinud Khan, a noted ringleader,
who for some time past had been committing raids
into British territory from the security of several
Baluch forts in the districts of Sarhad and Saravan.
I n a conversation with the Political Agent, ICalat,
the Governor-General of ICerman agreed to issue a
notification forbidding the furthey impoi-tation of
arms along the coast of Persian Mekran, and to
hold the Baluch Sardars responsible for any infringement of tlis regulation.
Thus far it might be thought that everything
liacl been done to put an end to the traffic. But
the authority of the Governor-General of ICerman,
and even of the Deputy-Governor of Bampur, is,
and always has been, of such a' legendary character
that little or no attention was paid to the notification by the Baluch Sardars, who are the real
masters of this portion of the Persian dominions.
The arms traffic continued to flourish in uninterrupted prosperity, and in spite of the repeated
warnings of the Political Agent, Icalat, and, as time
went on, of other frontier officers farther north, the
gravity of the situation was not realized.
A t the same time, in justice to the Government,
it must be said that an attempt had been inade
in about 1900 to obtain the consent of France to
the abrogation of the treaties which permitted the
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use of Muscat as an entrepbt for the arms traffic,
and which allowed France to grant her flag to
certain protdg6s in the port of Sur, under cover
of which it was feared that nakhudas were enabled
to evade search while running guns into Mekran.
With regard to the first point, it may as well
be said at once that, short of a substantial cession
of colonial territory to France"--an act against
which sentiment revolts-or of the possession of
some powerful diplomatic lever which chance may
put into our hand, we shall never secure the
abrogation of the trading treaties.
With regard to the second point, it was adjudged
by the Hague tribunal in 1905 that "after
January 2, 1892, France was not entitled t o
authorize vessels belonging to subjects of H.H. the
Sultan of Muscat to fly the French flag," except
on condition that their " owilers or fitters-out had
established, or should establish, that they had been
considered and treated by France as her protdgds
before the year 1863," though "owners of dhows
wlio before 1802 had been authorized by France
to fly the French flag retailled this authorization
as long as France renewed it to tlie grantee."
It was not till the year 1907 that the undoubted
truth of the warnings was brought home to the
Government of India, in a manner which could not
be ignored. In this year one big load of 30,000
rifles was successfully run through to Iiandahar.
It is said that a year or so previous to this, the
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Governments of New Zealand and New South
Wales had had occasion to dispose of a quantity
of old Government rifles which had seen service in
the South African War. The purchaser seems to
have been a man of no little enterprise. I t boots
not to inquire into the Homeric wanderings of
these rifles between the date of their departure
from the Antipodes and the date when the first
of them reached the hands of one of the political
officers on the North-West Frontier. Suffice it to
say that the rifle was forwarded to Simla, where
it seems to have been regarded as a very interesting curiosity-interesting enough, at all. events, to
be forwarded again to the India Office.
Further inquiries showed to what extent the
danger on the frontier had grown, and Colonel
Malleson was detailed on special duty to report on
the traffic through Afghanistan to the North-West
Frontier. The result of his report was to convince
j
the Government of India that no time should be
lost in instituting measures of the most repressive
kind. Military operations, which were undertaken
at Robat, were found inadequate to the situation
in view of the nature of the country over which
watch had to be kept. A Gurkha battaLion was,
however, stationed there in case of eventualitiw,
which succeeded in making several important
captures. Accordingly, in 1909 a rigorous blockade
was instituted in the Persian Gulf and in the Gulf
of Oman. During the cold-weather season of
1909-10 so numerous were the captures of gun8
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running dhows that the Arab skippers soon learnt
to look before they " skipped."
And now we come to the genesis of the autumn
crisis of last year on the frontier. Before the
development of the arms traffic through Afghanistan, what rifles were in the possession of
the Pathans had either been run in througl~
British India or were the products of successful
rifle-stealing from regimental guard-houses. Of
some 1,500 rifles returned at the end of tlie Tirali
campaign, the majority were identified as haviiig
been stolen in this manner. Coffins had also been
successfully employed to convey rifles across the
frontier under the very eyes of unsuspecting militia
patrols. I n Calcutta rifles had been strapped
under goods-waggons destined for Peshawar, wlience
they were secretly carried off by natives on arrival.
Ammunition had gone through the IChaibar cleverly
conceded in bales of merchandise. Bolts had
disappeared mysteriously from arms-racks. All
these methods of obtaining arms now suffered a
severe slump. It was no longer worth while
stabbing a sentry in the back to get his rifle. The
cunning which had prompted the rifle-thief in the
stillness of the night to pitch a pebble t o one side
of a sentry and to attack liim from the other wliile
his attention was distracted in tlie direction of
the souiid was no longer called forth. These ways
were too difficult and dangerous, and were not
always rewarded with success.
Even the Adam IChel Afiidis who owned rifle-
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factories in the Icohat pass began to appreciate
the decline in trade consequent on the appearance
of the " vilayeti " (European) rifle with which the
border was being inundated. The '(pass-made "
rifle fell in price to half its value. With one
accord the Adain Ii11el closed their workshops and
invested in the new avenue of trade. A few went
theinselves to the Gulf, but the majority elitrusted
their savings to the l'owindal~ merchants who now
visited Mekran in large numbers. These Powindalis, it is said, were financed in some cases by the
Amir, on condition the rifles were sold in districts
designated by him.
For a time everything went well. Rifles poured
into the frontier. But suddenly the crash came.
The Pathans who, returning from Mekran, reached
their homes about the beginning of June, 1910,
reported that they had been unable to obtain rifles.
The ships of the "Sirkar," they said, had put an
end to the trade. Their money was in the hands
of the dealers in Muscat.
Whole clans were ruined-nay, whole tribes.
All through the sninmer indignation grew. Raiding recommenced with unexampled persistence.
Demands from tribes-people for colnpensation began
to be heard. The Adam Ilhel reopened their
worksl~ops,on the principle that " 'tis an ill wind
that blows nobody any good." It was of no avail ;
nobody had any money wherewith to buy even
a pass-made " rifle.
But though ,the suppression of gun-running in
c6
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the Persian Gulf had undoubtedly had its full provocative effect on the tribes of the North-West
Frontier, yet there had not been wantirig causes of
unrest, which, independently of gun-running and,
to all appearances, of each other, had been gradually
leading up to a frontier crisis. Gun-running in its
succeeding phases, first of toleration and then of
suppression by Government, had provided first the
means and then the pretext for a rising. I n a
sense, then, it should be regarded more as the latest
development in the situation than as the fons et
origo of all the trouble.
That an outburst was, at least for the time
being, warded off reflects the highest credit on the
tact and judgment of the frontier political ofhers.
For not since 1897 had such a favourable opportunity for combined action occurred sim.ul-tnneously
all along the frontier. I n nearly every quarter
disaffection had been rife. ATot only in the south
had the Mulla Powindah, since 1904 the evil
genius of the Waziri border, been exerting himself
in the cause of Islam, but in the north, in Swat and
Bajaur, the Gud Mulla, upon who~n fell the
mantle of the late IIadda Mulla, had also, in s
tentative manner, taken up his parable. At the
same time, there was evidence that influences of
Afghan origin had been st work to seduce the
tribes-people from their allegiance-influences which
seemed to point to the fact that a rising of the
independent tribes would not have been looked
upon with disfavour in certain quarters in Kabul.
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Yet further signs of the times were to be found
i n the revived activity of the Hindustani fanatics,
a politico-religious sect which for twenty years had
been practically regarded its a cipher in Indian
politics. What passed between Nasrullah and
Abdul Icerim, the nephew of their present leader,
during the latter's visit to Kabul in the autumn of
last year has not yet transpired, but it is safe to
say that it bodes no good to us, and we sl~all
probably hear of them again before very long.
But by far the most dangerous exhibition of
ill-feeling came from the IChaibar Afridis, and
especially among the Zakka Ichel section, who saw
i n the disaffection of the IZohat Pass Afridis an
opportunity not to be lost of fbrwarding their own
quarrel with the Goverilment of India.
As in 1897 and in 1908, so to-day the tribes on
the Peshawar border take their cue from this
powerful division of the Afridis ; and it is as much
due to the fact that the Iihaibar Afridis hesitated
t o take the lead as to anything else that the
TCohat Pass Afridis, who of all the tribes had
suffered most in connection with the suppression
of the gun-running, acquiesced in the refusal of
Government to compensate them for their losses.
A word as to the divisions of the Afridis. The
Afridis themselves are divided into three great
divisions distinct from one another. 'I'hese are(1) the Khaibar Afridis ; (2) the Adam IChel or
ICohat Pass Afridis ; (3) the Aka Rhel Afridis.
Though participants in the Afridi rising of 1897,
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taking a prominent part in the burning of Landi
Ilotal and Ali Masjicl, the Aka Ilhel have given us
little trouble in comparison with the other sections
of the Afridis. Owing to their geographical
position midway between the IChaibar and Icohat
Passes, when in 1881 allowances were apportioiled
to the Afridi clans for the policing of these passes,
the Aka IChel found themselves excluded. They
remained, therefore, for many years the only tribe
among the Afridis not in receipt of Goverilment
grants. This has constituted their chief grievance,
venting itself in numerous petty raids into British
territory. To remedy this very natural feeling of
jealousy, a pretext was found for granting thein an
allowance, and in 1902 they were e ~ t r u s t e dwith
the protection of their section of the frontier.
Since that year they have not shown any active
hostility. They are, however, in the habit of
harbouring outlaws, as it is contrary t o their code
of l~onourto give up anyone taking refuge anlong
them, and for this they have been fined more than
once. Notable among these refugees was the
Hazari~aogai~g,wl~ichin recent years, from the
safe retreat of the hills between the Bara ltiver a i d
tlie ICohat Pass, cormnitted many raids on the
Pes11,zw;tr district.
Tke Adam Ichel, who live in the rnountaiiious
district between Peshawar and ICohtlt, through
which for fifteen miles runs the Icohat Pass, are,
as has been mentioned before, the only section of
the Afridis who show any ct~pacity.for trade.

T H E RHAIBAR AFRIDIS
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They are engaged in carrying salt, and also in
the manufacture of rifles, for the production of
which there are half a dozen workshops in the
pass owned by the Galai section of the Afridis.
They have no connection with either the Aka
Illiel or tlie Bhaibar Afiidis, and are politically
under the Deputy-Commissioner, Icohat.
The IZhaibar Afridis are further divided into
six clans, which I here, for the sake of convenience,
tabulate under their respective political factions of
Sainil and Gar, tlie origin and meaning of which
are lost in the mists of antiquity, but whose
ramifications extend to all tlie tribes between the
Ichaibar and Icurram. Like Whig and Toly, the
Afridi accepts, as a matter of course, the traditions
of the faction to which lie is born. As Salnil or
Gar, nascitur, non fit.
Samil.

Gar.

MnIikdin Khel.
Zaltka Kliel.
Sipahs.

Kambar Khel,
Kuki Khel.
Kamrai.

There is a dynastic alliance between the Malikdin Khel and the Icambar Ichel, while tlie Zaldra
Bhel and the Ilulri Ichel are mortal enemies. The
Sipal~sand Ibrnrai are of minor importance. These
clans live in Tirah in the summer, coming down in
winter to the country along the south of the
IZliaibar Pass, and are therefore known as "dokora," or " two-homes." To these clans, from whom
are recruited the Ichaibl~rRifles, is entrusted the
guarding of the pass, for which services they
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receive allowances amounting to the value of the
tolls levied by them before the Britisll occupation
of the pass. There is no more mistaken idea than
to regard these allowances as a kind of danegeld,
by which it is hoped to buy off raiders from making
inroads into the Peshawar district. Such a policy
would only serve to aggravate the evil.
The tranquillity of the passes and the consequent
rapid growth of trade has tended to enrich the
tribes-people, who calk now come and go with
greater security and regularity in pursuit of their
own humble trade, which for the most part consists
in carrying firewood into Peshawar. This enhanced
prosperity, far from having had any marked civilizing effect, seems rather to have rendered increasingly difficult the task of the malilts in keeping
order among the more unruly element. Moreover,
one or two successful raids, for which reparation
was not immediately exacted, had still further
increased the arrogance of the tribes-people.
After the Zakka Ichel Expedition of 1908, each
of the Afridi clans, by the terms of the agreement
then come to, undertook responsibility for the good
behaviour of one section of the Zaklca Icllel. This
was never meant to be a perrnanent measure by
those who made it, nor did the Zakka Khel, who
consider themselves a match for any two of the
other clans, contemplate an indefinite submission
to the yoke of their neigl~bours,even had these
latter felt thcmselves capable of enforcing it.
For ten years there has been a bitter blood-feud
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between the Zalcka Khel and the IEuki IChel, which
from time to time breaks out with more than usual
ferocity. A t such times it is the obvious duty of
the other clans, under the agreement of 1908, to
intervene and put a stop to this internecine strife.
But here the eternal question of Samil and Gar
crops up to divide the Afridi jirga among itself,
and to destroy the balance of power in this tumultuous commonwealth. The Malikdin IEhel,
being in politics Samil, refuse to take sides against
the Zalcka IChel, and the Kainbar Khel, though of
the Gar faction, hold to the Malilrdin IChel on
account of their common ancestry. The two reinaining clans, conscious of their numerical inferiority, are too frightened to exhibit any active
sympathies.
When roused, there is no saying to what lengths
the Afridi will go, and these internal feuds constitute a direct menace to the security of the pass,
and thus violate the agreements of 1881 and 1908,
by which the trade through the passes is snfeguarded and the tranquillity of the Zalclca Khel
guaranteed. Any infringement of these undertalrings renders punitive intervention not only
legitimate but allnost obligatory.
I11 the midst of these internal dissensions, the
news of their losses as the result of the suppression
of the gun-running raised the indignation of the
Zalrlra lChel to fever-heat, and the Afiidi clans, all
of whom had been affected in a greater or less
degree, were found either unwilling or powerless

I
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to restrain them. A t the same time, the demand
made to Government by the Kohat Pass Afridis
for compensation, which received a firm refusal,
led to the perpetration of numerous raids into
the Peshawar district, and the mail-tonga was held
up and looted in the Kohat Pass, which was in
consequence closed for about a fortnight in
September.
At one time in September it looked as if
hostilities could hardly be avoided. The situation
had resolved itself into the problem of how long
the Icambar and Mdilidin Khel would remain content with merely evincing a passive sympathy
towards the turbulent Zakkas. There were even
budmashes among the Kulu Khel prepared to
sink their feud in order to foment a general Zaklia
I<hel rising against the British. Excited by the
success of several raids at this time, the warlike
spirit of the Zaklca Khel threatened t o obliterate
the memory of the expedition of 1908. As a
precaution a guard was placed on the bridges over
the Indus at Attock and I<ushalgurh, both of
which are threatened from the low hills of the
Jowaki Afridi country. But chiefly owing to the
tactful treatment of the situation by Mr. Merli,
acting as Chief Commissioner in the absence of
Sir George Roos-Reppel, the storm was happily
averted, though it was some time before it could be
said that the frontier had returned to its normal
degree of tranquillity. However, it may be hoped
that a final and satisfactory termination has resulted
,
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from the deliberations of a united Afridi jirga
held by Sir George Roos-Keppel in Peshawar on
December 3, at which all parties were fully represented, and in which it was tacitly agreed to drop
the question of losses sustained, since it was obvious
that there was no intention on the part of the
Government to comply with their request.
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CHAPTER V
T R I B A L RESPONSIUILITY VERSUS FANA'I'ICISM

ONCEagain, therefore, the priming of the Pathail
pistol has been followed by a flash in the pan.
The whole history of tlie frontier has been made up
of such abortive attempts at revolt, with here and
there an interval of short-lived success. But
though the Pathan is capable of causing the despatch of a considerable quantity of cipher telegrams, these sporadic outbursts are inere side-shows,
and in reality there is an unmarked struggle going
on all the time for the sovereignty over this noman's-land which we call the independent territory.
Western diplomacy is being pitted against Oriental
finesse, and the commercial instinct is being employed t o exorcise the militant spirit of Islam. The
wire-pullers in this little comedy are the Amir
on the one hand and tlie Government of India
011 the other, and the rnawionettes a t the end of
the wires are respectively the inullas and the
inalilcs or tribal headmen.
The problem with which the Govern~nentof
India is now confronted is that of convincing the
maliks, and through them the bulk of the tribes64
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people, that it is useless any longer t o kick against
the pricks, and that in lending an ear t o the fantastic
schemes of the mullas for driving the infidel beyond
the Indus they are only laying up for tllemselves
retribution in the near future, instead of the
treasure in heaven which they so fondly irnag'me.
By no other means will the Pathans be induced
to combine ill any definite action with a view to
putting down raiding or expelliilg firebrands from
their borders. As a race they are too intensely
democratic, and concerted action between the
members of even a small subsection of a tribe
only arises from two motives-one of which is
religious fanaticism, the other self-interest. The
former being a monopoly of the Moslem inhabitants, there remains but the latter to Government
for the accomplishment of its object. Once, then,
that this idea of self-interest, of material benefit,
of something to be gained and of something to be
lost, is aroused in the minds of the tribal elders,
a powerful counter-agent begins to operate against
and gradually to undermine the nefarious influence
of the mullas.
The system that has been adopted for inculcating
these ideas is known as that of "tribal responsibility," by which the lawlessness of this people is
gradually giving way before the better instincts of
more civilized communities-industry, discipline,
and respect for property and authority. Thus, the
inaliks are responsible for the repair and policing
of the roads through their territories, protection
9

REAR

TRIBAL RESPONSIBILITY

of the border, keeping open the passes, prevention
of raiding, expulsion of outlaws from their borders,
restitution of stolen property, etc., for all of which
services they receive allowances in proportion t o
their value to the State. These alIowances can
always be, and frequently are, stopped when the
tribe proves incapable of fulfilling its obligations ;
and this system has been found to worlc well,
especially among the Afridis, who, besides not
being so susceptible to the wiles of the mullas,
have a certain $ail- for the buttered side of
the bread. This was well illustrated in the Zalclca
IChel Expedition of 1908, when the Afridi maliks
evinced no desire t o risk the loss of their allow-

I

ailces by allowing the clans under their charge
to join in the fray.
I n spite of their constitutional hostility towards
us, the Pathans show a decided readiness t o enlist
in the frontier militias, which, since the reincorporation of the Punjab Frontier Force with the
regular army, have been raised in most of the
agencies. These are the Chitral Scouts, Khaibar
Rifles, Rurram Militia, Northern and Southern
Waziristan Militias, forming a force of some 14,000
troops directly under the command of the Chief
Coinmissioner of the North- West Frontier Province. These native militias render invaluable
service in intercepting raiding-parties, but, in spite
of their extreme mobility in this respect, it is
obviously impossible for them t o be on the actual
spot selected by the raiders as their objective,
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unless previous information has been received, and
i n the case of villages near the border it is easy for
the raiders to make a sudden descent and to carry
off their booty to the hills long before the militiainen can arrive to intercept them.
T o remedy this evil the somewhat risky experiment was made last year of rearming%the beadmen of those border villages on whose loyalty it
was felt we could depend. There is, of course,
always the chance of these rifles being used against
us in the future ; but it is not unnatural that
tribes within our border, and entitled to our protection, should consider as rather illogical a situation in which, while debarred from seeking satisfaction in the way most congenial to them-i.e.,
by making counter-raids-they were conlpelled
t o submit to systerntltic plundering without the
means even of offering an effective resistance.
One of the greatest oljstacles that has stood in
the way of the extension of this system among
the tribes is the fact that in some cases the maliks
have contracted responsibilities which, owing to
the democratic spirit of the Pathans, they have
since found themselves unable to discharge. This
is especially the case among the Mahsuds of
Southern Wazhistan, who, besides being inveterate
raiders and more than usually susceptible to
fanatical influences, are democratic to such a
degree that the term " rnalik," as applied to a

* Lord Curzon had caused the disarmament of the border
villages.
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Mahsud, is a ridiculous misnomer. The asseinbly
known as the Mahsud jirga practically includes
the whole tribe. The agreement come to at the
tennination of the Mahsud blockade was signed
by no fewer than 1,565 so-called maliks, each of
whom considered his personal pal-ticipation in the
proceedings indispensable.
From this democratic condition it follows that
the richer, and, on this account, presumably more
influential, rnaliks are not necessarily those best
able to preserve order. Those malilzs, in fact,
who annually received the tribal allowances were,
in many cases, found quite incapable of controlling
the ruclr. of the tribe. Their influence over the
younger' members was nil, and it was found
repeatedly necessary to fine them and to stop their
itllowances.
As age~ztsprovocateurs of the Kabul Anglophobe party, the mullas naturally head the
anti-malilr faction, and in a country where the
inhabitants we steeped in the grossest superstition,
even the mullas themselves being in most cases
ignorant of the true doctrines of the religion they
profess to teach, it is not to be expected that their
hold over the population will be easily loosened.
In spite of the fact that in the Maholnmedan
religion these are, properly speaking, no priests,
the whole country is overrun by an hereditary
hierarchy of mendicant fanatics-hereditary
as
being composed of Saiyids, or descendants of
the Prophet, and Sahibs, or descendants of the
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associatcs " of the Z'rophet, with their innumerable following of " rnurids," or disciples. For all
of these the tribes-people have the profoundest
reverence, and tlieir paves are, after death, places
of pilgri~nngeand the scenes of reputed miracles,
whicli often take thc form of' the grave growiiig
loilgcr us the s:~intly reputation of its occupant
increases. One of these, situated in l'eshawar
Ca~itorlmcrltitsclf', i ~ n dknown as the 4 4 11,zu-gajar,"
or nine - yil~~cler,
:~ttninecl to such L: leilgth that
it thrcatcncd to grow right across the road. One
night, I~o~vcvcr,
tlie c:~ntonment 1n:~gistrate or- .
dai~ledthat a will1 sEioulcl be built round it, since
when it llt~sbccu kept more or less within reasonable bourlcls. 'I'licse " zisr:~ts," or sliri~les,are held
in such respect tllnt the natives, on leaving their
l ~ o n ~ efor
s any lengtli of time, do riot hesitate to
deposit their houscllold v~1u:~bles
near one of them,
in the full certainty of fincling tliem there on their
return. Shriries are frequently erected over the
bodies of Rlusi~lrnans wlio have died fighting
i~guiristthe unbeliever," uild it is not uncommon
to see several of these within s sliort distance of, and
solnetimcs right under, the w:~lls of s British fort.
A t ,Jiuicl.oli~,in Southern FVnziristnn, there is one
itctuillly in the hartled-wire el1tar1glernents that
surroulld the fort. It: is corisidercd u dishonour
for a d a ~ ir ~ o tto possess oiic or more of these
sllrines ; tirirl it is relilted of tlic Znkka Khel that,
being on tliis ucoo~lt~t
r111 ot~jeetof contempt among
tllc other Afridi clans, they oric day induced sn

cc

10

70

I

1
I

I

I

TRIBAL RESPONSIBILITY

exceptionally holy man to visit them, whom they
promptly murdered, thus wiping away the stain
on their honour, and at the same time acquiring
a shrine which soon became the envy of the
surrounding countryside.
Independent territory is divided by a belt of
comparatively non-fanatical tribes-a circumstal~ce
which explains to a great extent the difficulty the
mullns experience in mganizing a simultaneous
rising all over the frontier. Southern Waziristan
is fanatical, and the whole of the Peshawar border
north of the IChaibar (Swat, Bajaur, Buner, Agror,
and the Mohmands) intensely so. Tirah and the
ICurram, however, are little influenced by the fiery
exhortations of the mullas, and though Tirah is
potentially our most formidable enemy on the
frontier, it chooses its own time for a hostile
demonstration, and refuses t o dance to the piping
of every wandering faqir. The following will
illustrate this trait of the Afridis : During the
Mohmand rising of 1908 the Sufi Sahib of Batikot,
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through jealousy of the Hazrat Sahib of Charbagl1,
retired from the Mohmand country, and entered
Tirah, with the intention of raising a lashkar there.
He gave out that he had the power of turning
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bullets into water. I n any other portion of the
frontier this statement would have been accorded
full credence, but the Afridis were not born yesterday. They suggested that he should first give
an exhibition of these powers, deciding that the
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was t o be expected, the lnulla did not care to risk
his skin in this manner, and was hooted out of
Tirali.
It is this non-conducting area t h a t has for so
long frustrated the efforts of the rnullas to bring
about a combined revolt against British rule, and
a point on which it is impossible t o lay too much
stress is that 'I'irnh is the KEYSTONE of the whole
situation. As in 1897, so to-day, the revolt of
Tirah would be the signal for a general rising of all
the Pathan tribes. But as long as Tirah remains
passive, so long will the efforts of t h e mullas in the
more fanatical districts resemble the explosions of
damp gunpowder.
Before the conclusion of the Durand Agreement
the Pathans feared the Amir's designs on their
independence no less than our own, and even
accused hiin of being the friend of the " infidel ";
but now that their freedom has been guaranteed
from attack on that side, they loolr on the Amir as
their natural ally. Even now the frontier from
Mount Sikaram, the western extremity of the
Sofaid ICoh, to the Nawa ICotal in Bajaur remains
undemarcated, chiefly owing to tlze dilatory and
obstructive policy of the Amir, who was astute
enough to recognize the value of such an open
door into our back-yard, which might be utilized
by his emissaries without incurring any responsibility for interfering in affairs on our side of the
line. Little troubles are constantly cropping up
on the frontier below Landi ICotal, and the un-
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demarcated portion of the Mohlnand boundary
is a continual source of danger, as the territory
to which it gives access is a veritable hotbed of
fanaticism and intrigue. For half a century it has
harboured the political riffraff of North-West
Sitana or Hindustani fanatics, the
India-the
mutinous 55th Native Infantry Regiment in 1857,
the Iladda Mulla and his successors, the Gud (Lame)
Mulla and the Sufi Sahib, the Nazrat Sahib and
the Mad Faqir (known also as the Mulla Mastan or
the Sartor Faqir)-and the Mohmand tribe, half of
wllich is Afghan and half independent, surges backward and forward at will, and Afghan lashkars
infiinge the Durand Agreement with impunity.
Whatever measure of success may be said to
have attended Abdurral~man's treatment of the
ccjehad" (holy war) question, he certainly never
succeeded in organizing the fiontier priesthood as
the Amir's brother, Nasrullah, has done. Not only
has the latter been successful in reco~~ciling
to each
other many who formerly were enemies through
jealousy of each other's influence or sect, but he
has created a regular network by which communication is kept up between the northern and southern
parts of the province, and these in turn are in
communication with ICabul.
Formerly the activities of the mullas had been
centred on their own narrow and selfish little
interests. The preservation of their own saintly
reputations and the undermining, b y fair means or
foul, of the reputation of any rival divine, varied
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by an occasional jehad, seemed in their eyes a
praiseworthy aim and object. Many a plot directed
against tlie British failed tlirougl~the petty jealousies
of its authors. Few of them were capable of such
patriotism as the late Akhund of Swat, who, in
spite of religious differences of opinion, used his
influence on behalf of his rival, Saiyid Akbar Shall,
the leader of the Sitana fanatics, to procure his
election as Icing of Swat, a t a time wlle~i tlie
proximity of the British demanded, and the rivalry
between the Swatis deferred, the choice of a recognized leader. Few, lilce him, had the good sense to
perceive that the independence of Swat was inore
easily preserved by adopting a frieildly attitude
towards us than by continual raiding into British
territory.
The reasons that have led Nasrullah to stir up
the mullas t o a sense of their comlnon interests
are t o be found in the general belief, entertained all
over the Mahommedan world, that tlie European
nations contemplate a partition of the entire Islamic
asea that yet retains a semblance of freedom in
Western Asia. Events in Turkey, Egypt, Morocco,
Arabia, and Persia, are followed with anxious
interest. Close touch is maintained with the PanIslamic League. These fears receive daily confinnation in the rumours of proposed railway construction
across Persia, and the discussions about respective
spheres of influence that are carried on in a cool
pkoprietary tone in the newspapers. Moreover, the
advent of civilization and education in these coun-
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tries spells loss of influence to the mullas, whose
power varies in direct proportioil to the credulity
of the masses. Thus the mullas are fighting not
only for tlieir religion, but for their daily bread.
Appearances being decidedly against the European nations, Nasrullali has not hesitated to enlist the
active co-operation of every sect, not even despising
the exiguous remnant of the once formidable body
of fanatical warriors known as the Hindustani or
Sitana fanatics. These at one time had made
themselves inasters of the whole of Yusufzai and
Peshawar, but on the arrival of the British west of
the Indus were hunted from pillar l;o post, until
they finally found refuge among the Amazais of the
Blaclr Mountain, where they have remained since
1888, in spite of a treaty by which the Arnazais
undertook to expel them from their borders. The
elaboration of this scheme was materially assisted
by a " ghaza," or Church Congress, which Nasrullah
caused to be summoned for the discussion of these
and lcindred matters, and secret agents have been
appointed for the maintenance of close relations
with such outlying districts as Southern Waziristan.
For this purpose Ilhost is found to be a very convenient halfway house, since it is within easy reach
of the Mulla Powindah and the Hamzullah
Mulla, and the Khostwals can always be counted
upon to assist in attacks on the Sllias of the Icurram
Valley.* The mullas of Ningrahar, who are both

"

Lala Pir and the Malang Paqir collected a Iashkar here in
1908, t o be used against the Shias.
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influential and numerous, devote themselves to
intrigue in Tirah and the country to the north of
the Ichaibar.
Of the more reinote tribes inhabiting the valleys
on either side of the Chitral Road, in Upper Swat
and the vast tract known as Rohistan, little is
known, and the Government of India rarely comes
into contact with them, except indirectly through
the Nawab of Dir. The strategic value of Chitral
vanished with the cessation of the Russian advance
in the Pamirs and the conclusio~~
of the labours of
the Pamir Boundary Commission, which interposed
the narrow strip of Afghan territory, known as
Wakhan, between the rival empires. But, in spite
of its dangerous isolation, it is thought advisable to
retain a hold on this distant outpost, owing to the
difficulty of getting into the country again should
the necessity arise. The yearly reliefs go up in
October, and from that time onwards the little
garrison is cut off from British territory by 100 odd
miles of treacl~erouscountry and two difficult passes.
A railway runs from Naushera to Dargai, at the
mouth of the Malalcand Pass, and the Malakand
movable column is ever ready to secure the line of
communications. The security of the road is, however, continually menaced by the constant intertribal
fighting that goes on between the Nawab of Dir
and his son, Mian Gul Jan. The signal services and
thorough loyalty of the Nawab for many years
past have always been gratefully recognized, and,
indeed, it is very fortunate that such a large portion
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of the independent territory should be in the hands
of a ruler who is known to discourage the presence
of hot-gospellers in his tei~itories. Quite recently
(December, 1910) the subject-tribes in the Upper
Swat Valley, wrho pay him a yearly tribute, threw
off their allegiance, drove the Nawab's tax-gatherers
hoin the country, and prepued to offer a spirited
resistance to tlle collection of the revenue. The
Nawab immediately collected a lashlrar, and, uaaided by any outside help, soon regained control
over his unruly subjects.
Meanwhile, in other parts of the province, in
spite of occasional set-backs, the tribes-people are
gradually being brought to realize the wisdom of
following the line of least resistance. Every year
fresh evidence is forthcoming to show that the
policy of iinposii~gresponsibility on the rnaliks for
the behaviour of the tiibes under their charge is
one that has been justified by results, and perhaps
the greatest proof of this is t o be found in the
peaceful termination of the crisis through which we
have just passed.
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FROM PESHAWAR TO PARACHINAR

~ TEIE
~ enormous
~
j
mountain
massif of Tirah, forming

the lreystone of the frontier arch, runs down between the Peshawar and Kohat borders to witliia
fifteen miles of the Indus, neatly 11:~lving the
province. I t s eastern extremity is lrnown as the
country of the Jowaki Afridis, and as such is cut
ofl from Tirah proper by the Icohat Pass, which
connects Peshawar and Kohat. The Jowalci
Afridis, like the Galai Afridis, who inhabit the
pass, are a section of the large tribe of the Adam
Khel Afridis.
It was through this pass that I found myself
careering along one December morning a t full
gallop in a dak-tonga on my way to Icohat, e?z
~ o u t efor the Kurrarn Valley and Parachinar. W e
had left Peshawar at half-past ten, and, skirting the
southern wall of the city, past where the " l~ingi"weavers prepare and dye the long woof of cotton
which eveiltually becomes a turban, through the
long avenues of bul-bul trees and the slow-moving
throng of bullock-carts, buffaloes, donkeys, camels,
and other beasts of burden, with their attendant
77
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drivers, had at last reached the open plain. ICohat
is forty miles off, and we hoped to do the journey
in four hours. The first stage of about seven miles
took us fully an hour, and the fresh pair of horses
jibbed at starting. This happened also at the
second change, and at the third the sluggish " near "
horse lay down in the dust, breaking his harness,
or rather its string fastenings. When the tongawallah had induced it to resume a perpendicular
position once more by stamping with an iron-shod
boot on its nose (I made feeble expostulations in
English), more string was produced, and we started
off at a wild gallop. A t Matanni post we changed
horses again, and the shaft-horse jibbed anew. It
is always the shaft-horse that jibs. The " off" horse,
" tied " to the ,tongs with some string and a leather
trace, seldom gives trouble, unless by backing out
into the road at right angles to the shaft-horse, and
outside his trace. Sometimes both horses are
harnessed to a pole, with a kind of iron yoke, which
clanks and clatters when they g d o p in step. But
when galloping out of step, the natural oscillation
of their bodies keeps the yoke always fast against
the pole, and the noiseless seesaw, seesaw of the
yoke goes on like the pistons of a double-suction
pump. Many of the tonga-11orses seem to lcnow
this, and avoid the discordant clank, clatter, clank
of the yoke. A t Matanni we picked up a SubadarMajor of the Frontier Militia, on his way to ICohsLi;,
and with the aid of an interpreter he explained to
me the topography of the pass.
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W e were then just entering the foot-llills of the
Galai
country, and from time to time we passed
bf
groups of tall and wild-looking Afridis, all armed
with modern rifles, for we were now in independent
%
territory. These looked askance at the white man,
4 o lggi$ll I ~ ~ ~ , J
for they were under the displeasure of the Sirkar,
i 8 tr:
II~~CII~~~~
having held up and looted several tongas during
'I ICX1 the tangr.
the disturbances that had occasioned the recall of
:S ~ ' ~ ' l ' i ~ ~ ~ d i c ~ l ~ ~
the Chief Comrnissiol~erfrom England. A little
!t Fa" iron.sl~~d
farther oil the narrow valley began to assume the
*stll\;ltions in
appearance of a Scottish glen, with green fields of
:t t lrl \Ye htrrted
barley on either liaad, and presently we drew up
Wb,
& WL' clla~l~ed
a t a village of the Zarghun I<llel, with its mud:1 1
iiIIt\v, It
walled, fort-like dwellings, its whitened " hujrah "
I 't a t t '.off" horse,
or guest-house, and its " kar1chanav or workshop
F 1 $r ;i!((1 :I lcntl~er
(i.e., rifle-factory). There are six or seven of these
lap. backill! out
rifle-factories in different villages in the Adam I<hel
-9 f ; a it-llorc;e, and
country, and thougli the rifles produced in them
~i t t i i 110r)eii are
cannot compare with those run in from the Persian
i ra .ti t y ~ k e\vhich
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was with great regret that, owing to the strained
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paid a visit to the interior of one of these karkhanas.
For several miles more the road continued to
wind through this narrow valley of low foot-hills,
till of a sudden a sheer blank wall of rock blocked
the end of the valley. Up the side of this wall we
zigzagged, and presently reached Fort Mackeson
at the summit, looking out both ways over the
Icohat Plain and the valley through which we had
just come. Far away through the haze we could
malte out the silver thread of the Icohat River as it
wound its way eastward over the level plain. Below, on the sight, and followhlg the curve of the
hillside, the white ribbon of road floated downwards
like the " paying-off " pennon of a man-of-war.
Away to the left a faint brown scar across the
mountain-side showed where the ancient track of
the Buddhist pilgrims of bygone centuries led
nortliwards to the Himalaya.
A t ICohat I put up for one night at the house of
the Deputy-Commissioner, who was away on tour
at the time. This bungalow was designed and
built by the ill-fated Cavagnari, who was massacred
in Kabul wit11 all his followers during the second
Afghan War. It possesses a central rotundo with a
domed roof, round which the rooms are built, this
design being adopted for the sake of cooliless
during the hot weather. The Revenue Comrnissioner's bungalow in Peshawar is built on the same
plan, and as far as I know is the only other like it,
being an exact replica. During my brief stay in
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KOHAT

ICohat I was indebted for much Iundness to Colorlel
and Mrs. Kennedy, and have grateful ~emembrance
of the hospitality extended to me, and of a pleasant
evening spent with them. Rohat is a deligl~tfully
cool and shady-looking place for a frontier cantonment, and its green foliage is in stsilting contrast
to the barren semicircle of hills which close it in on
the north and west. From rising ground on the
outskirts of the cantonment may be seen the
V-shaped notch in the hills tl~rougl~
whicb the
Ublam Pass leads up to the Miranzai border,
rendered historic during the Afridi revolt of 1897.
It was through here that the main southei-n advance into Tirah under General Loclchart took
place.
Kohat lies on the narrow-gauge railway horn
ICushalgurh on the Indus, and it was along this
railway that I continued my journey westward the
next day to Thall, its terminus. The line follows
the Miranzai border along the southern face of'
the Sarnma Ridge, on whose crest the two forts,
Gavagnari and Lockhart, look down into Orakzai
Tiral~. These two forts are held by the Samana
the surroundRifles, a fi-ontier militia raised
ing tribes. A t Hangu, the " jumping-off place"
for the Samana Xidge, the little train was boarded
by an army of locusts, in the shape of some fifty or
sixty sepoys of the Kurram Militia, just returning
froin furlough to their regiment at Parachinar.
As the train was already fairly full up, and there
seemed no possibility of obtaining any more
11
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carriages, every available footboa~cl and platfonn
was so011 covered with a yelling and writhing mass
of beturbaned strap-hangers, shouting and gesticulating to their friends on distant portions of the
train, and waving good-byes to their relations on
the platform, tvllich seemed as crowded as before.
T h e journey from Kohat t o T h d covers about
sixty miles, and lasts nearly the wl~oleday. Towards evening it was curious to see some devout
Mal~omnmedan spread his prayer-carpet on the
platforln and perform his evening devotions in
the midst of the seething mob, wholly oblivious
for the time to the discordancies of the world
about him. Among this crowd may often be
seen the Powindnh or Icabuli merchants, on their
way down into India. Their tattered clotl~es
and dirty red-bearded hces give no indication of
their means, and for all one can tell the most
ruffianly among them may be on his way t o
Calcutta or Bombay, Sometimes they go even
farther afield, to Australia and even British
Columbia, where I have seen them employed in
sa~nnills. The story goes that one day a British
officer, whose motor-bicycle had broken down on
the way up t o Parachinu, was electrified on being
accosted by a huge bearded Powindah with a
l c Why, hullo, son ! what's wrong with the ' bike'?"
T h o u g h the throng also move black-robed Turi
woinen with covered faces, sturdy Afghan women
with a jingling necklace and breaqtplate of Kabuli
rupees ; buxom, laughing Afridi wenches with their
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THE ICURRAM VALTZY

short kilts, and ever and anon the slrirl of the
" serenai "--the Pathan equivalent of the bagpipes
-is heard above the incessant din.
The Kurrain Valley lies immediately to the
south of Tiral~and the Orakzai country. Itemarkable alike for the beauty of its scenely and for
the friendly character of its inhnbitai~ts,it presents
in this respect a marked contrast to the rest of
the North-West Frontier Province. The entrance
to the I<ul.ram leads through a narrow and b:lrren
defile, commanded by the fort of Thall, which is
situated on an eminence of great natural strength.
Here I passed the night in the dalr-bungalow,
setting out early on the following morning through
the narrow entrance to the valley, to the tune of
the long-drawn, melancholy howl that the tongnwallah extracts fioin his battered bugle as a
warniilg to the natives of the approach of the
mail-tonga.
A curious sight we must present to the sleepyeyed Turi as he watches our approach through the
cold dawn, with a letter or a parcel in his hand for
the post. Strapped on either side over the wheels
are two Peshauri mule-trunlrs, or yalrhdans," and
two bundles of bedding. On the roof of the conveyance is a ragged and unkempt urchin, used
for stmting the ponies when they jib, tying the
harness again when it breaks, and perfoiming odd
jobs of varying utility. Our Jehu is attired in a
khaki militia great-coat, and wears a blue turban,
the end of which is wound round his mouth to
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keep tlie dust out of his lungs. A pair of motorgoggles for the front passenger is not so much
a luxury as a necessity. I n this fashion we proceed
till the mounting sun compels me to change my
cap for a topee, to avoid sunstroke. Presently
we stop at the village of Manduri, and I incakethe
acquaiidance of a hospitable custorn of the Pathans.
The lieadinan of the village, ISalnid IChan, presents himself, and, after the usual salutation, offers
me a cup of tea. TlCs is an invitation which
cannot be refused without giving ofrence. The
best ten-service is brougl~tout-a very fine affair-and n charpoy to sit on, and for once the tea is
excellent. I t is not always so, but one cannot
refuse, even tllougli the sugar has been upset and
piclreil out of the dust by grimy Iiands, as happened
t o ine on one occasion.
After leaving Manduri the valley broadens out
ancl the road sweeps up a gradual ascent to Sadda
Post, some thirty-five miles from Thall, where
the valley takes a sharp bend to the left. On
eitlier liaiid are diminutive fields sur1.ounded by
'' bunds," or balilrs, for irrigation purposes. The
fertile soil here produces two crops annually-wheat
in winter and rice or lndian corn in summer.
The fields descend in terraces to the Kumarn
River, which is perennially fed by the snowfields
of the Sofaid Koh. Chennb-trees of great size
and age afford a pleasant shade to the fortified
villages, which everywhere present an appearance
of prosperity not to be met with in the more arid
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parts of the province. These trees, as convenient
reildezvous for raiders, have each a name by which
they are known to the natives.
A t Sadda Post I met the Political Agent for the
Icurram, Mr. S. E. Pears, t o whom I had a letter
of introduction, and as he had come down from
Parachinar on urgent matters of State, I decided
to stay there with him a couple of days, and return
with him to Parachinar. Sadda Post lies just to
the south of the Charnkanni country, and has
stood a siege more than once, notably in the rising
of 1896. A t the timewhen I was there the village
was full of Massuhzai and Alisherzai clansmen of
the Orakzai tribe, who, with numbers of Turis, had
been summoned to appear in jirga before the
Political Officer.
A s most of the differences between the Government and the independent tribes are settled in this
way, it may not be out of place to present to the
reader a mental picture of one of the more orderly
varieties of jirga.
W i t h a view to creating as much trouble as
possible, the rnaliks, or headmen, of the clan Gave
turned up two days late, only to find that the
Political officer has gone off in his turn in another
direction, apparently oblivious to this manoeuvre on
their part. In reality he had been expecting it.
They are now, perforce, compelled to await his
pleasure, or forfeit the small grant that Govemment generally makes towards their travelling
expenses, which in the case of the more distant
1R
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tribes is, to them, ;l matter of some importance.
When the Political Officer returns, he finds that
the tribe has come in in great force, scenting a
day's feed at Government expense. All the '' greybeards" of the tribe are here, as well as inany of
the younger members, some armed, in number
about 400. The scene presents a picture almost
Biblical in its solemnity, the analogy being
heightened by the Jewish type so prevalent among
the Pathans.
Assisted by the Extra-Assistant-Colnmissioner,
generally s Khan of good local family, the Political
Officer takes his seat, the jirga disposes itself
round him on the ground in a semicircle, and
the discussion begins, graduating in violence
according to the "jungliness " of the tribe. The case
for settlement is as follows: The tribe in question
has gone bail in Rs. 5,000 for the good behaviour
of a notorious outlaw among their number. This
outlaw has since raided a tribe under British protection, carried off much loot and several pi is one^:^,
and escaped through his own country into the
back of beyond. The tribe is now faced with the
knotty problem of rescuing the prisoners and recapturing the outlaw, or of suffering the loss of
Rs. 5,000. What, then, are they to do ? I n spite
of having been badly let in by a "pal," their
sympathies are all with the miscreant, whom they
consider to have performed a very commendable
feat. Had he not succeeded in escaping, their
verdict would have been otherwise, and he would
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have been handed over to justice as a disturber
of the peace. On the other hand, a large sum
of money is at stake, and the Pathan does not
"part."
These little sidelights on the Pathan
character are transparently visible in his choice
of arguments. (I must admit that I was unable
t o follow the arguments, conducted as they were
in the Pushto- tongue, but the dumb-show was
eloquent to a degree.)
See that aged patriarch in the centre, with the
flowing snow-white beard and the dignity of an
Abraham. H e has not said much yet, but sits in
silence, shielding his eyes from the glare of the sun.
The two old men on either side of him are doing
all the talking, and from the tones of their voices it
is easy to see with what cunning deftness they are
putting their case before the Justice of the Peace.
Resignation, aggrieved and pathetic ; indignation,
scornful and well simulated ; wrathful outbursts
and spasms of mock-humility, each in turn fail to
move the Political Agent from his impartial summing-up of the case, in which character-study aids
largely in sifting the trutll from the untruth.
Still the ancient patriarch opens not his mouth,
and holds one with his quiet dignity. No doubt,
as head malik of the tribe, he is too proud to sue
for a slight reduction in the matter of the fine, and
while his subordinates, fioin time to time casting a
pebble on the ground in front of them by way of
emphasizing a point, weave a voluble and circumstantial romance, if haply the fine may be eluded,
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he sits with studied indifference, making a little
pattern with the pebbles at his feet.
But for all his air of dignity, he is not the noble
patriarch you thought him. I n a long life he has
iun the gamut of crime, from petty larceny to
murder, and has seen the inside of Icol~atGaol more
than once. Furthermore, his dignified silence is
not the expression of a wounded pride, but an
indication that, like a spoilt child, he is at this
moment merely very sulky.
From Sadda Post to Parachinar the road runs
parallel to the beetling range of the Sofaid Koh.
None of the passes over this range into Afgl~anistan,
whicli lies beyond, is under 12,000 feet high. The
crest of the range is some 2,000 feet higher, rising
at its western extremity t o a height of 16,620
feet in the snowy peak of Sikaram. To the west
of Sikaram lie the low hills of the Peiwar Icotal,
the point of British territory nearest to ICabul, and
beyond this, again, can be made out the elephantshaped mountain in Afghanistan, over the brow of
which runs the Shutargardan, or Camel's Neclr
Pass, and the road to Kabul. It was through here
that Lord Roberts led his column into Afghanistan
Parachinar is an open cantonment, and, owing to
its altitude of 5,750 feet, would make an ideal hillstation, Here are the headquarters of the Kurram
Militia and the political agency. The whole
British staff, however, only amounts to eight
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men-viz., five officers of the militia, the Political
Agent, a sapper, and a doctor. By these the whole
of this valley, sixty miles in length and in area
about the same size as Cambridgeshire, is administered.
The inl~abitantsof tlie ICurram are Turis. By
religion they are Shias, and have, in consequence,
always been at enmity with the surrounding tribes,
who are Sunrii Mahommedans, by whom they
might well in time have bee11 exterminated. But
in 1893, a t their request, the valley was occupied
by the British, since when the Turis have been left
more or less in peace by their neiglibours. A
small portion of the Bangash tribes in South-East
Tirah profess the Shiah creed, and, like all other
sects, are divided up into factions. These factions
are led by different Saiyids (descendants of the
Prophet), and are at consta~nt enmity with one
another. The Turi Saiyids are divided into two
great factions, of which tlie Mian Murid, whose
present leader, Mir Akbar Mir, resides in T i d ,
though numerically inferior to the Drewandi,
possesses by far the greater power of the two,
owing to the lack of combination among the latter,
and the jealousy which prevents the selection of a
supreme head.
The Turis enjoy a reputation for bravery equal,
if not superior, to that of any other Pathan tribe,
else had they assuredly been exterminated long
since. The raising of the ICurram Militia put
them in a position to defend themselves against
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the Shinwari and Orakzai tribes to the north and
the IChostwals to the south, As in the IChaibar,
so here there are numerous posts along the road,
and communication is kept up between these by
means of heliograph, at which the native jemadars
are adepts. Having learnt the Morse code and its
equivalents in the English alphabet, they are
enabled to speak to each other in their native
language, Pushto, through this medium, even
though in solhe cases they are unable t o write
their own language.
Khost is a small district of Afghanistan abutting
directly on the southern boundary of the IC~~rram
Valley, and jutting out wedgelilre into the Bannu
district. It commands the Bannu road to Miram
Shah in the Tochi Valley, or Northern Waziristan.
When we took over the ICulqramand occupied the
Tochi Valley in 1893-1895, the Amir Abdurrnhman
is said to have exclaimed : " Tl~eseare two knives
in my side 1" With greater justice we might weU
reply that Ichost has been a thorn in ours. Separated from its natural markets, ICohat and Bannu,
the hostility of its inhabitants towards us has
gradually increased, alternating, curiously, from
time to time with intimations that they were ready
to throw over the A m i ~if we would consent to
take over their country. It has for long been a
ready place of refuge for all the blaclclegs of the
border, offering as it does a secure retreat from
which they might harry the Bannu border. Many
a Hindu has been kidnapped and carried off into
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IChost to be held to ransom by the outlaws.
Efforts were from time to time made to procure
the dispersal of these bands, but it would appear
that the Halcim of Khost was in league with the
outlaws, for the raiding never stopped for any
length of time. Emboldened by the distractiolls
that were occupyirig the attention of the autllorities
in other parts of the province all through last yeay,
the raiding became more fiequent than before.
The crisis was reached in September, when a
Jeinadar Adjutant of the Northern Waziristan
Militia, named Muzaffer Shah, together with
several sepoys, was carried off from Datts Ismail
Ichel by a notorious outlaw named Arangi and his
gang. Hitherto the Rhostwals had been content
to direct these personal attentions t o Hindus, but
the capture of a Government servant in the shape
of a native officer of a frontier militia was a direct
challenge to the Government of India. No ransom
was forthcoming, but on November 7 news was
received that the Jemadar had been released, after
a captivity lasting two montl~s. A declaration
issued some days later by the Amir, to the effect
that all outlaws were to be banished fifty miles
from the Durand line, let drop a hint as to the
means by which his liberation had been effected.
Between Thall and Bannu there is a wedge of
independent territory jutting out into administered
territory, and commanding the Rohat-Thall and
ICohat-Bannu roads, through which the raiders
from Khost were obliged to pass. While the
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recent kidnapping of Hindus from the roads was
at its height, a cordon of troops was placed along
a line indicated by Spinwam and Edalr, for the
purpose of intercepting the outlaws. Should the
proclamation of the Amir fail t o produce any
effect, it will probably be found necessary to make
this line a permanency.
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CHAPTER V I I
SOUTHERN WAZIRISTAN

THE development of the railway system in the
North- West Frontier Province, considering its
vital iinportance fsom strategical considerations,
leaves a great deal to be desired. The value of
such schemes as the Icurram Valley and ICabul
River Railways lies chiefly in their more or less
probleinatical utility at some future date, and their
construction can only be justified by the supposition that a t some future date that chain of circuinstances will arise which will lead to the necessity
of lauilching a large force into Afghanistan. But
with regard to the administered districts of the
province it is quite different. Many arguments,
not least of which is tl-ie civilizing effect of railways, can be brought forward in support of their
construction. A t the present time there is no
railway connecting l'eshawar with the sout%ern
portions of the province. T o reach Dera Ismail
Khan, for instance, from Peshawar, it is necessary
t o undertake either a long and uncomfortable
journey of some 200 miles by tonga via Icohat and
Bannu, or an equally unpleasant railway journey
by way of the Attock Bridge and the left bank of
93
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the Tndus. Various schemes have from time to
time been sub ,jzjzsdice for linking up, not only the
northern and southern parts of the province, but
the whole province, with the Baluchistan Agency.
Expense, however, has stood continually in the
way of their redizatio11. But the difficulty of
rapidly transferring troops from Peshawar to the
Derajat constitutes such a weakness in our system
of frontier defence that the question of further
railway construction is recognized in many quarters
as being one of primary importance. Had the
money that was spent on the abortive Ribul River
Railway been expended on a line through the
Kohat Pass to Kohat and Bannu, with a branch
line from Bahadur Khel to Thall, a valuable and
lasting work would have been effected, with, perhaps, less likelihood of stirring up the ill-feeling
of the tribes than there was i11 the former case.
From Bannu the line co~lldthen, in the course
of time, have been continued via Lalci and through
the Pezu Pass, in the IChuttak country, to Dera
Tsmail Khan. From Pezu also, which is in the
neighbourhood of Sheikh Budin, the hill-station
of Scuthern Waziristan, a further extension could
be made south-westward tl~rougll Tarilr to the
mouth of the Gumal. Its ultimate continnation
through the Pass would depend on the state of the
tribes in the Sherani country. A glance at the
map will convince anyone of the undoubted
strengthening in our military position that would
result from sudl construction.
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RAILWAY DEVELOPMENT

No doubt in time something of the sort will
be done, but the midnight change at the miserable
little junction of ICundian, and the bitterly cold
drive on a winter's morning across the bed of the
Indus from Darya IUzau to Dera Ismail, is an
experience that most people would not willingly
undergo a second time. Dera Ismail is separated
from Darya Khan in winter by twelve miles of
*. " '?.rli Of furt\ler
sandy river-bed, with an occasioi~alpontoon-bridge
5 i c i g&P:t,ny(luartcrs ,
over the last remaining threads of the Indus,
IIad
which meander along sluggishly towards the sea.
y,y-G %.
alb\ll liver
I n summer a swollen stream-not very deep, it is
: - .. -,. t 1i rflu~lltlIe
true-extends from bank to bank, and the river.. ;* q*%;hklg;I bmnch
ferries take sometimes as much as eight hours
:.:, 2,* ::i
-.;;Kla;i\k
and
getting across. The reason of this is that the river
:;-,+
- - L,-:;$, pel.
is so encumbered with shifting sandbanla that the
- ;:3 5 i: ill.hl.ling
small steamers have now to steam upstream, and
".! :
t' 5 'TI,I!.I C&,,
now to drop down a little with the current, so as
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to avoid them.
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The track along which we drove across the
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+
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Indus,,changing horses twice, was marked out by
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4 is iR tile
a fence of rushes erected on the windward side
.
. .fr :-~i~]].\t~\iOn
of the road, so as to guard against its obliteration
v*
;i.;iJll eoll]d
by drift-sand. Now and again we traversed tracts
'. .
:,
$ - t;l to tl~c
of low-lying sedge and rushes, known by the
. . .*. .. >:,s.h:ttilr\l:i\i~n descriptive name of jheels "-the
haunt of bittern,
.,,
-. . . . ,#..I I the
~
snipe, and quail. From time to time a artr ridge
.
-?a ,
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scurried across the track in front of the galloping
. -d.
c vJi!,~!\l~~t(d
horses. Whenever a pontoon-bridge came into
a .+
ri;...~4 giik! \s~uId
sight the tonga-wallah would blow a soul-stirring
blast on his broken-winded bugle, to warn all and
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sundry whom it might concern that the mail was
approaching, and that on no account should the
slow-footed caravans venture on the bridge until
it was safely past.
The passage of a kafiln
several hundred yards long is an affair of at least a
quarter of an hour.
The change in the scenery of Dera Ismail Iihan
from that of Peshawar is very striking. A new
climatic belt has been entered. Here the date and
other palms flourish in profusion, and brilliantly
coloured parroquets flash in and out of' their shade,
uttering harsh and discordant cries. 'J.'he bright
sunshine, the whitewashed bungalows, and the
luxuriant green of the vegetation, give the lie t o
its nickname of Dreary Dismal. But t o Live there
is perhaps to understand. Dera Ismail is in constant danger of being engulfed by a sudden change
in the course of the river, and the present site
of the town dates only fivom about half a century
ago. The new Paharpur Canal, whicli takes off
from the Indus some 100 miles farther noith at
Balakot, passes close by here, and falls again into
the Indus a little below. It was intended to
irrigate the country round Psharpur lying to the
north of Dera Ismail Iihan, and to supersede the
ancient and little scientific practice of damming
up the torrent-beds till the water sllould back up
above tlle level of the bi~nks,slid be led off at
right angles oveib the fields. The advantage of
the new canal lies in the fact that it renders
perennial irrigation possible. The old method
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depended entirely on the rainfall, which might
prove insufficient, or, on the other hand, if very
heavy, was more than likely to rush down with
such force from the hills as to sweep away in one
night the huge dam which it had taken the communal labour of several villages six months to
build. Utter famine would in such cases result,
necessitating a remission of the revenue - tax.
When it is remembered that the "rains" are all
over and done with in i ~ b o ~ai t fortnight, it will
be seen how precarious is this method of irrigat'ion.
The new canal is not yet in thorough working
order, and no decision hi~s yet been arrived at
as to what tribe allall be allotted the land which,
through it, will eventually be brought under cultivation. The scheme is known as the Paharpur
Canal Colony, but it is to be hoped that such land
will only be panted to tribes dwelling in the
administered poi-tion of the province, since it
would be as u~ljustas impolitic to grant it to ally
independent tribe when tliere are so many of our
own subjects with better claims. While on the
subject of irrigation I sliould like to inention here
that the general character of the soil a i d the
aspect of the couiitry through which the Paharpur
Canul flows bear a striking resernblarlce to large
portions of Persian Mekran, lota ably the coast21
belt, tllroug1-i which the route of the &Ielu.nll Field
Force lay. Rekrcace to this will be made in u
subsequent chaptcr.
The town of Tank, situutecl forty miles to the
13
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north-west of Dera Ismail Khan and nine from the
independent border, is a t once the terminus of the
tonga service and the jumping-off place for the
Mahsud country. It is also the hereditary possession of the ancient Nawabs of Tank, whose ashes
lie rnouldering in the ruined cemetery in the picturesque palm-garden of the Nawabs. The present
Nawab is something of an eccentric, devoting his
time and his money to the breeding of greyhounds,
hawking and coursing being still n favourite pastime
of the local chieftains in this part of the world.
The Nawabs of Tank have always been bitter
enemies with the tribes of tlie Cl'azil? border,
though they do not appear t o have beer1 very successful in "keeping their end up " against their
aeighbours, but rather to have been utterly at their
mercy until the arrival of the British flag.
To the south of Tank, some forty miles distant,
rises the famous " Throne of Soloznon," the Takhti-Suliman, wit11 its twin peak, the Kaisitr Ghar.
West and north is a level plain, inhabited by
Bhitannis, beyond which a dreary and barren country
rises up gradually to the snowclad peak of Pir
Gal, at least forty miles o f , ill the Derwesh Ichel
country. Twenty-two miles west of 'l1aiik lies the
British outpost of Jandola, arid between this and
Pir Gal is the country of tlic M d ~ s u d s ,coirlprising
in all some forty or fifty square milcs.
Tlle occasion which led me to undertake niy first
camel-ride, from T:mk to ,J:~ndoln,was the anriunl
meeting of tlic hlul~sudjirga, for receiving their
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allowances or paying up the balance of their
fines, as the case might be. The Mahsud jirga is
a byword ainong the tribes from Chitral to the
Gumal for turbulence and L C shaitani '' (devilry).
Our party consisted of the Resident in Waziristan,
Mr. J. Donald, C.I.E. ; Major Jacob, who had come
from Quetta for the purpose of enlisting Mahsud
recruits in the Indian army; and Major Dodd,
Commandant of the Wano Militia and Political
Agent in Southern Waziristan. The cavalcade was
further augmented by our respective bearers and a
couple of sowars (troopers). Thus escorted, we
rode out across the plain towards the wall of mountains. As we approached these the stately head of
Pir Gal sank gradually out of sight, and we were
not to see it again until we stood on the ramparts
of Jandola. The route led up the valley of the
Zam River, and the stream had to be forded many
times. As usual, the way was crowded with herds
of small brown cattle and flocks of goats, being
driven along by wild and unkempt-looking savages,
whose loose cotton pantaloons were girded up
about their loins because of the continual fording
that had to be done. Southern Waziristan is noted
on the frontier for its mutton, and grazing disputes
are not uncommon between the Mahsuds and their
neigl~bours. The Bhitannis especially are always
looking for trouble of this kind by grazing their
flocks on the land that by long usage has become
the recognized ground of the Mahsuds, and though
the former always come off' worst, generally having
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their flocks driven off, yet they never seem to learn
by experience that the M:thsud is best left alone,
Another source of illcome to the inhabitants of
Waziristan is derived fiom the magnificent forests
of edible" pine which clothe the slopes of Pir
Gal and the surrourlding mountains in the Derwesh
Hhel country. These forests are : ~present
t
undergoing, for lack of inore efficient methods, a systen~
of "robber exploitation," by wllich at least a. third
c Hdown they are
of every tree is wasted. I ~ T ~cut
then roughly squared wit11 nrl ndze, until about half
the tree is lying in chips on tlie ground. The balks
of wood that rernain are then laboriously floated
down the Zam River in loiig boorns of pairs of logs
tied end to end, being dragged over the shrtllows
until the plain is reached, wllen they are corlveyed
two at a time on camels into Ti&, :md there sold.
IS n British occupittion of the bTallsud country ever
becomes a fkil cicco71plz',a forest officer would be as
desirable ari addition to the administrative s t a r as
he would be in the forests of Ilir d the present
moment.
The last approach to .Jr~ndola,wlle11 once the
open arn~~hitl~eatse
of liills 1l:ld heen reached, in the
n~iddleof wllich the fort is situated, led past :r little
oasis of fields, lccpt etenlally gllecn by nn irrigation
ditch which led alo~lgthc face of the hillside.
Fonncrly the Sort was tinder the charge of' n single
Bril;isll officer, brrt tlie strain of this solitary life
provcd too great, :111(l. now two aflicers go up from
Dera Ismnil Klinn fur two montlis a t EL time.

I

JANDOLA

Certainly it would be difficult to find a more
depressing and dismal place for a two months'
sojour11 than Jandola. The fort itself is small, the
rooms dark and ill-lit by narrow windows placed
high above the floor, a very necessary precaution
agzinst being shot through the window by some
fanatical "sniper." Officers are not allowed to go
farther than three-quarters of a mile from the fort,
and even then must have an escort. The walls of
tlle mess-room were covered with the artistic efforts
of tlie various people who from time to tiine had
undergone a two months' incarceration within the
fort. Itegimental crests predominated, those of the
19th Punjsbis, 47th Sikhs, and 40th Pathans, being
conspicuous ex:trnples. The homely gramophone
grinding out "The Merry Widow" served in a
measure to distract the mind from thoughts of the
lnarkhor " on the neighbouring mountains-so
near and yet so far. To relieve the daily
monotony of this existence, Major &IcPherson,
40th Patlmns, in charge of the fort at the time of
my visit, had introduced the game of rounders to
the notice of his sepoys, who entered into the spirit
of the gtme as much as we did on the afternoon
of our tirriv:ll. hImy of the PIahsuds who had
itssem1)led iri the " hujra," some 200 yards from the
fort, cairic over to watch tlie game. Among them
wils nn ngerl ihqir wit11 a scarred and wrinkled
face, to wliicli a 1)lixld eye gave a peculiarly mulig11a1ita11d I I I ~ C ~ I I I espression,
~Y
He wtts dressed in
the foulest rugs and carried n heavy bludgeon,
14
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following us about with the most unpleasant persistence, and muttering hoarse maledictions against
us. Hoping t o be rid of him, we presei1ted him
with a couple of annas, which he cast back in OLW
faces with every sign of contempt. H e tvas then
cC moved on " by the sepoys.
It is hard to realize the change that comes over
sucl~a barren and hideous country as this as
evening draws in. The ochre-coloured circle of
hills, that all day has quivered in the heated atmosphere, at twilight takes on a softer hue, and the play
of colour as the s u i ~sinks behind the violet hills
would have caused Turiier, could he have seen it,
t o despise his best masterpieces. As the desert
breeze springs up the opalescent light dies away,
Pir Gal flashes a last pale signal fi-om above Wano
Post, and everything is swallowed up in umber.
A bugle sounds the 6cRel;rea;t"and tlzen the
c c Alarm," and immediately the whole of the troops
in the fort are at their quarters, as if an attack
were impending. This is frequently done for
practice, as the fort is in reality always in a state
of half siege. Every night the barbed wire .that
surrounds the fort is religiously linked up in fi-ont
of the large gateway, and the flares of straw, which
are ignited by a. torch slung down a wire from the
ramparts, are seen to be in ordcr.
TheMalisudsl~avealways been,without exception,
the most turbulent tribe on the frontier, and commit outrages from a sheer irresponsible " Schadenfreude," which no amourlt of fining has availed to
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mitigate. But for rnany years past they have been
under the evil influence of the Rlulla I'owindali, a
fi~rlaticult ~ n du~~scrupulous
mountebank, who has
aspired to recognition by tlle Governrneut of India
;LS the leading rnalik of tlie Mahsuds.
This znan is of the Shubi Khel section of the
hlahsuds, and started life as a vagrant " talib-ulilm" (seeker after knowledge) irl Landidah, an
isolated village in the Bannu district. I l e was the
instig:~torof the night attack on 5Van0 Cainp in
1894, wllen he relnairled un1ieroic:~llyin the rear,
besting a drum, while his yelling accomplices
rushed 1ie:~cilongin among the lines of tile Waziristan Deliinitation Escort. Froin this time dates
liis influence in Soutllern TiiTi~zii~istaii.Ilis position
was still f~lrtllersherigtllened in 1000, when in a
weak moment he was accorded an interview wit11
the Political Officer, by which action Goverillnent
virtu;~llyrecog~lizedllinl as u chief of the Mahsuds.
This was one of the greatest inistakes that could
have been inade, and it h:~staken years to undermine the position he gained ill consequence of this
~neetirlg. Alllong other things, it precipitated the
crisis whidl led to tlic estr~blishmentof the Blallsud
1)lockncXe in 1!)00-01, :~ndliad its indirect efTects ill
tIlc rrlurders of Captairl Bowring in 1904 nncl of
Coloxlcl I-Iarnlail ztnd Captain I>o~i:tldsonin 1'305,
in which tllere is little cioubt that tlre ~nullalrud a
ha~ld.
'I'llis winter tlw RIulla Z'owi~ldah nnnouncerl his
intcotiori to bc present at tllc delibcri~tiorrsof the
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jirga in a manner which suggested that he
expected the Political Officer to come out a mile
on the road to meet him. I-Ie was coldly informed
that he might come as an ordinary Blahsud if he
liked, but that he would be accorded no status as a
malik. Incensed at this slight to his dignity and
blow to his prestige, he promptly sought to incite
the Mahsuds to some act of violence, in the hope of
breaking up the jirga. I n this, however, he was
unsuccessful, which may be taken as a good omen
for the future, and as an indication of the gradual
decline of his influence.
The usual delays had postponed the assembly of
the whole of the jirga for several days, with the result
that I was reluctantly compelled to return to Peshawar in the middle of the most interesting part, so as
to be there for Christmas. However, on the f i s t
day, which was chiefly taken up with settling the
afore-mentioned grazing disputes, the opportunity
occurred of taking several good photographs.
While on the way back to Tank by a different
route from that by which we had come, in the pass
not a mile away, had we known it, was a party of
Mahsuds just returning from a raid on certain
Uhitanni flocks pasturing in the plain. Two days
later, at the final sitting of the jirga, n free fight
nearly occurred between the Derwcsll I111el Wmirs
and the Mahsuds, owing to some trivial debt. The
majority of the tribes-people could not have known
the cause of the dispute, yet tliey showed theinselves perfectly ready to join in the frt~y,ancl it was
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by the merest chance that bloodshed was avoided,
through the presence of mind of Major Dodd, the
Political Officer, who threw up the rifle of a man
who was about to fire. This man admitted that
he had not the faintest notion what the quarrel
was about, and was grateful for having escaped the
sword of Damocles in the shape of a blood-feud
for the rest of his life.

CHAPTER VIII
TIiE POLICY O F NON-INTERVEN'TION
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WITHthe formation of the N ortll-West Frontier
Province was also definitely adopted the policy
of non-intervention, or " co11cili:~tory policy,"
which had beer1 laid down for the guidance of the
Government of India two or three years before by
the Secretary of State in a coillprehensive despstcli
of January 28, 1898. The kernel of this despatch
was admitted by Lord George Hi~rniltonin a later
com~liunicatiorlto be a cclimitatio~l
of your intcrference with the tribes so as to " (quoting the
despatch) avoid the extensioil of administrative
control over independent tribal territory." This
policy, of which the advantages had been previously
fully recognized even by Sir Ztobert Sandeman,
the " moving spirit " and very embodirnent of tlie
pri~icipleof the c c forwc~rdpolicy," was ill reality
no new cleparture fiom tlie plmactice of' fbrrner
lndian statesmen, si~icc it lltld heal, wit11 the
exception of the taking over of t l ~ cKurrani Valley
in 1892-98,consistc~ltlyfollowe(1 in respect of the
whole frontier to the north of the Gumul. The
reasons for wllich tllc forward policy carnc to be
'&
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adopted, with such admirable results, on that part
of the frontier known as British Baluchistan were
almost entirely unconnected with any immediate
and pressing need of controlling the tribes on that
border. It was the anxiety felt at the rapid
advance of Russia in Central Asia towards the
Oxus, and the strategical advantages which the
possession of Quetta would confer on us in the
event of a Russian war, that rendered imperative
the subordination of mere expediency in local
affairs to those larger questions which might turn
the scale against us in a Russo-British worldstruggle for the Asiatic continent. Had it not
been for these insistent military reasons, Sir Robert
Sandeman, as he admits in his memorandum of
September 27, 1890, would have remained an
advocate of the policy of non-intervention.

" As regards the extension of British control
over the frontier tribes not subject to the Arnir,
I would urge that the poIicy of conciliatory interyention has been forced upon us. It is an
absolute necessity that we should defend the
Kabul, G hazni, and Ilandahar line in Afghanistan
in case of war with Russia. Were this not the
case I would be an advocate of masterly inactivity
instead of conciliatory intervention, and I sl~ould
consider it a mistake t o make any attempt to
include within our control the fringe of independent
tribes which lie between ourselves and Afghanistan
proper. "
With the disappearance of the Russian peril the
forward policy &Us to the ground.
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That the forward policy has never seriously
been put into practice in the North- West Frontier
Proviilce shows how early i t had been recognized
by the military advisers of the Government of
India that, wit11 the advent of the Russians on
of :t foreign
the middle Oxus, the point d)~zppz~i
invasion had shifted froin Peshawar t o Quettn,
from the Rhaibw to the Bolan Pass, and from the
plain of ICabul to the desert wastes to the northwest of Ibndahar. With regard to n liussian
advance, it is now almost universally recognized
that the Hernt-ICandaliar route is the only thinkable
line. I n British Baluchistan we hold the key to
the situation, with Icarachi as a, base, Peshawar as
a right, and Gwadur or Pasni on the Mekran
littoral as a coi~venientleft. The railliead of the
Sibi-Quetta line is now at New Charnari, that of
the Russians at Icushkinsky Post or Icushk, sliglltly
nearer to I-Ierat than New Chaman is to Randnhar.
A s all the world knows, materials are held in
readiness at both places for building a railway to
Herat and to Kandahar. The Russia~ls coulcl
probably accomplish this it1 a shorter time than
o~zrselves. That is all. Armageddon would then
be fought in the nortllerrl part of the I-Ielmand
Desert, wliicll, lies in between.
Althougll the pertinacious aclvocncy of the
extension of the principles of the forwarcl policy
to the frontier 1iort11of the Guznt~lis an Iiereditury
trait amounting almost to rnonometrlil~nlnong the
frontier military, yet i t will be seen thttt iri the
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absence of any special reason, sucIl as that which
led to the permanent occupation of British Baluchistan, the arguments adduced in its favour were
not held to be sufficiently cogent t o warrant its
application on the Pathan frontier. Here the
danger of arousing the active aniinosity of the
tribes-people,possibly precipitating a general frontier
rising, is thought to outweigh any strategical advantages that inight accrue from such extension
vis-b-vis the Russian question. The tranquillity
of the fi'ontier, in short, dominates all other
considerations.
As evidence of this rnay be instanced the refusd of the Government in 1904 to comply with
the request of certain Orakzai tribes of the Shiah
faith, like the Turis of the Rurram Valley, on
the southern confines of Tirah, to be taken under
British protection, their land to be administered
as British territory. This refusal was given
face of the recommendation of the military advisers of the Viceroy, who professed themselves
ready, on its adoption, t o withdraw the regular
troops fiom the Sarnana Ridge, and t o replace
them with tribal militia. At the same time this
recommendation w3s accompanied by another, in
which it was urged that the time had come when
we should gradually extend our 6'close control"
up to the Durand line (Parliamentary Papers,
N.TV.F,,Cd. 4201). The refusal of the Government was actuated by their disinclination to risk
kindling the spark of disaffection among the Afisidi
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tribes to the north, wliose country would have
been made-for them-unpleasantly accessible to
British troops. Evidence of the feeling in Tirall
again& such a move was forthcoming ill an unmistalcable manner while the subject was still
under discussion.
Instances where tribes have requested t o be
taken altogether under British control, in spite of
their well-lmown love of independence, are by no
means uncommon, and among these may be cited
the Mallsuds, on all sides admitted to be the most
independent and intractable tribe on the frontier.
A t no time since the demarcation of the frontier
by the Duraiid Mission in 1893 was so mucli care
lavished on this poition
of our Indian Empire as
during the years of Lord Curzon's and Lord
Minto's administl.atio~is. Not only were the
frontier defences entirely reolganized, arid the
administratio~limproved by the formation of the
North-West Frontier Province, but this new
policy, to which I have already alluded, was
adopted towards the tribes. As an experiment
this innovt~tion was well worth tlie trit~l; as a
ntocZ7t~vivcndi it is as good us any that have been
tried. And thougk i t would he useless to cl:~i~n
for it that it has in any way provided the solution
of tllc fi*ontierprol)lem, yet it would not be fair
to attribute to it clircctly those rcgrcttable iiicidents that have occurrecl sirlc!c its inception. Rfr~ny
Icssons tnnd much vt~lunl>lecxperiencc hnve been
gained from it, which would not have been learnt
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in the school of the forward policy. It has
served more than anything else to throw light
on Afghan intrigue, and to show which way the
wind is blowing in our buffer State.
During the whole of the period mentioned not a
single square mile of territory was acquired, and
in the only expedition of importance this principle
was set forth in the most emphatic terms by the
British Government, that " neither immediately
or ultimately, directly or indirectly," should there
be any idea of annexation ; and though attempts
were made t o improve communications by the
construction of here a metalled road, there a railway, these have been either necessary for the
p-otection or convenience of our troops or complementary to our defensive alliance with the
Ainir, and their construction has in every case
been subject t o the consent of the tribes through
whose territories they pass. Furthermore, owing
to some inexplicable change of policy a t the India
Office, in two cases where strategical railways were
in course of construction these have been abandoned. These were the Iiurram Railway, in which
work never proceeded farther than the acquisition
of the right of way and the construction of the
station bullgalow a t Parachinar, which is now its
only memorial ; and, secondly, the Loe Shilman
or Kabul River Railway, on which work ceased
some three years ago.
By these conciliatory methods it was designed,
in the words of Mr. Chirol, to "win over the tribes
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by consent." The demarcation of the Durand line
had left a bad taste in the inoutl~sof the tribes
on our side of the line. I t was natui:al that they
should fear that this was but the pre1imin:try step
to the occupation of their country-a feeling which
the mullas were careful to stimulate with dark
references to the fate of Egypt and the probable
fate of Persia. It was thouglit tlmt by calming
these fears and by showing thenl that we had no
designs on their territory beyond the exclusion of
Afghan iniluences and tlie security of the persoils
and property of British sul;jects, we sllould gain
the coilfidence of the tribes-people, and the raiding
would eventually cease.
But the Pathan has always been an inveterate
raider, and consisteiltly hated and iriistrusted us.
Had we been able to exclude Afghaii firebrands
from Tirah, TVsziristan, and the Mohn~and
country, success might have follo~ved. For, in
spite of the treachery, the cruelty, tlie avarice,
and tlie cunning with which most writers have
hitherto credited him, one carlrlot help feeling a
parig of admiration for liis high courage, oiterl
lieroism, liis powers of endurance, aiid lis manliness--q~lualities which 11eed but to be developed
to make lii~ninto the sple~ldiii1nateri:~lof wliicli
tlie frontier militias can show sucli conspicuo~is
exaxnples. Ilere, one feels, is bettcr stuir?tlit~ntlie
flabby clown-countryniarl,with his tiiriid cireminac!y,
arid one urho, could wc but overcome this secmingly insuperable barrier of mistrust illid ~nisuncler-
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standing, would not be insensible to the benefits
of ordered government, nor turn and rend the hand
that gave it. For in their dealings with us tlley
have shown themselves not always oblivious to the
higher dictates of honour; but in many things
the Pxthan is a spoilt child, and must be treated as
such. It would be foolish to judge him by our
ow11 standards of right and wrong. Murder to
him is not a crime, but a creed; robbery a social
duty. H e fails t o grasp the theory of punishment,
though admitting its pmctice with sulky resentment. Childish in his mental attitude towards our
parental corrections, he is apt to be suspicious of
our kindnesses, and to attribute wrong motives
to any leniency shown him. Philantl~ropyis lost
upon him. It does not enter into his conception
of the social virtues. T o him might is right, and
any clemency is put down to the score of weakness.
A policy of " masterly inactivity " leads him t o the
conclusion that we are incapable of taking his
country from him, and one of concession that we
dare not. As this opinion gains ground among
the tribes-people, so the danger of a rising increases.
And so the raiding continues, and the cry goes
up that the " conciliatory policy " is a leaky vessel.
Whenever the disturbances show signs of abating,
a judicious prod with the Afghan stick is sufficient
to stir the smouldering fires of fanaticism, and to
cause little fires among the mountains, which, if
neglected, threaten to spread and t o cause a vast
conflagration. And this is, in fact, what has been
15
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happening. Tlzere can hardly be any doubt that
the activities of the fanatical Mulla Powindah
among the Mahsuds, as well as the martial ardour
of the Zalrltu Khel, and the ruinours of conspiracy
between the tribes north and south of the Kabul
River, derive their motive force from Kabul. A t
the Mdlsud jirga held a t Jaizdola at the end
of December, 1910, it was known that the Afghan
Government had taken measures to keep themselves fully informed of its proceedings.
Disgusted by an apparen1;ly week-kneed policy
of' indecision, which forbids any firm grappling with
the situation, and all unaware of the higher policy
to which the local questions of the frontier must
always be subordinated, it is hardly a matter for
surprise that some voices are raised more and more
as tirne goes on in favour of a reinitiation of
the forward policy as the only solution of a very
difficult problem. *
Looking at the question of moving up to the
Durand line merely as a question of theoretical
policy, and without regard to the situation at the
present moment, both on the frontier and in India
-in other words, to the fitness of the opportunity
-there is much to be said on either side.
Viewed from the purely military standpoint,
there can be no doubt as to the desirability of an
advance. The only alternative involves a pusillanimous retreat, and tlze formation of a strong
line of defences on what is known as the "inde-

*

See note at end of chapter.
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pendent border." Being at right angles to the
Durand line, our present position violates one of
the elementary rules of strategy. Should the
internal condition of Afghanistan ever necessitate
our intervention-a
by no means hypothetical
contingency-our only lines of advance are flanked
on either side by presumably hostile tribes,
demanding a force for the protection of communications altogether out of proportion to the
actual fighting force employed. I n the event of
a border rising these isolated posts form a positive
weakness, as they are easily cut off and have to
be relieved. The siege of Chitral in 1896 and the
burning of Landi Kotal in 1897 are cases in point.
It is evident that the Government realize the
insecurity of these posts, since from time to time
the question of evacuating the Wana Plain in
Southern Waziristan is raised, and the retention
of Chitral has already been condemned by expert
military opinion. The cumbrous machinery by
which we retain our hold on this remote stroiighold is in itself a demonstration of the risks we
run in this direction.
Opportunities, to be sure, have not been lacking
had we intended to occupy the country. There
is even reason to believe that a few of the tribes
would secretly welcome our coming as a means to
putting a stop to their blood-feuds, which in some
cases have assumed such proportions as to threaten
the extinction of whole clans, and that they would
only make a small show of resistance, in order to
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save their face " and to satisfy their own honour.
As far back as 1880, when the Mahsuds sacked
and burned Tank, at the supposed instigation of
Shere Ali, the punitive expedition which followed
in 1881 found the Mahsuds not inimical to a
British occupation of their country.
But militmy opinion differs from political, and
political opinion differs according as to whether its
source is north or south of Tirah, which, running
eastward as the country of the Jowaki Afridis to
within fifteen miles of the Indus, cuts the NorthWest Frontier Province neatly into two. The
nearer one approaches to the Baluchistan Agency
in the south the more the methods of Sandeinan
find favour ; but at the same time it is impossible to
conceal the fnct that the Khaibar is the pivot on
which turns tlie frontier question, and that on its
needs policy will be moulded and the event decided.
One of the most plausible arguments of the
Baluch school is that the occupation of British
Baluchistan has resulted in the complete pacification of that district. Deprecating the suggestion
that the Baluch character is not so fiercely warlike
as the Pathan, its votaries point out that north of
the Sibi-Quetta line the Zhob Valley is, in point of
fact, inhabited by l<alrar Pathans. T o clinch this
argument the occupation of the ICurram Valley is
cited. Where else in the province can one point
t o an open cantonment, as in Parachinar, only
fifteen miles from the Afghan border, and fiftyseven from the nearest British fort-that of ThaI1,
cc
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where even the dak-bungalow is situated for safety's
sake within the walls 1
It cannot be denied that, as a result of taking
over the ICurram, the valley now presents, in the
material prosperity and friendly character of its
inhabitants, a marked contrast to its independent
neighbours. But it must not be forgotten that
the 'I'uris owe us a debt of gratitude for having
saved them as Shia Mahoininedails, from extermination by their surrouading enemies of the Suilrii
persuasion-Shinwaris and Orakzais to the north,
and Khostwals to the south-and that it was at
tlieir express invitation that we marched up the
valley. Moreover, by so doing there was no
chance of raising disaffection in Tirah through a
mistrust of our ulterior motives on the part of
the Afridis. As for any comparison that Baluchistan may be thought to afford wit11 the Nol-tllFrontier I'rovince, the differences between
the two in respect of distance from the Afghan
capital and of populatiorl per square mile contribute to render unreliable any conclusions based
on inference from one to the other.
On the score of expense, too, serious objections
can be brought, not so much on account of actual
inilitary expenditure nt the time, but because the
revenue to be derived fro~nEL tract of country
which, when not desert, is poor grazing land, would
never support the army of revenue officials necessary for its collection. True, there are forests in
Southern TYaziristun which might produce con16
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siderable revenue, but these are chiefly owned by
the Derwesh IChel Wazirs, a tribe t o whom it
appears we have virtually passed our word never to
attempt to make them pay revenue. Thus the funds
for running the administration would have to coine
out of the pocket of the already overburdened Indian
taxpayer. Nor does irrigation hold out any prospect of converting independent territory into a
paying proposition," because, owing to the liinited
quantity of water available, for every new area put
under irrigation, a similar area goes out of cultivation. It was calculated that if a scheme for
irrigating 7,000 acres in ICurram-where taxes are
nominal-were put into operation, a corresponding
area in Bannu, which yields a considerable revenue,
would be turned into a desert.
But there are even inore pertinent objections
to a forward movement being made, with which
the perils of the moment are intiinately connected.
Were we to absorb independent territory, our
administrative boundary would be conterminous
with that of Afghanistan, and continual friction
would ensue. Outrages committed by independent tribes can be punished according to British
law or tribal custom without loss of prestige to
Government ; but such offences, when committed
by Afghan subjects in British territory, constitute
an act of aggression, and international issues are
immediately thereby raised. The Amir would
then no longer be able to shelter himself under the
specious plea that he is no longer responsible for
i
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outrages perpetrated in independent territory.
Any untowi~rdincident in that case would spell
Habibullah's downfall, for he would stand between
the devil and the deep sea. On the one hand he
must live up to the agreeinents which his father
made with the British Government, and which is
the price he pays for our support ; on the other he
must face his brother, with the whole weight of
n fanatical l~ierarchyat his back.
I n short, were we to occupy independent territory we should inevitably be drawn into a war
with Afghanistan-a
war of far - reaching consequences, and a responsibility against the assumption of which all the canons of common
sense combine to militate.
For in the present condition of India sufficient
troops could not be spared for such an enterprise,
and it is doubtful whether reinforcements from
home could be counted on. Furthermore, a war
with Afghanistan would alienate the 70,000,000
Mahommedans in India, on whose support we can
rely, at any rate for the present, owing to their
rivalry with the Hindu population. Then there
would be the question of holding Afghanistan,
which would constitute n severe drain on the
Indian exchequer and inlrnobilize some 80,000
n
could obvitroops. For this service F r ~ t l ~ atroops
ously not be selected, and it would probnbly be
found necessary to incret~setheir pay considerably
befbre Sikhs or D o p s could be got to serve there.
It is now barely three years ago that we were
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saved, by the conclusion of peace with the Zaklca
Ichel, froin being involved in a cornbilled rising
of the tribes t o the iininediate 1101%11and south of
the Khaibar, which, for reasons which need not
be entered into here, would almost certainly have
precipitated a war with Afghanistan. Practically
the same thing occurred again in the autumn of last
year, and this tiine the whole border from Chitral
to the Taltllt-i-Sulimsn was looking to the Zakka
IChel for a sign that was never given.
Whatever inistalres have been made in the past,
it will be seen, with this knowledge t o guide us,
that our duty lies, not in " rattling the sabre," but
in backing up the " man on the spot," whose efforts
are at this moment directed towards staving off
the explosion which all are agreed must come
sooner or later, and, in the meanwhile as far as
possible minimizing the effects of an evil, which it
is impossible to root out, well lmowing that in
the hold we have over the trade-routes into India
we wield a weapon less dangerous than c c cold
steel," but of proved efficiency.
N o ~ ~ . - r i d e article in the Globe of October 15, 1910 :
situation has now become intolerable, and the condition of the frontier to-day is a disgrace to any civilized nation
which pretends t o rule and give security in an alien country.
What we have now to ask ourselves is whether i t is not time for
us t o yeconsider our frontier policy, and t o advance our administration gradually up to the Durand Line. .
The reader may judge for himself what reliance may be
placed in this exponent of frontier policy, who, a few lines
farther down, refers to Dir and Upper Swat as among those districts that have al.ready been taken over by t h e Administration.

". . . The

. ."

A CRUISE I N THE PERSIAN GULF

IThad been my intention to return to England via
the Persian Gulf and the Baghdad-Aleppo route,
Karachi
and with this object in view I sailed
on February 9 in the British India S.S. Dzvarka,
fast mail for Muscat, Bushire, and the head of the
Gulf. Fate, however, decreed otherwise, and a
month later I found myself once more in Karachi.
Early on the morning of the second day out the
high Arabian tableland which backs the Sultanate
of Oman inland came faintly into view in the
offing, and an hour or two later we steamed slowly
into Muscat Harbour, past I-I.M.S. Fox,one of the
cruisers engaged in the gun-running blockade.
With the customary salute of three guns in honour
of the Sultan, we came to anchor opposite the
solitary gunboat which constitutes the Sultan's
navy. A n hour later, from the veranda of the
British Consulate, I watched the Dwarka steam
away for Busliire, while far away to the north a
tiny panache of smoke on the sky-line, showed
where the "slow mail" was labouring on her way
to Jask, on the opposite Persian coast.
121
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The little cove of Muscat, with its tiny town
huddled together at the base of the cliff's, is a
picturesque and compact little place. On either
hand, overlooking the town, rise the twin castleslast remnant of Albuquerque and the Portuguese
dominion-with their serried tiers of cannon pointing in every direction. Some oP these, on a visit to
the more easterly castle, called Fort Jellali, proved
to have the five bezants of Portugal emblazoned
on the barrel, while others had the monogram G.R.,
and are the remains of the armament of a British
6 5 7 4 " presented to a former Sultan by the East
India Company. The western castle is fast falling
into ruins, and quite recently a large mass fell away
from the wall of the central keep, which now
presents a similar appearance t o the cc gesprengte
Turm" of Heidelberg. The Constable of Fort
Jelldi is a Subadar in the Sultan's bodyguard. H e
was an aged man, and excused himself from accompanying me over the castle on the plea of astlma.
I asked him if he would allow me to take his
photograph, but this he also declined, on the ground
that he was not in uniform. On the eastern face
of the castle-that is to say, on the seaward sidethe ground slopes away to a sally-port a t the foot of
the hill. From above a long line of whitish cliffs
can be seen stretching away to the south-east, with
never an inlet or bay, t o the heights of Jabal
Al~htar,in the dim distance. Far below, a dhow is
beating up the coast in the teeth of a strong breeze,
and in imagination it is easy to conjure up the
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scenes of bygone times, when Muscat was the home
of piratical slave-traders and corsairs, sweeping the
seas from Cape Mussendarn to Ras-el-Hadd. For
all that, the Portuguese castles give a' curiously
Europeail air to the scene, as of the Western
Mediterranean. One could imagine almost that
the castle were inhabited by ICniglits Templar, and
that the pirates were the Moorish corsairs of the
African main.
At the back of the town rise barren and pointed
peaks of no great height, quivering in the heat, and
each surmounted by a watch-tower. These watclitowers are found to be needful in case of any sudden
attacli: by the nomad Bedouins of the interior, an
occurrence by no means infrequent in former years.
At night-time the watchmen in these towers keep
up an incessant chant in a minor key, calling from
one to the other a mournful refiain, which produces
a curiously melancholy effect when heard for the
first time. It is this mournful chant and the still
tropic night of Muscat that constitutes the individual charm of the place, and it is that which
comes into my mind as I look back to the week I
spent there.
The streets and bazaars of hhscat are narrow
and dirty to a degree, and peopled with the most
hideous speciinerls of huinanity that I have ever
seen. Ordinarily the men are wiry and of an unmistakable Arab strain, but the women-at least,
those that are to be seen in the streets-are of negro
or Suaheli origin, with flat noses, thick lips, and an
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oily and repulsive appearance. Whether from
personal vanity or from sheer coinpassion towards
the unwilling spectator, they wear a black mask
or visor, which still furthcr contributes t o tlieir
terrifying ugliness. The inhabitants live chiefly on
fish and dates, a large quantity of which is imported
from the opposite coast of Mekran. Tunny are
caught and offered for sale on the beach, where by
midday may be seen a festering heap of ichthyological remains, sweltering under a swarm of flies.
The town itself is surrounded by walls, there
being two gates on the landward side : the Little
Gate, which leads nowhere in particular, and the
Great Gate, which leads through a pass to the
neighbouring village of Mattarah, about tliree miles
up the coast. Mattarah is the commercial quarter
of Muscat, and from thence all the caravans start
for the interior of Arabia. Muscat is unapproachable from inland except by this route. To gain
the town from the side on which the British Consulate is situated, it is necessary to pass through a
gate over which is still a banner with the word
" WELCOME
" in large letters, which was put up on
the occasion of Lord Curzon's visit t o the Gulf in
1903. These three gates of the city are always
locked at night, for fear of a Bedouin raid.
As the centre of the arms traffic in the Gulf,
Muscat naturally bristles with rifle depots and
stores. The Custom House quay is seldom unencumbered with cases of rifles and ammunition,
-whileevery other shop in the bazaar is a rifle-shop

THE ARMS DEALERS

1RS

There is a certain ainouiit of humour in a situat'Ion
in which a British cruiser is actually tit anchor in
the harbour, with a dhow loaded to the water-line
with rifles and ammunition almost within a cable's
length of her, a Custom House quay fairly crowded
with large wooden crates coiitainiiig the same, and
a baza:~simply bursting with arms and ammunition.
But the laugh is on our side, and P am credibly informed tliat, owing to the tho~oughnessdisplayed
by the blockading squadron, there are now in
Muscat itself a t least 200,000 rifles and probably
3,000,000 rounds of ammunition for which a market
cannot be found. Prowling through ,the town one
day, I entered a house, and was shown upstairs by
an obsequious chuprassi to an upper room, where an
Arab was sitting at a roll-top writing-desk, directing
the operations of two servants, who were packing
up box after box of Indian rupees, ready for being
despatched to Karachi. I appeared to have chosen
a busy time for my visit, but made myself known
as an English traveller wishing to see as much of
Muscat as I could. I learnt that my interlocutor
was Ali Musa, the agent for Messieurs Goguyes
Frbres, tlie principal arms-traders in Muscat. Ali
Musa is an Algerian, and we conversed in French.
He told me that les afaires were not progressing
as satisfactorily as dnns le iemps, owing to the
watchfulness of the blockading squadron. H e
hinted, however, that the trade was not yet at an
entire standstill by any means, and that secret
channels of egress existed, which were being devel-
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oped, and which would prove troublesome to us in
the future. After this he became more reticent,
and I took my leave. On the whole there is little
hostility to Englishmen in Muscat, whose inhabitants take a sportsmanlike zest in outwitting us if
they can, taking defeat with good grace and a
smile, which tells that they do not consider themselves t o have had altogether the worst of the
game. A friend of mine told me that one day he
went illto the bazaar to buy a rifle, but that the
vendor refused to sell him one, saying, "If you
want rifle, you go and get him out of sea." This,
of course, had reference to our practice of " dumping captured rifles overboard.
To the courtesy of Major Trevor, the British
Char@ d'Affaires in Muscat, to whom I also owe
a debt of gratitude for his kind hospitality to me,
I owe i t that I was received by the Sultan, and,
though it was impossible to touch on any subject
however remotely approaching political questions,
or those connected with gun-running, yet sufficient was said to convince me that a very real value
is placed on the continuance of friendly relations
between Muscat and the Government of India.
The Sultan received us at the door of his palace,
and led us upstairs to a room on the first floor,
overlooking the harbour. On a black-and-white
marble floor, in the middle of the room, was ail
oak table, on which stood a globe of the world, to
which he frequently referred in tlle course of our
conversation. Round the table were a few chairs,
"
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and a divan ran the length of one wall, which
was decorated with steamship notices of the North
German Lloyd and other lines. On a shelf stood
two enorinous " beaked " coff'ee-pots, of the kind
usual in the Gulf. Presently the Sultan rose and
conducted us into an adjoining room, and proceeded
to put oil an embroidered robe of State, which I
gatliered he had worn at the time of Lord Curzon's
visit a few years before. This apartment was furnished in a more Oriental style than the first, the
walls being decorated with mirrors and coloured
glass. On the table was an emu's or ostrich's egg,
several shells, and numerous European novelties
and knick-knacks, and in one corner was a telephone, connecting the palace with two I'ortuguese
forts. The Sultan is a middle-aged man, inclining
to stoutness, wit11 a manner in which dignity and
bonhomie contend for the mastery. The following
day I happened to meet him again in the bazaar,
taking a morning stroll with his Court. H e was
dressed in a Norfolk jacket and wide, baggy
trousers, and wore a turban. H e had just been
inspecting his stable, which consisted of a number
of well-bred Persian horses picketed in an open
space in the town. As there is no possibility of
riding, or even exercising, them in Muscat, it is
difficult to see for what reason they are kept,
unless it be that in every Arab there is implanted
the love of horse-flesh.
The little European community that is condemned to pass a few years in Muscat consists of
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a French, an Italian, an American, and a British
Consul-there is not yet a German Consulatea British telegraph-master, a British doctor, and the
agents of one or two trading firms. Lawn-tennis is
the only form of recreation which it is possible to
obtain, and the little colony meets in the evening
for a set or two, to which the cruisers in the
harbour contribute sometimes a welcome addition
in players. Lunching one day on board the Fox,
Captain Hunt showed me afterwards an ingenious
invention which he had contrived for fishing at
see while under steam. It was an automatic
device for taking up the strain on the line when
tt fish was caught, and obviated the necessity of
keeping a constant watch on the line. By a system
of weights attached to the line, which had been
rove through a block at the masthead, a fish of,
say, twenty-five pounds would raise a shot of approxitnately the same weight, with a ivsh halfway
to the truclr, and would be brought up gradually by
the second weight attached farther down the line
coming into play. Should a fish of 100 or
even 150 pounds weight be hooked, the weight
would be thus automatically increased, as the
successive shot were raised from the ground,
until a sufficient drag had been produced. The
strain caused by hooking a large fish while steaming
at ten knots would otherwise probably snap the
line. With a large spinning-bait tunny of 50
or 60 pounds had been caught, but the possibility
of catching a shark had necessitated the employ-
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ment of shot of an aggregate weight of 250
pounds.
The phosphorescent effect produced a t night
by the presence of the red Sargasso weed" in the
harbour of Muscat was sometimes very beautiful,
and the light was occasionally so strong as t o throw
a glow over Fort Jellali up to the very battlements. The weed appeared to drift in from the
open sea when the wind set from the Indian
Ocean.
Having spent just a week in Muscat, I sailed on
a Monday in the slow-mail for Jask, where we
stayed long enough to permit of my lunching
on shore with Colonel Whyte and the officers
of the detachment of the 117th Malirattas, who
are stationed there for the protection of the IndoEuropean telegraph-line and the new c c wireless "
installation, by which the cruiser squadron are kept
informed of the movements of suspicious dhows.
Landing a t Jask, as a t all other points along this
narrow and shelving shore, is rendered difficult by
the dangerous surf, which beats constantly on the
beach even in the calmest weather. It is necessary
to anchor some distance offshore, and then back:
down the boat astern till near enough in t o jump
ashore. The steamer, of course, cannot come
within two miles of the shore, but anchors in Jasl:

* I am not awme of the proper scientific name of this plant,
though the readel; if he wish, could decide for himself approximately by consulting the list of seaweeds found on the island
of Henjam, given at the end of Floyer's "U~iexploredBaluchistan."
17
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East or West Bay according to the direction of the
wind.
The importance of Jask lies in the fact that it is
the point where the threads of three cables, one
overland telegraph, a local telephone
system for the
...
telegraph-huts, and the invisible threads of the
c G wireless," are gathered together in the hand of a
superintendent, who is also the Political Officer.
A t the time of my visit Jstslr presented the
appeasance of a miniature Ladysmith. On every
hand sand-bag forts, surrounded with an inextricable network of wire entanglements, met the
eye. Sand-bag forts aIso bloclced the entrance
to the main building, and more barbed wire. The
whole cantonment was surrounded by a veritable
zareba of barbed wire, from the middle of which
two flagstaffs rose to the height of 150 feet from
the ground. On the top of these more wire.
From the neighbouriag building
- an intermittent
tearing noise indicated that the wireless " was
working. I t was as if some gigantic bumble-bee
had been caught
- in a labysinthine spider's web,
and was making efforts to escape. And this all
because some 900 Afghans were on their way
down from the north to bend the Baluch Sardars
and the Arab " nakhudas" (skippers) to their
will.
From the top of the telegraph building Old
Jask is visible, the residence of the hereditary Mirs
of Jask, and behind this, again, the arid coast range.
The present Mirs of Jask, Mir Mustapha and Mir
'2
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Hoti, have gone down a bit in the world, and their
more powerful neighbour, Mir Haji of Salrui (of
whom more anon), wiped out Old Jask some years
since. I n summer the col~tinuallydrifting sand
raises a curtain in front of the coast range, so that
nothing can be seen farther than a mile fkoin Jask,
and for all one can see, Jask might be situated
in the middle of a vast plain as flat as a billiardtable.
W e weighed anchor towards evening, with an
addition t o the cargo of several drums of barbed
wire, so as to enable the Consulate at Bandar
Abbas to put itself into a better position for
defence against the expected onslaught of the
Afghans.
While still on the subject of radio-telegrapl~y,it
is an interesting fact that with a daylight radius
of 300 miles i t is impossible to communicate
between Lingah and Muscat, though at night
Bombay may sometimes be called up from Lingah,
a distance about three times as great. It is said
that one night Bombay refused to speak with
Lingah, because they were "talking with the
West Coast of Ireland," Whether there is some
formation in the rocky promontory of Cape
Massendam which interrupts the current is not
known, but the wireless operator on the P. and 0.
Xnlsette told me lie "could generally" speak to
ships a t the head of the Persian Gulf fiom the
entrance to the Gulf of Aden-that
is to say,
across the whole extent of the Arabian plateau, a
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distance of over a thousand miles. This is, of
course, oilly possible at night-time.
It was impossible to land either at Bandar Abbas
or Dibai, the two next ports of call, and all the
impression of them I retain is of a faint ribbon of
palm-trees some four miles away, and an invisible
line of sandy beach. Close to Randar Abbas are
the islands of Qishin, Henjam, Larak, and Hormuz,
the last of which gives its name to tlie straits in
which i t is situated. On the eastern end of Larak
are the remains of yet another Portuguese castle.
A t the western extremity of Qishm is the shallow
l~arbour.of Basidu, which has been used as a coaling statioil for tlie sloops and pinnaces of the
blockading squadron. It is, however, too shallow
to admit of the larger cruisers coaling there in
comfort, and since the rest of the island belongs to
Persia, there seems to be a general coilsensus of
opinion that it would benefit all parties concerned
were we to give up the harbour of Basidu in
exchange for the small island of Henjam.
Dibai is situated on what is known as the ccpirate
coast," and is ruled over by one of the seven
" tlucial" chiefs, so called from the fact that
after the suppression of the slave-trade they entered
into treaty engagements with the British Government. The remaining trucial chiefs are those of
Abu Thabee, Shargah, Ajman, Umm-al-Gawain
and Ras-al-ZCheyma. It was at Dibai that a
landing-party from the Hyacinth was fired on on
Christmas Day, while searching for concealed arms.
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This led to the bombardment of the town, and the
punishment of its chief. It is thougl~tthat the
trouble began through the employment of a strategy
of the natives, by which, under plea of removing
their women-folk before the search, the arms were
also removed at the same time, a trick which had
succeeded more than once before.
The majority of the passengers on board were
pearl-merchants returning froin India, where they
had been to dispose of their yearly output. The
next port being Bahrein, and their destination, we
were looking forward to being able to walk about
the decks once more in comfort. I think we were
justified in feeling a certain pleasure at their
departure, since there were only about three of
them who owned first-class tickets, the rest being
slaves and acquaintances, who battened on the
hospitality of the pear1 magnates, and spread their
carpets under our very feet as we walked the decks.
Remonstrance with the captain was in vain. W e
were told that it was the company's orders that
the Arabian passengers should be shown every
consideration. And this they were, even at the
expense of European travellers. W e could only
be thankful that we weye not on board the same
steamer on her way down the GuU a few weeks
later, when every flat surface that could be termed
tt deck would be crowded out with Arab horses
and Arab horse-dealers.
The value of the pearl-trade of the Bahrein
Islands appears to be steadily on the increase, and
18
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there seems t o be an opening for some enterprising
British firm to send an agent there aanually. The
figures, which me to be found in the Consular
Report for 1010, are as follows :

The drop noticeable in the figures for 1908-09
is no doubt due to the financial crisis of that year
in America, which reacted on both the American
and British markets.
About seven miles inland fiom Bahrein are the
ruins of an ancierlt civilization, thought at one
time to be of Phenician origin. It was even
suggested by some that this place might be the
cradle of the Phenician race. Having
- the whole
day in front of us, we determined to land and ride
out on donkeys to this burial-ground. Our donkeyride began sooner than we had expected, for the
beach shelves down so gradually that it is impossible to get a boat within 50 yards of the
shore, and after bumping over hard sand for a little
way, we rode ashore on donkeys. With good
trotting donkeys we did not take long to reach
our destination. The track led through mile after
mile of shady date-groves, till at last we came to
the open salt-plain. Continuing some time over
this, we came to another village, over wlich we
could see the rounded tops of innumerable tumuli
or barrows. Those nearest the village appeared to
be larger than the rest ; but there must have been
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several thousand of them, for they stretched away
to the horizon, and, going back by another way, we
came upon ailother field of them. A few of them
were excavated some years ago by Professor Theodore Bent, but so little was found in them that it
was not thought worth while continuing the excavations. Inside the mounds are large burial-chambers,
some of thein extending to a considerable depth
underground, and constructed of enormous blocks
of white limestone, roughly hewn and fitted
together, forming what I believe is termed " cyclopean architecture." Dr. Budge is of opinion that
they belong to a civilization vastly anterior to that
of the Yhcenicians, or, indeed, even to the Summerian or Accadian Empires of the Euphrates
Valley. "And God planted a garden eastward in
Eden. . . ." " Es lasst tief blicken."
From Bahrein we made for Bushire, and had
again to undergo the discomfort of landing from
the steamer a t a distance of four miles from the
shore. It is iinpossible for the British-India boats
to enter the harbour of Bushire without touching
ground, and since this is imperative to enter the
Shatt-al-Arab, it is thought advisable to do so as
little as need be at other places of call. A snapped
propeller is not an easy thing to replace in the
Persian Gulf, not to inelltion the cost of a bronze
blade, which runs into hundreds of pounds. It is
generally agreed that the situation of Bushire is
such as t o destroy any hope of it ever growing
much beyond its present importance. The Karun
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on the one hand and Bandar Abbas on t l ~ eother
are two coinpetitors wllose rapid expansion will in
the long run stifle the trade through Bushire. Its
situation on an island, and the exte~isivedredging
that would be necessary to convert its harbour
into a safe ancl~oragefor large steamers, are the
two largest disadvantages agaiilst which it has to
contend. The eventual trnilquillity of the Southern
Persian trade-routes is only a matter of time, but
the trade of Ispshan will find a better outlet
through the Valley of the I<ai.un, that of Yezd
through Bandar Abbas. 'I'here remains, therefore,
but the trade of Shiraz.
A t the time of my visit to Bushire, the Shiraz
road was considered to be so uilsafe that pernlissiori
was refused to travellers wishing to proceed into
Persia by that route. I remembered having read
of the British "note" to Persia on this sub,ject in
the Reuter's telegrams a t Port Said oil my way out
in October, and the incredulous surprise with wllich
the news was received. The " note " still ibrined a
chief topic of conversation, and it was laughingly
said that an enterprising traveller, wllose life was to
him of no particular impoltance, might cxsily earn
the lasting gratitude of his country by becoming
the sacrificial calf, over whose dead body British
troops might justifial~lymarch to Sliirm to restore
the tranrluillity of the road.
The European Consulates a t 13usliirc are for the
most part situated at sue11 a distance from the
town that it is hardly a matter of surprise tliat
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in times of disturbance it becomes necessary to
land troops from war-ships for their protection. I11
the centre of the town is the palace of the Darya
Begi, or Governor of the Gulf ports, and in the
harbour lies the Pel..~epolis,the one battle-ship of the
Persian navy. About three miles along the coast
to the eastward are the Russian and German Consulates. Behind these, a little way inland, at
Sabsabad, is the bungalow of the British Resident
irl the Persian Gulf, Colonel Cox. Yet farther
inland, and equally isolated, are the bui1gdows of
the Medical Inspecting Officer for the Gulf, and of
Mr. Consul Chick and Mr. Birdwood, whose hospitality I had the honour of enjoying for two days.
Had I continued my journey in the " slow mail,"
1 should have had an opportunity of visiting the
harbour of Iioweyt, about wl~ich,until recently, as
the " only possible " terminus to the Baghdad Railway, there has been so much discussion. This
theory has, however, beer1 recently exploded, since
it is now generally recognized that the dredging of
the bar at the mouth of the Shatt-al-Arab is within
the bounds of practical engineering. It is said that
were ICoweyt to be made the terminus of the
Baghdad Railway, it would still pay the steamship
companies to load up half bulk in Basra and the
rest in lighters outside the bar, as is done at present.
Proceeding again from Bushire in the ('fast
mail," we passed the Turkish fort of Fao, a t the
mouth of the Shatt-al-Arab, at the same time
bulnpiilg over the bar, and steamed up the Shatt-
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al-Arab, between wide banks covered with dategroves. These groves are among the richest in
South-Western Asia, and extend for a mile or two
on either bank. Behind them the land becomes
low and marshy, and behind this, again, is the
illimitable desert. On the right bank as we steamed
up to Mohammerah floated a mirage, as of mist
rising from off a lake. As far as Mohainmerah and
the mouth of the IZarun, which here debouches at
right angles into the Shatt-al-Arab, the eastern
bank is Persian territory. From Moham~nerahwe
went forward in Messrs. Lynch's launch to Basra,
preceding the steamer by a day. It is not an
uncommon thing for the launch to be fired on on
its way up to Baghdad, and, though we saw the
dents in her funnel ancl sides, we were fortunate in
escaping the attentions of any riparian marksman.
Frorn the Shatt-al-Arab branch off many canals
at right angles, and on one of these, at about a mile
from the liver, is situated the native town, with its
tortuous bazaars. Along its banks are the dwellings
of the
inhabitants and the few Europeans
whose business necessitates their presence in Basra.
On the river itself are the docks, wharfs, and quays
of the shipping and trading firms. The appearance
of this canal is picturesque in the extreme, and
might be termed an Oriental Venice without prejudice to the latter. U p and down this waterway
with amazing swiftness ply the long narrow native
craft, propelled at each end by a picturesque savage,
hardly less willowy in form than the punt-pole
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which lie so deftly wields. Halfway towards the
native town is a wooden bridge, constructed of
bdlrs of timber lashed togetller. When I first
beheld it, a small cavalcade of Bedouin cavalry was
slowly making its way across it, their dirty garments
contrasting ill with the Saracenic grace of their
horsemanship. The yellow house behind, with its
brilliant cobalt blinds, cast warm zigzaggy shadows
in the water below.
l3,zsr:~now boasts all hotel owned by a Greek,
and at this we put up. With its untidy and scrupulously dirty " patio," it was not unlike a Spanish
" posada " of the meaner sort. It was in no sense
n pleasure to stay there, and we were glad.we had
some tinned Bologna sausage to fall back upon.
Our spirits were, however, lrept up by a party of
three French engineers on their way to Aleppo.
The doyen of this trio was accompanied by his
wife, a charming lady. She, on hearing of the
horrors of existence in Baghdad, declared with
simulated horror that nothing would induce her to
go a step farther. Her husband had surely inistaken his vocation, for in a deep base voice, evidently
trained, he sung snatches from the opera with a
wonde~fulpatl~osof expression. When he switched
off into a less serious vein, his companions joined in
wit11 inelodious tenor and alto.
The baztu~rs of I3asra, though more extensive
than those of any Gulf port I had yet seen, did not
present any particularly new feature. The town is
occupied by a Turkish garrison, and it would be
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difficult to imagine a tougher or more truculentlooking set of soldiers than these. It was with
some little surprise that, on passii~ga group of three
or four soldiers, I heard the familiar greeting " May
you never be tired I" uttered in the Pushto tongue.
A rather laboured conversation elicited the fact
that these were Afghan and Pathan sepoys who
had enlisted in the Turkish army. I cannot now
remember from which part of the frontier the latter
hailed, but I rather think it was from the Yusufzai
side. The Afghans were Kabulis, and, since the
Afghan army is trained by Turkish instructors,
there is nothing so very remarkable in the presence
of these Afghans in the Turkish army.
Instead, now, of continuing my journey to Baglldad, the possibility of au expedition being despatched to Mekran led me to retrace my steps to
Karachi, Nothing of importance occurred on the
return run, and the voyage, which had taken three
weeks up the Gulf, was now accomplished in five
days. However, on arrival in Karachi it appeared
that there was no likelihood of such an expedition
being sanctioned in the immediate future, and, since
I was not due in Bombay till March 24, I set off
to visit Lahore, Delhi, and Agra, with an account
of which I do not intend to bore the reader.
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CHAPTER X
GUN-RUNNING I N THE PERSIAN GULF

HITHERTO
I had only had an opportunity of

$

I

&I

observing the effect of the gun-running on the
Pathan tribes of the North-West Frontier. But
during my cruise in the Persian Gulf, of which in
the last chapter I gave a short narrative, I was
enabled t o learn considerably more of this interesting subject.
About the middle of February it began to be
rumoured in various quarters that a large body
of Afghans, numbering, it was said, 3,500, had
been concentrating for some time past in the
neighbourhood of Bampur, a town in Persian
Baluchistan. The presence of Afghans in Persian
Baluchistan was not in itself remarlcable, since it
is in spring that the GhiIzai traders visit the Gulf,
on their way back from India through Afghanistan
to Central Asia. But the gravity of the situation
was to be found in the temper of the invaders, and,
according to rumours that were current, their
intentions were of the most warlike nature. They
were reported t o be contemplating a repetition
141
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of the outrage on the Central Persian TelegraphLine of September, 1910, when four miles of wire
had been cut up. An attack, under the leadership
of Mir Barlcat IChail, late Governor of Biyaban, on
one or other of the small posts that have been
established for the protection of the Indo-European
Company's line at such places as Chalibar, Jask or
Bandar Abbas, was also feared. Mulla Ichair
Mohammed of Icarlcindar in ICarwan, coinmonly
known as the IChalifa Sahib," was also stated
to be advancing at the head of a following of
upwards of 200, accompaiiied by a wandering
derwesh of mystic powers."
Among the Afghan tribes none have benefited
more by the arms trade, nor enjoyed greater facilities for embarking in this traffic, than the Ghilzais.
These, besides being themselves the purchasers of
large quantities of rifles, have gradually acquired
almost a monopoly of the carrying trade in arms.
Owing to the hostility of the Persians of ICerman,
to the vigilance of H.B.M. Consul-General in
Meshed, and, more recently, to the presence of a
Gurkha regiment in Robat, the routes followed
by the arms-caravan have of necessity been gradually narrowed down to an area indicated by an
isosceles triangle, of which the apex is roughly at
the Helmand Lake, and its base between Lingah
on the west and Chahbar on the east. From
the apex of this triangle the caravans cross the
Afghan frontier to Bandar -i- Kamal Khan, on
the Helinand River, thence along its banks to
cb
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Girishk, whence they branch off to Icandahar and
Ghazni, the country of the G.hilzais.
This powerful and warlike tribe, the backbone
of the Afghan nation., and our old enemies at
Maiwand, is divided into two sections, of which the
nomadic 'IPowindahs," or warrior-merchants, constitute the wealthier of the two. As traders between
Hindustan and Ichorasan (Herat, Bokhara, etc.),
they are accustomed to fight their way through
their hereditary enemies of the Mahsud and Waziri
borders. They visit India during the cold weather
to barter the merchandise that they have brought
from Central Asia, leaving their families and their
herds of camels in vast encampments on the banks
of the Indus. It is estimated that 50,000 of them
pass yearly through Dera Ismail IChan. They
command a considerable credit among the Hindu
bannias of Peshawar, Lahore, Delhi, and even
Calcutta and Bombay. When the rapid development of the arms trade opened up an additional
and more profitable field for trading,
the Ghilzai
merchants were not slow to seize tlie opportunity,
and for some years now have had commercial relations with the principal arms-dealers of Muscat.
But it is to the second and more stay-at-home
section of the Ghilzais, known as 'c Jais," or
settlers, that the Afghans who had invaded Persian tei~itorybelonged. Though by no means so
wealthy as the Powindahs, they, too, had invested
large sums of money in the arms trade. The
Sultan of Muscat, however, discouraged these
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Ghilzai traders from coming in person to Muscat,
fearing that itwould prove prejudicial t o his relations
with the British Government, through whose instrumentality alone the Beduin tribes of the Olnani
hintelbland are kept at bay. But in spite of this
restriction, such was the confidence of the Ghilzais
in the A/Iuscat dealers that they continued to pay
their inoney down, in the full certainty that the
rifles would be duly delivered on the Mekran
coast. The Muscat dealers undertook, in fact,
t o engage the dlzows and make all arrangements
for running the guns over t o the Persian side,
where, in their turn, the Baluch Sirdars found
camels and acted as intelligence agents in the
interests of the Ghilzais. The arrival of cargoes
of rifles, watched for and marked by the Baluch
Sirdars, was duly notified t o the Afghans, who,
owing to the lack of forage for tlieir beasts near
the coast, as well as to tlze need for secrecy, were
expectantly waiting some ten or fifteen miles
inland. When the coast was clear, they came
down, loaded up the rifles, and the long march
inland commenced, each successive chief through
whose territory the caravan passed taking his toll.
Among the Baluch Sirdars of Persian Mekran
the most indefatigable in the interests of the gunrunners has been Mir Barkat Khan, Governor
of Biyaban up till the time of his capture in
March, 1910-a man of more spirit than the
majority of his race, and one who has presumably
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reaped a substantial harvest from his enterprise.
So great, indeed, at one time was his activity as
to cause the Persian Government anxiety as to
the preservatioi~of their authority in this district.
We was in consequence one day spirited away on
board the Persian cruiser Persepolis by the Derya
Begi, or Governor of the Province of the Gulf
Ports, who had been sent by the Persian Governinent for this express purpose.
Last August, however, he managed to effect his
escape, and returned to Biyaba~iat an oppoi-tune
moment for those engaged in the traffic, for the
disorganization caused in the plans of tlie gunrunners by the vigilance of British cruisers in the
Gulf of Oman had brought the tmde to a standstill. Not only had dhows which had left Muscat
been compelled, after a severe chasing, to put back
to their port of departure to evade capture, but the
" nakhudas," or Arab skippers, owing to the increased risk, refused any longer to run guns across
on tlie same terms as before. The arrangement
hitherto 'adopted had been the payment of a third of
the value of the dhow to her owner by the Afghan
trader, with an undertalung to pay up the remainder in the event of the ship being captured or
otl~erwise lost. The nakhudas now demanded
payment in full, as dhows were becoming scarcer
and scarcer every day. In this condition the
Afghans were unwilling to acquiesce, having no
guarantee of the good faith of the nakhuda. Even
Barkat Khan, with all his influence, proved unable
19

146

GUN-RUNNING I N THE PERSIAN GULF

to iliduce them to resume their occupation, and
was also in consequence lii~nselfa loser.
The naval measures that resulted in this state
of affairs are briefly as follows : The Omani and
pirate coasts of Arabia are watched by cruisers,
and the departure of dhows is commurlicated
immediately on receipt of the intelligence by
wireless telegraphy to Jask, whence the information
is passed on to " boat-cruisers " that are stationed
along the coasts of Mekran and Biyaban at the
most likely landing-places. These boats contain
an officer and from six to a dozen bluejacl~ets,and
are visited fortnightly by the cruisers to which they
belong. Their occupants are frequently sniped
from the shore, and when a strong ('shumal"
(north-west wind) is blowing, the only alternative to riding out the gale in very uncomfo'ortable
quarters is the hazardous venture of landing up
a creek and accepting the risk of being fired on.
Cruisers search dhows in Persian waters, in accordance with an agreement entered into with the
Persia11 Government, but not in Muscat territorial
waters, since it is suspected that the captured rifles,
when returned to the Sultan, find their way back
into the possession of the dealers. Precautions
l-rave also to be taken against any gun-running
dhow getting through from Hodeidah or other
Red Sea port. Information is generally available
as to the presence and whereabouts of any large
number of camels in the interior, which very often
furnishes a clue to the place selected by the nakhuda
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for running the cargo. It is, however, not improbable that camels are collected in one place as a
blind, while the rifles are being landed at another
point.
Whether the continuance of the bloclrade will
eventually have the effect of killing the trade
altogether is a point on which it is difficult to form
any opinion. Myself I do not think it will, and
short of some definite arrangement with the French
Government and with the Sultan of Muscat, by
which the abrogation inay be effected of the
treaties which give to certain subjects of the
Sultan the right to fly the French flag, and to the
French and other nations the right of free trade
with the port of Muscat, the presence of a cruiser
squadron in the Gulf will remain necessary to check
the traffic. For so long as these treaty rights
enable the Sultan, without forfeiting the support
that we afford him in his dealings with the Beduin
tribes of the interior, to permit a trade which he
knows to be contrary to our interests, but from
which he is reported to levy a large sum in import
duties, so long will he be in the enviable position
of being able t o eat his cake and still keep it."
Rumours have been afoot of proposds from the
French Government for the relinquishment of
these rights in return for the cession of a certain
British possession in West Africa. Such a sacrifice, however, would hardly seem "worth the
candle," and as things stand at present our only
lever with the Sultan is his fear of a second sack of
Muscat by Beduin invaders.
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The traffic, nevertheless, has been greatly reduced.
The constant harassing to which dhows have
recently bee11 subjected lias undoubtedly caused
many of the dealers in Muscat to transfer their
business to other quarters, or to shut up shop
altogether, owing to actual or imminent bankruptcy.
Muscat is, of course, very closely watched, and
quite recently in the harbour was t o be seen a
dhow, with 2,000 rifles on board, that had twice
essayed without success to run through the tightly
drawn cordon. This has led t o an attempt to
form depots farther up the coast. By this the
additional advantage would be gained of being
able to put straight across the Gulf of Oman at its
nxrrowest part, instead of having to work laboriously up the coast (by night, so as t o benefit by
the 0%-shore breeze) before getting a fair wind.
Depots were also probably formed on the pirate
coast within the Persian Gulf. No doubt Dibai
was one of these, though the punishment that
was meted out to its sheikh will probably deter
the remaining trucial chiefs frfi.qm emulating his
example, At present suspicion centres on Sohar,
a poit about a hundred miles north of Muscat, as
a possible depot, the rifles being conveyed secretly
from Muscat.
0
1
1 the refusal .of the nakhudas to continue
operations as before, the Ghilzais demanded that
the money they had on deposit in Muscat, as
security for the guns they had caused t o be ordered,
should be refunded to them. This the dealers
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refused to do, saying that they must take the
value out in rifles. Indignant at the loss of their
money, it is not to be wondered at that, taking
matters into their own hands, they should invade
Persian Mekran in force, breathing threats of
violence to all and sundry who should oppose their
progress, intent on bringing the naldludas to
reason, and with the avowed intention of cutting
the telegraph-line and of driving the " kafir " into
the sea. Any chance there may a t one time have
been of Mir Barlcat-who
periodically used to
apply for an increase in the already liberal allowance granted him for the protection of the linecoming in, vanished wit11 the news that the Afghans
were about to place themselves under his leadership. It looked as if the wave of indignation
which had swept over the North-West Frontier in
October, and spent itself in impotent fury along
the Afiidi border, were now about to break again
on the low sandy shores of Persian Mekran.
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The ubiquitous tendency t o territoriril expansion, wliicli is
so marked a feature in Ruropean States of the periotl, results it1
a corresponding coxltractio~iof the ground free cclunllp t o all ;
and as this narrows tllcre cannot but 1)e increasing jealousy of
every movement; which carries with it n tllrerit of exclusive
control, whether by acquisition or by pretlon~illarlt influence,
especially if the latter depend, not on fair commcrc!ial struggle
in open markets, but upon t h e alien elements of nlilitary mld
political ~o~'c~,"--CAPTAIN
MAIIAN
: Prohbax
/!sin.
f

f

IT was not till March 30 that it was known
that the Government 2.1:ld decided to send an
expedition against these invaders of I'ersian
territo~y. News had, indeed, been received that
a small telephone-hut so~newhere between ,Task
and Chahbar had been wrecked, arid the tclephone clerk forced to fly for his life. I3ut beyond
this nothing further, as h r as it was known, hncl
happened, although the Afghans litid by this time
moved down by easy stages tow:~rdsthe coast, iuld
were occupying a line of csuritry just sotit11of Uint
(a town midwily between I3arnpur and the r:ot~st)
stretching away westward ,towards Ihshnkard tlxlcl
Biyaban.
The reluctance of the Governmcrlt to scrid all
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expedition t o Mekran may possibly be attributed
to the anxious jealousy with which any forward
movement on our part in Southern P'ersia is looked
upon by Russia and Germany, the former because
she has interests there herself, and the latter
because she has none. This feeling of jealousy
is admirably appreciated in the quotation from
Mahan's " Problenls of Asia " which I have placed
a t the head of this chapter. The secrecy with
which preparatioris were made and the operations
conducted was commented on in the following
words by Mr. Lovat Fraser in a paper on " Gunrunning in the Persian Gulf," read by him before
the Central Asian Society 011 May 17.
You cannot mobilize a squadron and an expeditionary force and start out to conduct warlike
operations, and then ask the rest of the world to be
kind enough to look the other way."
The apparent leisureliness of the movements of
the Afghans, and the fact that, with the single
exception of the molestation of an isolated lineguard, no outrage had been committed, could not
be taken as an indication that their warlike temper
had been exaggerated. Their very numbers served
to negative such an assumption. bloreover, small
accessions t o the Ghilzai host continued t o make
their appearance. The circumstance that the
departure of the main body from Afghanistan had
been known as early as ill October, 1910, and the
fact that they had frequently halted for weeks at a
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time in places where good pasture was available
was held by many to be a sign of their deliberate
intention to procure rifles a t all costs, the inore
so since the month of May is the last in which i t is
possible to return over the waterless desert which
now lay between them and the Afghan frontier.
Only the year before the returning arms-caravans
had suffered the most terrible privations and
unmentionable hardships through having postponed till too late their return journey.
Realizing at last that the Ghilzais had in fact
a come to stay," the Government on March 30
issued orders for the mobilization of a small force
to proceed to the coast of Mekran, under the command of Rear-Admiral Sir Edmund Slade, IC.C.I.E.,
Commander-in-Chief of the East Indies Squadron.
The lariding force was to be under the comrnand of
Colonel Delamain, D.S. O., 123rd Outram's Rifles,
~vliohad led a similar expedition up the Gulf the
previous year, and consisted of the 104th Wellesley 's
Rifles, with two machine-guns, under the command
of Major A. P. Stuart ; the 32nd Mountain Battery,
under Major Williamson Oswald ; the 19th Company Sappers and Miners, and two sections of Field
Ambulance-in all about 1,000 men.
On April 6 the naval Commander-in-Chief
transferred his flag from H.M.S. Hyacinth to
H.M.S. Wig/i$yer, which had arrived two days
before from England, and oil April 7 the transports
Nardi?zge and No~~thbrook,
escorted by the Highjlyer, steamed out of Bombay Harbour. As we
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passed the old flagship, flying her paying-off pennon, her gallant crew, who had borne the burden
and heat of the day, and were now to return to
England, gave us three cheers, which came faintly
t o us over the water.
The heat in Bombay had been pretty bad, but it
was nothing compared to the stifling air betweendecks. Both transports were packed to overflowing
with men, mules, stores, and kit. The mules, of
which there were about 230 on either ship, were
stabled along both rails of the main deck, while tlie
sepoys occupied the forecastle and the lower boatdeck. Shortly after staiting we were startled by a
furious trampling of hoofs on the declr, accoinpanied
by the curious vocal noise of the mules, which is a
cross between a neigh and a bray. Investigation resulted in the rescue of a sheep which had
got under the hoofs of a mule, a i d but for timely
succour would in a little time have been trampled
t o death. The removal of the sheep produced a
monotonous void in the mules' daily round, until
it was discovered that ,the wood of which tile stalls
were built was saturated with the most excellent
salt. From that date onward "crib-chewing"
became a favourite occupation, and by the time
the expedition reached Bombay once again the
mules must have been in debt to the Government
of India for a considerable amount on the score of
dilapidations.
On the fourth day after leaving Bombay a narrow
yellow line bounded the horizon to the iiorth. The
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coast between Chahbar and Jask affords but an
open ancl~onlge,and consists of a low, sandy, surfbeaten shore, backed a short distance inland by a
series of difficult parallel mountain ranges running
in a general direction north-west to south-east.
Behind these we suspected that the Ghilzais were
encamped. The villages along this coast are all
well-known landing-places of the gun-runnersGabrig, Sadaich, Rapch, Galag-the last of which
was given out as our landing-place. It is situated
about one mile up the eastern branch of the Rapcli
River, just inside an inconvenient bar. This river
is one of the few perennial rivers along this coast.
At ten o'clock on the morning of Monday,
April 10, the HigIfiyc?. and the -iVo?~ti~broolc
dropped anchor off the mouth of the Rapch between
two and three miles from the shore, and the latter
began immediately to disembark tlboops. It was
some time before the Hardi~zgearrived, as she
had dropped some distance behind owing to the
fact that she was burning cc country coal "--i.e.,
Indian coal. A pilot la~lnchwas sent off to discover the best place for landing at that state of the
tide, and on the way to the shore fell in with a
patrolling c' boat-cruiser," whose hirsute occupants,
Ulyssean in aspect, hailed the boat with offers of
assistance in finding the channel. The tide being
at that hour somewhat low, it was found impossible
to cross the bar, and so the landing had to be
effected slightly to the eastward of the mouth.
Hour after hour the launches came and went, each
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with its cc tow" of three ship's lifeboats, until by
's
three in the afternoon the N o ~ t h b ~ o o kcomplelnent
formed up on the beach, and marched off to camp
at the date-grove a t Galag, one mile inland. The
Ha~dhzgchad not been so lucky, for a stiff breeze
springing up in the afternoon interrupted the laiiding, which was not completed until the following
morning. The mules were landed i11 lifeb'onts from
which the thwarts had been removed. On arrival
in shore a cordon of sepoys was formed round the
boat, from which the mules leapt into the water.
The mules, on gaining terra-firma, were allowed
one long roll in the sand, to take off the stiffness
of their cramped positions on board-a diversion
which they appeared thoroughly to enjoy-and
were then loaded up preparatory to marching. The
landing costume of the men, as may be seen in the
photograph, was of the scantiest description; and
very necessary it was, too, since the boats could
rarely approach within seventy yards of the shore.
The Hig?@ye?- also landed a contingent of
Marines under Major Herriot, R.M.L. I.-handy
men, every one of tliem, and already well versed in
" Gulf lore." Blankets and " grub " were scarce
that night at Galug, and most of us slept as we
were on the sand.
The next day a tiring march in the heat of the
day through a scrub desert brought the vanguard
to a well, surrounded by an iron fence, from which
it11 drank greedily, regardless of filters, and by evening the whole force was encamped about twelve
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miles inland at the telephone-hut at Rapch, the
scene of the murder in 1897 by Baluchis of Mr. E.
Graves, one of the Indo-European Telegraph
Company's superintendents. Here the column was
met by Sirdar Saiyid Khan of Geh, a seini-independent chief whose autllority extends over the
greater portion of Persian Melcran, a man with
whom our relations have been on s friendly footing
for some years past on account of the telegraphline which traverses his territory, for the protection
of which he receives a small subsidy.
A t Gdag the coluinn had been met by Mr. E.
G. Gregsoi~,who had succeeded Colonel Malleson
on special intelligence duty in the Persian Gulf in
1909, and whose intimate knowledge of all frontier questions, and personal acquaintance with the
~rincipelcharacters, notorious and otherwise, in
gun-running circles, fitted him in a peculiar manner
to accompany the expeditioil in the capacity of
Political Officer. In a conversation with the latter
and with Captain Craufurd, D.S.O., Gordon Highlanders, Intelligence Officer at Jask, the Sirdar
readily agreed to lend his good offices oil our behalf
in inducing Sirdar Islam Khan of Bint to co-operate
with us in the extinctioil of the arms traffic by
excluding Afghans from his country. A letter in
this sense was accordingly despatched to Sirdar
Islam Khan, notifying him of the landing of the
force, and requesting him, under the authority of the
Persian Government, to come in, with the object
of arriving at some solution of the situation. This
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interview took place in the Sirdar's camp at Rapch,
where, under the shade of a giant tamarisk, a few
rugs had been spread, on which the Sirdar reclined
with his son. Two negro slaves handed cool water
in a shallow brazen bowl, but out of our saddlebags we produced some chocolate and a sparklet
siphon, which surprised and delighted both father
and son. Saiyid Khan in appearance is a man of
fifty years of age, with the dark complexion of the
true Baluch, and a melancl~olyexpression in his
dreamy eyes, which is accounted for by the fact
that he is an opium-smoker. His son, a cheerful
boy of ten or twelve years of age, rode with us
several marches.
The experience of the previous day had convinced Colonel Delainain that the heat would not
permit of day-marching, and hencefoiward all
marching was done either by night or in the early
morning. Except when night-marching, camp was
therefore always broken before even the dawn was
faintly perceptible in the eastern sky. A t Rapclz
we were fortunate in obtaining about thirty camels
after a slight palaver with their owners, who had
driven them off into the scrub, thinking that they
were to receive no payment for them. This settled,
the column marched twelve iniles to Chikai Bund
on the Rapch River. Troops marched well, giving
evidence of the exceptional mobility of the force,
whose transport had been cut down to one blanket
(4 pounds) for officers and half a blanket (2 pounds)
for the men, no tents being allowed. The country
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traversed consisted at first of a tama~iskjungle,
which later gave way to a gradual ascent over a
stony plain, until the range of Zaur came into view.
The route then dropped down once more into the
bed of the Rapch River to the oasis of Chikai Bund
on its left bank, about three miles from the entrance
to the defile between Zaur and Chikai. Here a
halt was made for three days, while mules were
sent back to the coast for six days' extra r at'ions.
Up till now not a sign of life had been noticed.
Except for deserted tracts of desert, surrounded by
ditches, which appeared to have been subjected to
a half-hearted attempted at cultivation, there was
nothing that could have been t e ~ m e da field. But
as we entered the rich oasis of Cliikai Bund, a
herdsmail was perceived driving off his cattle, and
on the followiilg day we caught a glimpse of a
white-robed form high up on the opposite hillside,
apparently scanning our position with interest.
I<arkindar lay now almost due west of us, and a
short reconnaissance was made in this direction, in
the hope of finding traces of the " dushman "
(enemy), Icarkindar being the home of Mullah
Rhair Mahommed, who was known to have
collected a small following. Nothing came of it,
however, beyond the establishment of helio cominunication with the coast.
On April 12 news arrived that Sirdar Islam Khan
was already on his way down from Bint, in answer
to the summons that had becn addressed to him.
On the following day one double company, under
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the cominai~dof Ma,jor Williamson Oswald, with
silppers and miners and one section of the Mountain
Battery, moved through the Chikai defile and
encaiulped about eight iniles north of Chiltai Bund,
a t Zarnin, from which camp two cases of sniping
were reporLed on the night of the 13th. Intelligence was now received from Biyaban that Mir
Barkat had been active in instigating raids, and
that many Ghilzais were moving through Bashakard
into that province. The Iihalifa SnlGb was in
Bampur, while the Gllilzais in Bint had retired
througli the gorge of F a ~ u c l lto I-Taimani, on the
Bsmpur lrrtfileli route.
The news of these dispositions made it finally
clear that if any good were to result from this first
landing, it was absolutely necessary that the column
should reach Bint. With this intention it was
gently broken to the Marines that they would be
expected to furnish a camel corps, and a parade
was ordered for the afternoon of Good Friday.
Now, there is a good deal of difference between a
riding-camel and a paclc-camel, and those n t the
disposal of the Marines were chiefly of the latter
variety, so that after the parade it became evident
that if there were to be a camel corps at all, the
Punjabis, who are accustomed to camels, and not
the Marines, were the Inen to undertake the job.
T11e Marines therefore magnanimously waived their
cluiin to the honour, and were provided wit11 mules.
With regard to camel transport, there can be no
doubt of its superiority over all other in military
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operations in Persia. Owing to the rocky and
impassable nature of the ground, mules are unable
to undertake long days of successive marching with
impunity. I n addition to this, the camel is capable
of carrying a load of 380 pounds t o the mule's
160 pounds. Of this a smaller proportion is taken
up by the animal's fodder, since the camel call
practically exist on the scanty scrub of the desert,
while in a waterless country its limit of endurance
is greater than that of the mule.
As a means of locomotion he is by no means t o
be despised. There is something rhythmic and
soothing in the ambling motion of this '' grim, ungainly, gaunt, and gliastly " ship of the desert, as
he pads along on silent foot through the " dasht,"
whether ill the stifling glare of midday, in the
silent watches of the night, or in the cool of the
evening, with tlie sunset afterglow behind the hills
and the fresh night breeze blowing up the pass.
There is something restful when at the end of the
day's march he sinlts domi in three ponderous
movements, and begins to chew the cud, his jaws
working alternately from right to left and from left
to right. Now and again his long-lashed eye roams
with a supercilious philosophy over the lines of
mules, to whom the proximity of a camel, whether
on account of its unpleasant odour or of its strange
and terrifying appearance, fi~rnishes a continual
excuse for stampeding. The camel, indeed, seems
to appear to the mule much as the Spanish horsemen appeared to the Peruvian aborigines, a new
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and undreamt-of monster. And, to be sure, he is.
The interior of the camel is constructed on the
latest and most scientific basis, and is the last word
ill desert economy. In addition to the ordinary
furniture of the ruminating orders, he possesses
auxiliary tanks for water and bunkers for fuel, and
an emergency ration growing on his back. As a
dog perspires only through his tongue, so the camel
only perspires at the back of his neck, thus retaining the maximum of moisture in his body. Hence
he will not stop and drink at every stream, as
will a mule or a horse, if allowed, but will plod
d o i ~ gall day, inaking his four to five miles an
hour if a riding-camel, his two miles if a packanimal.
Not only is he the symbol of the desert, but of
the mysterious East. From Pekin to Icasbgar and
Yarkand the long caravans pass, accomplishing
their journey in about six months. From Bokhara
to tlie Indus extends another great camel route,
and from Iihorasan through Icerman t o Bandar
Abbas. The large Powindah tribe of the Ghilzais
possesses a t least 50,000 camels, beside which the
10,000 of the Queen of Sheba appears paltry and
pretentious. The two-humped Bactrian camel of
Central Asia is not considered such a good marcher
as the Arabian camel, but is eminently fitted by
his long hair for crossing snowy passes at great
altitudes, such as the Bamian Pass over the Hindu
ICusl.~,due north of Kabul.
For the rest, the camel is a vain creature, loving
81
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to be decked out with gaudy trappings and tassels
of red and green, yet he can hardly be called a
good-looking animal, except for his liquid eye and
glossy " back hair."
Havirig awaited the return of the convoy froni tlie
coast,theremainder of the column moved up through
the Chikai defile on April 15, accompanied by
Sirdar Saiyid ICllan, to Zamin. That evening
Sirdar Islam Kllan also arrived in camp. But it
was not until the next day that the meeting
between him and the officer commanding the
force occurred, dusing the march northward from
Zamin. A t one point the route led across an
elevated plateau, or <' dandynof vast extent, stretching away to the distant mountains without a sign
of vegetation, reminding one of Sven Hedin's
description of the Chang Tang Desert of Tibet.
Over this tableland the barbarian cavalcade which
constituted Islam Khan's bodyguard careered at
full gallop, the horsemen bending low in the saddle
as they picked up stones from the ground, or standing up in their stirrups as they brandished their
rifles in the air, their gaily coloured clothing,
embroidered saddles, and bandoliers crammed with
cartridges, completing a characteristic spectacle.
Islam Khan himself is a man of about thirty-five
years of age. His face, though indicating a certain
doggedness of character, has a pleasing expression,
his aquiline nose, black beard, and fiercely bristling
moustaches, contributing toa decidedly distinguished
appearance. H e expressed his readiness to meet
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the wishes of the British Goveniment, and showed
but a momentary surprise on learning that Bint
was to remain the objective in spite of his compliance. It is probable that neither he nor the
GhiIzais, whom he had been entertaining at Bint,
had any real belief in our intention or ability to
reach that point, thinking, no doubt, that we
should be satisfied with the assurances of friendship
so cordially given by its ruler.
If this had been their hope, they were sadly disappointed. O n Easter Day, April 16, camp was
broken a t 3.30 a.m., and a twelve-mile march made
to the entrance to the Pass of Korandab. The
going was very bad, deep sand alternating with
stony gulches, while the river had to be forded
many times. Arrived in camp, Colonel Delamain
acquainted the Sirdar of his intention to push oil to
Bint, a distance of thirty miles, that same evening.
Thus the final march to Bint was undertaken by
night. A t five in the afternoon a picked mounted
column, made up of a detachment of Marines, a
detachment of the 104tl-1,and a half-section of the
Mountain Battery on camels, moved out of camp
and up the Pass of Korandab.* The remainder of
the column was to move up through the pass on
the following day, as a support in case the flying
column should be attacked, as it was impossible to
know whether all the Ghilzais had retired from Bint.
The route lay for twelve miles through the pass.

* Korandab = " The Meeting of the Waters."
drains through the narrow defile,

A large area
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Several ineffectual attempts to delay us were made
by the Sirdar and his attendants, who at sundown
ostentatiously dismounted and spread their prayercarpets for the eveiling prayer. This, however,
although repeated more than once, had no visible
effect on the rapid progress of the column, and the
devout Mahommedtlns were forced t o gallop t o
catch up with us again. A t eight o'clock a two
hours' halt was made until the moon rose. The
end of the pass was now reached, and leaving the
river-bed, tile force passed over a long and difficult
kotal and down into the river-bed again. Here
a five minutes' halt was made, during which most
of us slept soundly for three or four minutes.
From thence a long succession of narrow and
rocky g~zlcheswound in and out among the mountains, till at last the huge rock of Bint, rising some
700 feet from .the plain in which it stands, appeared
in the distance as a filmy veil of blue in the fresh
morning sunlight. Bint was reached at 6.30 on
the morning of the 17th. A t the foot of the rock,
under its north-eastern face, is situated the village,
containing a population estimated by various
travellers ill the neighbourhood of 2,000 souls. A
long c c mach," or belt, of date-palms borders the
river, partially concealing the village with its mud
fort, and among these the column encamped at a
distance of about one mile from the village. The
country surrounding Bint is dotted with curious
conical hills of sllale: suggesting an oil formation.
Traces of oil were also noticed in the Rapch River
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a t the southern debouchment of the Korandab Pass,
and it is not improbable that oil exists in considerable quantities in the neighbourhoodt. Far away
to the north-east could be made out the violet
crests of the Band-i-Nilag and the Lashar Range,
the principal watershed of the district.
After breakfast and a short rest, Islam Khan
appeared, and invited us to the village, where he
said he had prepared a small cc tomasha" in our
honour. Colonel Delamain, however, considered it
inadvisable to avail ourselves of this invitation, in
view of the fanatical temper of the Baluchis, whose
revengeful feelings might be awakened by the most
trivial incident, and lead, perllaps, to a disaster.
W e had perforce to content ourselves with the distant view of the mud-fort peeping out from among
the date-palms. Since it was not my fortune to
enter the village of Bint, I will here quote the
description of it given by Floyer :

4

I

" Accordingly, the following morning we walked
across the common, and, entering through a
breach in a curious natural sandstone wall,
climbed up some steep, narrow, and filthy streets,
whose uses for progression were subordinate to
their value as manure-beds. W e had noticed every
day donkeys passing into the town laden with kikgrass roots, and now found every nook and corner
througl~outthe town spread deep with kik-grass
and old rice-straw.
c c The houses of Eint, Fanuch, Maskhutan, and
other Baluch towns, are simply built in what
resembles an English crew-yard, or yard for wintering cattle in, and the smell at some se?sons must

22
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be fearful. The quantity of rice-straw lying about,
the sparrows, and the substantial look of the wellthatched houses, give the place at the back the
appearance of a very slovenly English homestead."

I
I
I

I
I

Evidently we did not miss much I
After a halt of eight and a half hours, the
column set out on the return journey and second
night march of thirty miles. One mule had to be
left behind through foundering, and shortly after
the start a camel fell and broke its leg, and had
to be kiled. The object of this rapid advance
on Bint was to impress the Baluchis. It was
thought that this rapid advance on Bint would
have a salutary eff'ect on the Sirdar by dispelling
the delusion, under which he had been labouring,
that Bint was invulnerable to a small force, based
on the sea seventy miles away. It affords, indeed,
a valuable illustration of the effective radius of a
small mounted force, entirely dependent on itself
for supplies, operating in a barren and almost
waterless district, and with a transport limited t o
one-tenth of what had hitherto been considered the
irreducible minimum.
After the rapid march on and retirement from
Bint, in which, counting the twelve miles already
accomplished on the morning of the 16th, seventythree miles had been covered in forty-nine hours,
the force arrived back at Chikai Bund at dawn
of the 19th. A portion of the mules left for the
coast the same evening, where they were embarked
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the next day. The rest of the force embarked
on April 31.
The fact that Bint was reached without a shot
being fired, though disappointing to the troops
composing the expedition, is hardly a matter of
surprise, even after the reports that were brought
down as t o the warlike character of the invaders.
The temper of the Ghilzais is well lmown, but
Persian Baluchistan is a large district and a barren,
and large bodies of Afghans could no more have
remained together living on the country than
could the British army. The Ghilzais were bound
to have scattered for the purpose of foraging, and,
since Islam Khan had no doubt been guilty in
their eyes of having betrayed their cause, it was
not improbable that those who had not already
retired through Fanuch on their way back to
Kandahar were making their way across Bashakard, attracted by the news of Barkat Khan's
activities in Biyaban and those of Gl~ulamHusain
in Ahavand. I t was against these that the
efforts of the expeditionary force were now to be
directed.
But in spite of the pacific manner in which the
object of the expedition had been attained, the moral
effect remained considerable. Though primarily
directed against the Ghilzai gun-runners and their
abettors among the Baluch Sirdars, one of the most
important results that have attended the demonstration must be counted the restoration of Saiyid
Khan's authority over a district in which lawless-

THE DASH ON BINT
ness had been gradually gaining ground. No doubt
the operations of the small bodies of troops that
were moved up a short distance into the interior
fi.oin Chahbar and Jask a t the time of the landing
of the Mekran Field Force also contributed to the
same desirable effect.
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CHAPTER XI1
A BRUSH WITH T H E GUN-RUNNERS
rr

In the land that lies beyond
Erzeroum and Trebizond
Garden-girt his fortress stood ;
Plundered khan or caravan,
Journeying north from Koordistan,
Gave him wealth and wine and food."
LONGPELLOW.

THE satisfactory results accruing fiom the first
landing of the Melrran Field Force partook more of
the nature of a political victory than of a military,
and may be looked upon as a distinct step towards
a permanent solution of the arms question-at any
rate, as far as the more easterly routes employed by
the gun-runners are concerned. For of late, as has
been mentioned, the gun-runners have shown an
increasing preference for the coast of Biyaban, as
affording greater chances of success in running a
cargo, owing to the lesser distance of open sea that
has to be crossed. This factor probably aided
Islam Khan materially in his decision to come to
terms with the Government of India, as his profits
must have decreased considerably during the last
year. And in its turn, too, Islam Khan's decision
169
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to 'C come in" no doubt accounts for the entire lack
of resistailce that was offered to the advance ; for,
with the exception of the two cases of sniping
reported from Zamin on the night of April 13, the
column did not come into touch with the enemy at
But the success of the establishment of friendly
relations with Islam Khan was also in a great
measure due to the friendly offices of Sirdar Saiyid
Khan of Geh, the parainount chief of Persian
Mekran, ~ 7 1 1 0has not always been on the best of
terms with his neighbour. Moreover, he had
further cause for jealousy of his rival, in that, while
Islam IChan was reaping a substantial profit from
the arms traffic, he himself, in loyalty to the
Government of India, from whom he receives a
small subsidy for the care and protection of the
telegraph-line, was unable to engage in the traffic,
and was forced to sit by and watch the arming of
the Ealuch tribes on his northern boundaries with
rifles which he might well fear might be used
against him in a not very distant future. However,
the fact that he recently appointed Islam Khan his
" vakil " for the province of Karwan points to the
burial of the hatchet, though there can be no doubt
that in Islam Khan Saiyid Khan has, if not a
successful rival during his lifetime, a probable
successor to the overlordship of Persian Mekran.
It is well known that the Baluchis have no love for
the Persians, and have for years succeeded in
evading payment of all revenue, in spite of the
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periodical expeditions sent to collect it by the
Governor-General of ICerman, under whose nominal
jurisdiction this district lies. To such an extent
has this authority declined that it would be easy
for a strong man t o make himself master of the
whole of Persian Mekran.
A similar situation prevails in Biyaban, where
Mir Barkat Khan, having used his legitimate position as Governor of that province to consolidate
and extend his influence, has now seceded from his
allegiance to the Persian Government, carrying
with him the syrnpatl~iesof practically the whole of
the population, with the exception of that portion
under the immediate control of Mir Haji of Sikui.
It was to this quarter that the efforts of the
Mekran Field Force were now to be directed.
After the return from Bint and the re-embarkation at Galag, the Mekran Field Force proceeded to
the coast of Biyaban, where a second landing was
effected on April 24 at the small coast village of
Sirik, which lies at the mouth of the Gaz River.
On the way up from the Rapch River, the transports had touched at Jask, for the purpose of renewing the supply of camels, which journeyed
thence overland to Sirik. Jask was found to be
full of refugees from Biyaban, who had fled there
to escape from the cruelties that Mir Barkat Ichan,
gun-runner, outlaw, and erstwhile Governor of
Biyaban, had, with the assistance of his motley
following of Tahirzai tribes-people from the coast
villages, Bashttkardis from the interior, and a

1
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spkkling of Afghans, perpetrated on the unfortunate supporters of Mir Haji, the present Governor.
The ICalantar of Sarzeh, so it was reported, had
been burnt to death by the orders of Mir Barkat a
few weeks before; Mir ICambar of Kuhistak, on
returning from the Batineh Coast of Arabia, whither
he had been to transact some business, had found
his houses burnt to the ground, his property destroyed, and his cattle Lifted. From all sides came
the tale of rapine and bloodshed, of murder and
robbery. Men had been beaten ; women had been
robbed of their ornaments ; villages lay deserted by
their terror-stricken inhabitants. Thus did Mir
Barkat hope to make himseK master of the situation, and pave the way to a veritable orgy of
gun-running.
At Sirik news was received that Mir Barkat had
retired from Sarzeh into the mountains, and that
Saiyid Abdul Rahim, his second in command, had
left Goshlu and was preparing t o join him. A
number of Martini rifles were brought into camp
by the orders of Mir Haji, with the information
that they had been saved from the wreck of an
&rab dhow that had run ashore in a westerly
gale about a week: before. These had, incidentally,
nearly fallen into the hands of Mir Barkat, who had
been surprised in the act of carrying them off
inland. The rifles, though new, were in a very
rusty condition, but what most attracted the attention was the fact that they had 40 stocks. This
method of packing them has been, recently adopted,

SARZEH PORT
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both on account of convenience in transport and
because the different tribes to whoin they are eventually sold in Afghanistan and on the North- West
Frontier prefer to make the stoclrs themselvessome with and some without the metal butt-plate.
Marching eastward along the course of the Gaz
River, tllrough the well-tended date-palm groves
which here clothe the foot of the coast range,
evening found the force cncamped on April 26 in
the neighbourhood of Sarzeh Pi'oit, having safely
negotiated the narrow Tang- i- Sarzeh, tl~rougl~
which the Gaz River finds its way to the sea.
This coast range is composed of a stiff blue clay,
known as " shur," capped with limestone. From
the seaward side it presents a. jagged horizon of
sharply denticulated peaks ; on the landward it falls
away in a precipitous drop to the level plain, a
noticeable feature common to the succeeding ranges
which back it inland.
Towards the middle of the plain the ground rises
gently to the fort of Sarzeh, the scene of a fight
between Mir Bmkat and a British force, made up
of a company of the IlYtIl Mahrattas from Jask
and a landing-party from the cruiser Fom, as
recently as on Christmas Day last. Arriving early
in the morning in search of cz consignment of arms
of which news hacl been received, they surprised
the occupants of the fort, who incontinently fled.
A t the same time another party of Barkat's inen
fired 011 the landing-party, who promptly took
refuge in the fort, whence they were enabled to
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drive off their foes, though during the retirement
to the coast a spirited rearguard action was fought
through the Sarzeh Pass.
Sarzeh Fort occupies a commanding site, standing four-square and facing south, the entrance
being on that side. It would form an ideal place
for a frontier military post, commanding as it does
one of the principal caravan routes f?om Jask into
Bashakard. It belongs nominally to the Governor
of Biyaban, but, being in such close proximity to
the mountains, it is more often occupied by Mir
Barkat, since it forms a convenient refuge for gunrunners while awaiting the arrival of a cargo of
arms, Unlike the majority of Baluch strongholds,
there is no central ark or citadel, but in each angle
of the walls is a tower, those on the western side
being circular, while those on the eastern are
square. In the north-eastern corner is the
crumbling mud-tower set apart for the use of the
chief, the tribesmen, it is presumed, sleeping on
the ramparts, or, if no enemy is to be apprehended,
among the camels in the open space below. Here
a quarry-like excavation seems to point to an
attempt having been made to level the ground,
which slopes away sharply to the eastward. As in
all Balucll forts, a well, dry at the time of m y visit,
has been sunk right through the mound on which
the fort is built to a considerable depth. Close by
the fort is a small mat-hut village, whose solitary
inhabitant, an aged man, too old for the wars,
cursed me volubly as I returned to camp.
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From Sarzeh a short march brought the column
to Gwaj, whence, as we arrived, a cloud of dust
betokened a small party of cavalry moving off
rapidly to the hills. Here we found Mir Haji and
his attendants, who had preceded us, seated under
a spreading thorn-tree, excitedly discussing the
contents of several letters, which had apparently
been delivered by the party whose dusty departure
we had just witnessed. One of those letters was
from no less a personage than Mir Barkat himself.
I n it he begged to be excused for his discourtesy
in not having met the column in person on its disembarkation at Sirilr, pleading in extenuation of
this omission urgent business in the mountains.
H e added, however, that he yet hoped for a
personal meeting in the Marak Gorge, where he
intended making a stand. From the remaining
letters it appeared that Mir Barkat, with a large
following, had come down from Sahri-i-Gurg, in the
ICuh-i-Biyaban, with the intention of holding the
narrow gorge by which the Marak, a tributary of
the Gaz, flows out at Gwaj into the Sarzeli Plain.
A reconnaissarlce of the pass having accordingly
been made, the enemy had been found to be
occupying a line of sangars halfway between the
Marak defile and the pass of Pashak, where the
Maralr, leaving the Sahri-i-Gurg, the " plain of the
wolf," enters the ICuh-i-Biyaban.
On the morning of April 28, Colonel Delamain,
D.S.O., commanding the expedition, ordered an
advance with the intention of forcing the pass. A
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picket that had been posted on the top of a hill
commanding a view of the Marak Gorge reported
that the enemy had vacated their position of the
previous day, retiring up the pass in the direction
of Pashak. The column therefore advanced through
the Maralc Gorge, following the river, which wound
tortuously in aiid out between high benches of
gavel and limestone detritus, cemented together
by the blue clay from the surrounding hills. For
mile after mile the column forced its way through
the deep sand which filled the bed of the shrunken
stream, through which every now and again inen
and mules splaslied, stoppiilg to drink and to fill
their wnter-bottles and " chargles " (canvas skins).
The day was hot, and the heat was accentuated by
the funnel-like defile, into which the sun shone at
an almost vertical angle. There was still no sign
of the enemy, and the sight of an oorial on the
mountain-side see~nedan evil omen for the day.
" No oorial would remain there," Inen said, " if the
pass were held." It was inlpossible to send flankingparties along the crest of the hills on either side, on
R C C O U ~ I ~of their inaccessibility and the nunierolzs
ravines which separated each peak from the next.
But what could be done was done. The advanced
guard sent out a line of scouts through the willowscrub, and a convenient hill was picketed now and
again. Suddenly a muffled shot was heard somewhere ahead, another, and then another. A n orderly
galloped back and reported that the enemy had
been located in sangars round the next bend in the
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The position had indeed been well chosen.
At a bend in the pass, where the limestone cliffs
rose sheer and smooth from the river-bed, the
" dushman " was discovered, skilfully ensangared
right across the narrow valley. The vanguard,
under the command of Major Turton, 104th Rifles,
immediately opened fire on the sangars, and with
the support of the advanced guard guns, which
opened fire at 800 yards four minutes after the first
shot had been fired, held its position until the
arrival of the main force. Then, under cover of
the 32nd Mounted Battery, a general advance was
made, and the enemy could be seen leaving their
position and retiring in open prder with the greatest
coolness t o another line of sangars. Each line was
successively carried, while the intermittent " cougli,
cough " of the machine-guns followed the retreating force across the open spaces. Each shell from
the ten-pounders as i t burst on the hillside laid
bare a conspicuous round bare patch of blue clay.
Many burst right over the sangars, and though it
was afterwards ascertained that several of the
enemy had been killed, the survivors succeeded in
carrying their dead off the field of battle. At last
the end of the pass was reached, and the fugitives
divided into two bodies, some seeking refuge in the
direction of Sahii-i-Gurg, others in a more easterly
direction. One prisoner was taken, carrying a
Werndl rifle, who had been concealed by his
fiiends in a deserted mat-hut, severely wounded in
the leg.
23
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On the principle of the Persian proverb, c c A
jackal of Mazandei-an is not caught but by a
dog of Rlazanderan,"* the services of the bodyguards of Mir Haji and Mir Icambar had beell
enlisted for the purpose of executing a turning
movement on the left flank of Mir Barlcat's
position, and.these were instrumental in continuing
the pursuit of the vanquished gun-runners far over
the plain. The action lasted from 9.18 till a little
past noon, the casualties to the force amounti~igt o
three sepoys wounded, whilst the enemy, whose
numbers were estimated a t 200, lost eight killed
and twenty-four wounded, as was afterwards learnt.?
I t is probable thttt the enemy encountered a t
Pashak was little more than the advanced guard of
Barkat's main body a t Sahri-i-Gurg, though, had
the defence been attended with better success, no
doubt large reinforcements of Bashakardjs would
have rolled up from all quarters. Neither Mir
Barkat nor his lieutenant, Saiyid Abdul Rahim,
were present a t the fight, though t h e probable
effect on the morale of Mil*Barlrat's following may
be judged &om the losses sustained by the gunrunners, among whom were the son of Gliulam
Husain, Chief of Afon (Ahavand), mortally

*

Shagal i Mazanderan nilgirad juz sagi Mazanderani."

'1 News has just reacher1 me (October 1, 1911) of the murder
at Gwaj of one of the native guides employed by the Expedition
in the Marak Gorge.' Mir Barkat, who is probably responsible
for this outrage, is said to be in the neighbourhood of Bandar
Abbas, awaiting the beginning of the cold-weather gun-running
season.
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wounded, and the son, brother, and nephew of
Karimdad, headman of the Tahirzai, among the
slain, besides two of BZir Barkat's confidential
" gholains," or Suaheli slaves. I n the face of these
casualties it is difficult to foresee whence Alir
Barkat is to recruit his following in the future.
Thus it so happened that, with the exceptioil of
a diminutive following of Bashakardis under Ali
Abbas, son of Ghula~nHusain, the whole of the
enemy's force consisted of inembers of the Tahirzai
tribe, Barlrat's own men. These, it must be
admitted, fought with the greatest bravery and
determination, particularly their leader, Ali Abbas,
who formed a rather conspicuous mark in a red
puggaree, and retired shot through both thighs.
But though the Ghilzais, who during February
were reported to have invadecl Persian Mekr'ul,
were conspicuously absent fiom the fight, the fact
that they did actually exist, though not in such
numbers as was at first reported, has, a t any rate,
been substantiated, not only by those whose business it was to collect trustworthy information as
t o the whereabouts of gun-running caravans, but
indirectly through the principal Baluch Sirdar
implicated in the traffic, as well as by the personal
experience of a Persian army advancing on Bampur.
During the first phase of the operations, and while
the column was still in Bint, intelligence was
received from a trustworthy source that at the
approach of the troops a body of Afghans had
retired on Fanuch, where it had joined a large
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kafileh, consisting of 500 men and 1,000 camels.
On arival at Gwaj further information had been
elicited, to the effect that Mir Barkat had received
a letter from these Ghilzais, promising active
support and bidding him on no account to make
peace wit11 the Sirkar, for they were making all
haste to join him in the highlands of Bashakard.
There c,m be little doubt that it was this knowledge
that decided Mir Barkat to oppose the column in
the pass at Pashak, though the sudden defection
of the whole of the Bashakardi tribesmen, numbering some 2,000 rifles, consequent on the non-arrival
of the Afghans, was a severe blow to his fortunes.
This non-arrival is, however, sufficiently explained
by the news of the despatch of a Persian army
fiom Ilerman, which met a hostile force in the
neighbourhood of Bampur, and is reported to have
suffered a severe defeat.
A further advance not coming within the scope
of the operations, the force encamped on the
enemy's position, returning the next day to Gwa-j,
thence to the coast, the main body embarking at
Sirik on May 3 for Bombay, while a small column
under Colonel Walton, 104th Rifles, who had
rejoined his regiment from leave in England in
time for the fight of April 28, proceeded southwards by way of Goshki, Bris, and Gwan, to
embark on May 6 at Bunji. This movement was
undertaken with the object of strengthening Mir
Haji's hold over the outlying villages from whicl.1
Mir BarkatJs following had been drawn.
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During the time that it remained on shore, the
force was accompanied by Mir Haji, who, as
Governor of Biyaban, in the absence of the
Governor of the Gulf Ports, represented the
Persian Government, and also by Rlir ICambar of
Icuhistalc, both of whom had recently been the
victims of Mir Barkat and his raiding Tahirzai.
This latter chieftain presented a more truculent
appearance than even the most villainous of his
retainers. H e was attired in a "coat of many
colours " of the kind made in Bint, the embroidery
of which, covering the whole garment, was of a very
rich and elaborate nature. EIis modern rifle was
decorated with silver bands round the barrel, while
the stock was studded with plates of the same
metal. Round his waist he wore a bandolier neatly
ornamented with fine brass wire, into whicli had
been thrust a curiously shaped silver dagger in the
form of a cross, the blade being slightly curved and
the hilt set with a large turquoise. On this belt
he carried a silver cartridge-box, of Shiraz workmanship, in the lid of which had been set a
cornelian. But what lent him such a ferocious
aspect were the crafty eyes, twinlding out from
under bushy eyebrows and an enormous white
turban ; the bristling moustache and henna-dyed
beard, and the brown lungi loosely fastened over
his mouth and under his chin, to hide a throatwound which he had received a short time before
in an encounter with Mir Barkat's gang. As for
Mir Haji, not only is Barkat Khan his son-in-law,
24
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rival, and predecessor in the governorship of
Biyaban, but had it not been for the latter's active
participation in the arms trafic, and his consequent
outlawry by the Persian Government, there was
small chance of his ever rising to the position which
he now occupies. It was illerefore with sornething more than inere zed for law and order that
Mir IXaji suggested, and his and Mir ICambarYs
followers carried out, the successful turning movement of the 28th. The impression, however,
created in his favour by the presence of the troops
in Biyaban should suffice to establish his unchallenged supremacy in the district of which he
is now c'Zabt," or Governor. Incidentally we
thereby gain an additional guarantee of a material
reduction in the arms traffic at tliis point, since it
would be virtually impossible for the nakhudas
to run :t cargo of rifles over from the new depot a t
Sohar without the fact coming to his knowledge.
It may be of interest to mention the fact that
ainong the empty cartridge-cases found in the
Baluch trenches after the action of the 28th,
besides those of the principal Continental manufacturing States, were many of English make,
specimens of which I retained as souvenirs.
The questions that were asked in Parliament by
Colonel Yate, shortly after the return of the
Mekran Expedition (May 1911), with regard to
measures being taken for the protection of the
Central Persian Telegraph-Line, raised another
aspect of the point which originated in the British
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note to Persia of October, 1910, to the effect that
if the Persian Government should prove incapable
of preserving order on the Southern Persian traderoutes, it would devolve on the British Government
to put forward more effective measures for the
purpose of safeguarding the interests of our own
commerce in particular and that of foreign nations
in general in the disturbed areas. The telegraphline in question, after leaving Kerman, crosses the
Dasht-i-Lut by way of Bam to Kuh-i-Malik Siah,
where i t enters British territory at Robak. Between
Bam and the British fronbier it intersects at more
than one point with the caravan routes from
Mekran and Biyaban, by which the returning arms
caravans regain the Valley of the Helmund. What
more likely than that, having been driven out
empty-handed from Mekran, the Ghilzais should
take what revenge lay in their power and destroy
a few miles of telegraph-line ? Only last year about
four iniles of wire were cut up by a party returning
to Afghanistan, and carried away bodily to Ghazni,
where it commanded a ready sale as a substitute
for string in tying together the component parts of
the Afghan plough. Fortunately, up to date the
telegraph-line has remained intact. The point at
issue, however, was not whether a force should
have been moved out, presumably from Robat, to
protect the line, since this was precluded by the
approach of the hot weather and the consequent
drying up of the water-supply, which makes it
impossible for a column to operate in this district
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A BRUSH WITH THE'GUN-RUNNERS

after a certain date, The real question, which still
remains to be decided, is to what extent we are
justified in interfering in Persia, and in taking our
own precautions to insure that the concessions that
have been granted to British subjects are not
rendered nugatory by the inability of the Persian
Government to provide any guarantees of proper
protection ; that our telegraphic comlnunications
with India are not in jeopardy from casual bands
of disaffected tribes-people from a neighbowing
State ; and that effect is given to the assurarlces of
the Persian Government, who profess to be in
sympathy with our attempts to prevent the a ~ m i n g
of hostile tribes on our North-West Frontier.
I n this connection it is interesting t o learn how
the matter is regarded in the country through
which the Rfekran Field Force passed. Mir Haji,
the chief whose authority has just been restored
over the province of which he is Governor, professed himself anxious to learn when the British
Goveinment proposed carrying out their expressed
intention of policing the trade-routes of Southern
Persia, adding that the three months granted as
respite to the Persian Government had long since
run their course, and that the disturbing news from
Bushire at that time (April-May) warranted the
adoption of precautionary measures of the nature
suggested. He was thinking, no doubt, of his own
lands and of those of Mir ICambar of Kuhistak, so
recently harried by Mir Barkat and his freebooters
from a safe retreat in the fastnesses of Bashakard.
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That there is no love lost between Persians and
Baluchis is a. truth on which it is needless to dwell.
Persia fulfils no duty towards its province of
Baluchistan, beyond the self-imposed task of extorting from time t o time by force of arms what
revenue can be squeezed out of the uiducky inhabitants. I f we should be justified in policing the
trade-routes of Southern Persia proper, surely, then,
it is our duty to preserve the peace in Baluchistan,
where a country, potentially fertile, as I shall
attempt t o show in the next chapter, is being kept
back through the oppressioil of the Persians on the
one hand, and the lawlessness of the neighbouring
hill-tribes on the other.

CHAPTER XI11
THE FUTURE OF MEKRAN
f c Before my dreamy eye
Stretches the desert with its shifting sands
And i~nimpededsky

."

LONGBELLOW.

WHILEinterest still lingers over a country that
has just been traversed by a British force, and
which has hitherto remained t o all intents and
purposes a terra incog~itaeven to the pioneers
of British trade, it may not be out of place to offer
a few remarks on the resources and possibilities
of Persian Melcran, as far as it is possible to judge
of them during a short and transitory visit. The
probability, also, of a railway being constructed
through Southern ~ e r s i din the not very distant
future affords an additional reason for speculative
interest in Mekrm.
Of the early history of Mekran we can obtain
only occasional glimpses, and for these are mainly
indebted to the diligent researches of British
officers who, such as Pottinger, Goldsmid, Holdich,
and Sykes, have traversed this region in the service
of their country; or to men such as Bloyer, who,
186
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during a long residence in Mekran in the employment of the Indo-European Telegraph Company,
explored the little-known interior of Persian Baluchistan, and gave to the world the results of his
wanderings in "Unexplored Baluchistan," Such,
indeed, is the isolation in which this out-of-the-way
corner of Persia has been sunk for centuries that
it is only when an Alexander, a Ghenghiz Khan, or
a Nadir Shah, leads his victorious armies in this
direction, that we gain more than the distorted and
legendary accounts of mythical heroes or local
chieftains handed down from mouth to mouth and
sung by the gipsy bards* of Mekran. Since the
time when Alexander led his army back from
founding an empire on the Indus, almost every
century has brought a fresh invasion, the Baluch
Sirdars, then as now, yielding a minimum of
homage t o the conqueror of the moment. Persian
dynasties and invaders from beyond-Sassanians,
Hindus, Arabs from Aleppo ; Saffars, Deilamis,
Seljuks from Central Asia ; Mongols and Afghans
-each in turn have made themselves masters of
Mekran, none, however, having been able to
maintain more than a temporary supremacy over
the hardy Baluch chieftains, in whom the spirit
of patriotism, common to all hillmen, is so
strongly implanted. In the majority of cases they
were content t o exact an exorbitant tribute at the
time, and retire with a nominal title to the lands
which they had conquered, but had been unable

*
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t o retain. This is the position of Persia to-day
with regard to Mekran.
As a result of these numerous irruptions of halfcivilized tribes, the whole of Persian Baluchistan
has been overlaid with successive deposits of ethnological sediment, differing in character according to
the quarter from which they originated, much as
the low-lying flats of the Kabul River around
Peshawar differ in the cha~acterof their sediment
according as to whether the Swat, the Bara, or the
Kabul River was last in flood. These different
tribes have, as a general rule, no very strongly
marked territorial limitations, as among the
Pathans, but are scattered broadcast throughout
the country, their tribal occupation being a surer
guide to their origin than the locality in which
they are found. Much of this inay be accounted
for by their semi-nomadic habits. It must also
be remembered that, besides the principal invasions
to which allusion has already been made, there
occurred many immigrations of which not the
slightest historical records exist.
In most countries the original inhabitants, where
yet they exist, are generally found in the course
of ages to have sunk down in the scale, and to have
been gradually forced into menial occupations by
the races by whom they have been supplanted.
This is true of Mekran, with one brilliant exception-namely, the Brahuis, an aboriginal tribe of
Dravidian origin, according t o Sykes, who have
inhabited Mekran since the first dawn of history,
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and who yet in its more easterly districts have
remained the dominant race. Among the remaining probably aboriginal tribes may be mentioned
the mat-makers of Geh and Qasrkand, several
l~omadictribes of graziers and camel-owners in
the Jaghin and Sadaich Valleys, and the c c Maids,"
or fishermen, who are almost certainly the descendants of the ancient <' Ichthyophagi," or Fish-eaters,
of whom Arrian spealcs in his account of the
voyage of Nearchus from the mouths of the Indus.
While landing at Galag, a good opportunity
occurred of observipg one of these "Maids" at
work, fishing with a line some half a mile out
to sea. A t first sight, and from a distance, this
ragged creature appeared to be standing motionless upon the face of the waters, but on a nearer
approach he was seen to be supported on what
looked like a mass of wreckage, througl~which
the sea was breaking as it lay half submerged in
the trough of the swdl. This crazy craft is constructed of a framework of date-palm branches,
ballasted with heavy blocks from the trunlc of the
same tree, and, in spite of its appearance of instability, is said to possess great buoyancy.
Of the tribes in Biyaban, the Mirs of Indian
origin are found also in Mekran; the Shaikh are
of Arab descent; the H o t constitute the family
of the Mirs of Jask; and the Tahirzai, of whom
I can find no previous mention, are agriculturists
and inhabit the inner valleys of the coast district.
With the exception of the Brahuis in the east
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of Melrran and the Gichki, descended from Rajput
chiefs, the Baluch Sirdars are all descended from
the large horde of Rinds that migrated from
Aleppo early in the Mahommedan era. The
priilcipal of these families are the Nahruis of Geh,
Bint, and Qasrkand ; the Jadgds of Bir, Dashtiari,
and Bahu; and the Hots of Jask and Biyaban.
All the Baluch Sirdnrs are interrelated, and form
a kind of feudal confederacy under Saiyid Khan
of Geh, who, as paramount chief of Mekran, is
liomiiially under the Deputy-Governor of Bampur,
who, in turn, is respoi~sibleto the Governo~-General
of Icirman. I t is this family relationship which
enables the Baluch Sisdars to present such a
determined front to any undue attempt on the
part of the Persian Government to interfere in the
affairs of Bduchistan, though among themselves
there is a continual undercurrent of animosity
and intrigue. For many years the Persiau Government has confined itself to making periodical incursions in force into Baluchistan, for the purpose
of collecting revenue; but whether the present
army, which is reported to have been defeated
in the neigl~bourhood of Bampur, was sent to
drive out the gun-runners, or whether the opportunity of collecting revenue while the British
troops were still in the country was considered
too good to be lost, does not appear. A t any rate,
success does not seem to have attended its efforts.
Melcran is divided into the five districts of Jask,
Geh, Qasrkand, Dashtiari, and Bahu, which, with
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the exception of the first, are under the Sirdar of
Geh, and pay, or are supposed to pay, an annual
tribute to the Persian Deputy-Governor of Bampur.
The taxes are collected, but it is very doubtful
whether the Governor of Barnp~zrever sees more
than a portion of them. Jask, though reckoned a
district of Melrran, is under the Daria Begi, or
Governor of the Gulf Ports, of whom it is, however, almost entirely independent, paying no taxes.
Biyaban also forms part of the
of the Gulf
Ports, but the mountainous and inaccessible region
of Bashakard, running down like a wedge between
Melcran and Biyaban, is a subdistrict of Rudbar, a
district of ICirman. It would be very much better
were Bashakard incorporated either with Baluchistan or the Gulf Ports, for, lying at a consideyable distance from, it is virtually independent of,
ICirman, and, being infested with robbers, is a distinct menace, not only to the compa~ativelyunimportant country to the soutll and south-east, but
to the highly important trade-routes leading from
Bandar Abbas to Hirman. Caravans are constantly
being attacked and looted by these robbers from
Bashakard, and being outside the jurisdiction ofthe
Daiia Begi, the latter cannot, while the Governor
of Kirman will not, take any steps to put a stop to
the nuisance.
Towns can hardly be said to exist; in Mekran.
Geh, Bint, and Qasskand, are little more than large
villages of 2,000 inhabitants, though Chahbar and
Jask, on account of their European connection,
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might rank as such. Among the remaining villages
may be mentioned Old Jaslr, the residence of the
hereditary chiefs of Jask, wiped out by a rival
Sirdar some years since ; Grishkin, a port at the
mouth of the Jaghill River, which carries on a not
unimportant trade with the opposite coast of
Arabia ;Bir, a few miles west of Chahbar ;and Tiz,
a suburb of the latter port, which in early times
was the centre of a large silk export from the
Bampur region.
Our own relations with Persian Mekran have
been chiefly in connection with the delimitation of
the boundary between it and British Mekran, which
was effected by the Goldsmid Mission by a line
drawn fi-om a point eight miles east of Gwatar to
Icuhak, some hundred miles inland. It was this
recognition of Persian interests in Mekran that
incidentally suggested t o her the idea of reasserting
her rather shadowy authority over this turbulent
district. Since that time two British expeditions
have penetrated Mekran, one t o avenge the murder
of Mr. Graves in lcarwan in 1897, and the second
in 1902, under Major Tighe, as escort to Major
Showers, Political Agent, Icalat, for the purpose
of destroying some forts in the Sarhad district of
Persian Baluchistan which were being used as
strongholds whence raids might be committed into
British territory.
As to commercial relations, these can hardly be
said ever to have existed. It was at Jask in 1619
that British trade first sought to tap the markets of
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Southern Persia. Here the East India Compaily
had its first factoiy i11 the Gulf, whence in 1622 it
was trai~sfenedto the port of Gombroon or Bandar
Abbas, and the coi~nectioizceased.* I n 1904-05
the itinerary a t first selected for the Iudinn Commercial Missioil to South-Eastern Persia iilcluded
a return journey from ICirmwn by way of the fertile
district of Bain-Narmashir, across the Gishu Pass,
througli the Barnpula Valley and Persian Bnluchistan
(this would probably have included n visit to tlle
districts of Geh, Bint and Qasrkand), to Magas;
thence, via IZuhalc and the I<ej Valley, to the coast
at Gwadur o~ Pasili. But on al~ivnlin Persia
"the tour through s sandy and stony land, wllich
grudgingly supports a sparse population of wild
and poverty-stricken nomads," where tllcre was
"no trade worth speaking of, nor ally hope of
increasing it," was ultimately abandoned.? Tlius
for the second time British trade passed by on the
other side.
Broin the foregoing sketch it will be seen that
the drawbacks that have beset Persian Baluchistan
in the past-the scanty population, the huge u11cultivated areas-have been due as much to the
maladministration and extortion of the su~ceeding
conquerors who froin time to time have imposed
their will on the wretched populatioa as to the
vagaries of an unkindly Nature.
Tt would be premature to attempt to forecast

*

Cu~zon's" Persia."
-t. Report on the Mission.
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the actual route that a railway through Southern
Persia would follow, but this much may possibly
be hazarded with safety, that such a railway, if
built, will pass througli Persian 13aluchistar~,and
connect with the India11 system, not at Quctta, as
might be expected, but at Icarachi. Tlie difficult
gradients in the neighbou~hoodof Nushki, and the
desert zone wllicll lies across the pat11 of the more
northerly route, combine to favour the idea that
tlle more southerly, across Persian Baluchistan, will
eventually be adopted. It is possible that to many
the idea of developing R'Ielcrail will appear in the
light of making a silk purse out of a sow's ear. I
do not ~yislito claim too much for Mekran-qz6i
trop embrace, 71zal kkreiszt-but in the construction
of a railway it is necessary to talrc into account the
material resources of the district through which it
is to pass, and althougli no glowing future can be
predicted for Mekran, as has been for other parts
of the Shall's dominions-at least, for Inally a long
year to coine-yet, it is capable of sufficient development t o provide valuable feeders for the
tru~ilrline.
I n order to make the position clear i t will be
necessary t o give a rather detailed account of the
orographical features of the country, in which, for
the sake of homogeneity, it is proposed t o include,
under tlie geographical expression '"ekran,"
all
that country lying to the south of the latitude of
Bandar Abbas as far as the British fi-ontier, and
including the subdistricts of Biyaban and Bashakard,
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belonging respectively to the provinces of the ~ ~
Ports and of Kirman.
Geographically speaking, Mekran may be divided
into three distinct belts, of which the most southerly
consists of a broad strip of alluvial country extending on an average some ten to fifteen miles inland
to the foot of the coast range. In Melaan proper
this coast range is composed of a sandy conglomerate of gravel and shells, while in Biyaban it
is formed of the stiff' blue clay known as shur,"
capped with sloping strata of white lilnestone
several feet in thickness. From the seaward side
it presents a jagged horizon of sharply denticulated
pealrs ; on the landward it falls away in a precipitous drop to tlie level plain-a feature common
t o the succeeding ranges which back it inland. At
the foot of this range, where i t approaclles the
shore, are low-lying rnangrove swamps and long
stretches of driven sand, while in places are to
be found groves of date-palms, villages, and scanty
cultivation.
While in Biyab,m I had the opportunity of visiting the Governor of Biyaban in his mud fort at
Sirik, and of obtaining a nearer view of one of
these coast villages. Sirik lies about three miles
from the shore, from which it is concealed to view
by a long line of carefully tended palm-trees. The
village consists of some scores of huts made of
date-palm brailches, and thatched with the leaves
of t l ~ edwarf "pish" palm, clustering round the
square mud fort in the centre, while to the left
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is a large banked-up reservoir. A s we entered the
village women were passiilg to and fro carrying
pitchers of water on their heads, but these soon
disappeared into the huts, modestly drawing the
corner of their veils across their faces. It is
impossible to describe the impression of squalor
and poverty that tlie first sight of these rude
dwellings produces on one. Unventilated and
unlit but by the narrow entrance, the furniture
of these hovels rarely runs to anything Inore
luxurious than a threadbare Bnshakardi carpet,
a long red bolster slip filled with hay, a few
copper cooking-pots, a cracked lookii~g-glass, a
bag of beads from the Somali coast, some baskets
of dates, a saddle-bag or i;wo, and a naked boy,
while in the corner lnay be seen an old matchlocl~
c c jezail," and hanging on the walls the pendant
camel's-hair trappings which lend t o the ungainly
" sliutar " (camel) such an air of superiority.
Entering the mud fort through a kind of guardhouse, where a malefactor was undergoing punishment in the stoclcs, we came upon an open court,
in the middle of which was an empty mud tai11c
and a small heap of grain, which some woman had
no doubt been engaged in winnowii~gwhen our
appearance put her t o flight. T o right and left
were low and gloomy doorways leading to dark
recesses, while in fiont, under a high portico, supported by cylindrical pillars of uncommon thickness, sat the Governor, on a rich carpet, surrounded by his advisers, retainers, and negro
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slaves, passing from hand to hand the gurgling
" kalyan."
Behind the coast range is ail intermediate belt
composed of parallel ranges of hills of no great
height, and valleys, uninhabited for the ~rlostpart,
but possessing ,z light clay soil, wl~ichsupports
a few oases of date-palms and a luxurious growth
of tamarisk and acacia, camel-thorn and "akh,"
while hay, dwarf melons, wild indigo, and wildflowers, abound after the rains. The oasis of
Chikai Bund, at which the force encamped on the
~narch up to Bint, and also on the way back,
for several days, provided a plentiful supply of
first-class hay, and all along the banks of the
Rapch at this point the vegetation was especially
luxuriant.
Behind this intermediate belt the countiy rises
again through a third zone of rugged mountains,
stark and riven plateaux, ravines choked with
boulders, to the distant Lashar Range, wllich,
extending westward as the Band-i-Nushki to its
right-angled junction with the Band-i-Marz, or
mountains of Bashalcard, eastward as the Bandi-Nilag to the British frontier, forins the waterparting between the basins of the Gulf of Oman
and the Jax Morian Hamun-the
last remnant
of an inland sea probably still existent in early
histoiical times.
There is no reason to suppose that Mekran is
ally less fertile than any other part of Persia.
Given better govemmeilt and the abolition of the
26
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perilicious system of farming the taxes-" pisl~kesh"
(the " graft " of America)-and other methods of
extortion, a largely increased area might speedily
be brought into cultivation-an act of enterprise
which the humble tiller of the soil has hitherto
refrained from committing through fear of increased
taxation. T o those who have seen " in the rough "
the type of country which in TVestern America,
despised at first even by the cattle-rancher, has
become the richest fruit lands in tlie world, or to
those who are acquainted with the gigantic schemes
that are in hand for the irrigation of blesopotamia,
of Upper Egypt, and of the Sind " desert," the
latter of which reproduces in many striking ways
the characteristics of Mekran, the problem of
effecting the metamol.phosis of Melrran would not
present such apparently insuperable difficulties.
The water-supply of Mekran, as obtained from
the perennial rivers-i.e.,
those that take theii.
source in the main watershed-is both excellent and
abundant. Prom the Rudkhaneh-i-Minab, the
classical Anamis, where Nearchus brought his
celebrated voyage to a close, t o the Bay of Gwatar,
there are no fewer than ten such rivers, all of which
have quite respectable tributaries. As waterways
they are, of course, valueless, being seldom more
than 18 inches deep, and never continually so,
except perhaps in the flood season. The most
iinportant of these flow into the Gulf of Oman
-namely, the Jaghin, the Sadaich, the Rapch,
the Geh, and the combined course of the D a s h t i ~ r i
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and Bahu Rivers. Between them are many
smaller streams, rising mostly in the middle belt,
which dry up altogether in the hot weather, and
whose waters are brackish and generally unfit to
drink, even for beasts. The rivers of Biyaban, tlie
Mnzavi and the Gaz, also rise in the main range,
but are shorter, and flow into the Straits of Horinuz,
carrying with them quantities of gypsum, held in
suspension and obtained from the limestone farination, which, together witli the " shur " or stiff blue
clay, is everywhere to be seen, the latter rising in
jagged cliffs, seamed witli myriads of tiny perpendicular runnels and scoriations. The Marak River,
a tributary of the Gaz, where it forces its way
through the gorge bet~veeilthe plairis of Sahrn-iGurg and Sarzeh, has forrned on the inner side of
tlie bends in itsdcoursehigh benches of this mixture
of limestoile and clay soil, which appears to possess
a greater fertility thail the alluvial soil of Mekran
proper. At any rate, the cultivation here is in a
more advanced condition, the general aspect of
Biyaban being somewhat in the nature of a surprise
to eyes accustomed to the dreary wastes of uncultivated plain that had been encountered during the
advance up the Valley of the Rapch. On all sides
waving fields of wheat and barley stretcl~edaway
to the distant curtain-wall of limestone, while the
la~idscapewas filled in by a profusion of tamarisk,
mimosa, and acacia, with the usual date-groves, and
an occasional field of "jowari " (millet) and lucerne.
It was by far the most fertile part we had yet
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traversed in this land, where the evil administration
of the Persian Government, the rapacity of the
tax-farmer, and the ever-present menace of the
robber hillmen, have combincd t o atrophy the
ngricultural instinct in the oppressed and downtrodden peasantry. It is only necessary t o mention
that these crops have been produced by the simple
rainfall of the district to realize what might be
achieved were proper steps taken to store the water,
wl~ichcomes down in sucli quantities from the
l~ills,for the purposes of irrigation.
For inany years it was tl~ouglltthat the Bampur
River drained out into the Gulf of Oman, but this
mistake has been explained now by the fact that
the principal rivers of Mekran proper rise on the
northern slopes of the Lashar Range, and, hemmed
in by a kind of " trans-Lashar Range," bend southwards, boring their way through wild and fantastic
gorge scenery, that has more than oncc inspired the
pen of the traveller. During and just after the
rains, which occur in December and January
(Mekran being outside the monsoon area), these
gorges are filled with raging torrents, by which
many a caravan has been engulfed while making an
ill-judged attempt to negotiate the passes. Lower
down they inundate the whole of the coast district,
sometimes rendering impassable for many days at a
time the Rah-i-Daria, or coast road, which runs
at a distance of ten miles or so inland, coilnecting
the Mekran ports of Gwatar, Challbar, and Jask.
It is along this road that theNlndo-Europeantele-
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graph land-line runs t o Jask, and it is also at the
intersection of this road with the courses of the
rivers that the more important coast villages are
situated. But for the vernal floods these villages
would in all probability not exist, as they are mostly
uni~lllabitnbleand deserted in the hot weather.
The existence of these rocky gorges tends to
simplify in a p e a t degree the problem of waterstorage, and renders the country in many parts
peculiarly adapted for successful irrigation. Nature
has, indeed, herself supplied an object-lesson in this
direction by the vertical uptilting of the limestone
strata, which, acting as a natural dam, serve to
retain in deep and limpid pools far up among the
mountains the residue of the rains, which at present,
neglected by the unthrifty inhabitant of the plain,
flow t o waste in the sandy nals-beds of the coast
district. All over the Middle East are to be found
the remains of irrigation works, some of them on
a vast scale, and one cannot doubt that the noble
cities and fertile gardens of ancient Persia were
entirely dependent on the maintenance of such
dams as that on the Halil Rud, a little above the
city of Jiruft, destroyed probably at the time of the
downfall of the Seljuk Dynasty, but even to-day
capable of being sufficiently restored to hold a
large quantity of water.*
Immense reservoirs of this kind miglit easily be
constructed at comparatively small cost among the
hills, where the narrow gorges and oval-shaped

*

Sykes.
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valleys permit, and if these were not needed,
smaller dams would suffice t o raise the river-levels
high enougll to admit of the water being led off
into irrigation channels. A t present there is no
systein of irrigation worthy the name beyond
the " bund " round the date-grove, not even the
llo~nelyand primitive '' lta~iz,"'(qanat," or covered
ditch.
The principal industries and occupations carried
on by the inhabitants of Mekrnn are camel-breeding, mat-making, fishing, and, in a minor degree,
agriculture and grazing, and from these practically
all the trade is formed. Tile principal camelbreeding centres are a t Geh and in the Rapch,
Sadaich, and Jaghin Valleys. A considerable export
trade is carried on in dried fish with Maskat,
forming one of the principal means of livelihood
for the poverty-stricken coast population. With
the dried-fisli indristry may be mentioned the
export of sharks' fins and isinglass, also to
Maskat, thence to China and the East, where
they are valued partly as delicacies and partly for
their medicinal properties. Next to the fishing
industry that of mat - making ranks perhaps in
importance, being carried on wherever the dwarf
palm exists. Other occupations are those of carpetinaking in Jask and Bashakard, a black-and-white
carpet known as khirsak " being peculiar to the
Jask district. I11 Rint a curious kind of embroidered coat, worn by all the notables of Persian
Baluchistan, is made. The embroidery on these
c6
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coats is of a very high order, resetnbling iu pattern
and effect the richness of a Persian carpet in
miniature. I n a country where so inucli has remained unchailged since early Biblical times-the
legend of Jonah is said to have originated on the
shores of an inland sea that existed here formerly-it would hardly be surprising were this
coat the lineal descendant of the original " coat of
many colours " that excited the envy of Joseph's
brethren. The more usual crops raised include
wheat and barley in spring ; dates and jowari in
autumn ; small quantities of rice and cotton are
also grown. Live-stoclr is confined to a few herds
of humped cattle of a breed peculiar to the
country, and a few flocks of " dumba " (fat-tailed
sheep) and goats. Camels and dollkeys are the
beasts of burden.
W i t h this meagre stock-in-trade it is not to be
wondered at that European trade has impatieiltly
gone elsewhere. As far as inland communications
are concerned, Mekran is no worse off than other
parts of Southern Persia. The principal caravan
routes connecting the coast with the interior
follow the course of the rivers. The most important of these is undoubtedly that which from
Chahbar strikes inland up the valley of the Dashtiari River past Qasrkand, over a low kotal, and
down into the valley of the Bampur River. A t
Bampur it connects with the main caravan route to
Kirmaii via Barn and Rayill, and also with the
Sistan-Khoras~nroute through Robat and Nasrata-

I
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bad. Next in importance is that coilnecting Jask
with the first, by way of the Sadaid1 River Valley
and Bint. Other routes ascend the Jaghin and
the Rapch, the former, as already mentioned, being
.a favouiite with gun-runners.
One of the most debilitating disadvantages
with which the trade of Mekran has to contend
with at the present day is the total absence of
anv suitable ~ o r t salong its coasts canable of
accommodating ships of even such moderate
draught as those employed in the Gulf. A t
Gwatar, Chahbar, and Jask, the two last of which
are regular places of call for the British India Line,
vessels have to anchor as much as three or four
miles from the shore, and discharging a cai1go is
rendered difficult by the surf, and by the everpresent possibility of the dangerous " shumal "
springing up at any moment. In early times,
Chahbar-or rather Tiz, as it then was-boasted
a considerable trade in silk, coming down from
the interior by way of the Bampur-Chahbar caravan
route. The possibility of ever revivifying this
route as an alternative artery of trade for the more
easterly portions of the commercial catclzmentbasin of Bandar Abbas depends on the development of the country that lies between Bampur
and Chalzbar. A t present the trade of Chahbar is
slightly on the decline, owing possibly to the rapid
development of Bandar Abbas and amounts to
about two lakhs and a half of rupees per annum,
of which one 1ak.h accounts for imports ; while that
I.
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of Gwatnr amounts to one laklr, of which a third is
in imported goods. I~nportscoilsist of Mmchester
cotton goods, rice, flour, lead, iron, tobacco, beads,
oil, matches, tea, thread, silk, spices, and sugar,
for which latter commodity there is said to be
an ever-increasing demand in Persia.
It is improbable that Jask will ever rise above its
present position, overshs~dowedas it is on one side by
Bandar Abbas, and on the other by Challbw. It has
110 coinlnercial hinterland worth mentioning, while
that of Chahbar already includes Geh, Bint, Qasrlrand, Fanucl~,Barnpnr, and Fehru;j, and there is no
reason why it should not be extended so as to
embrace Sarllad and Saravan, when developed, and
Sistan and Bam-Narmashir, for which, however, it
will have to compete with Baildar Abbas.
I n his valuable report on the Indian Cominercial
Mission to South-Eastern Persia, Mr. Newcomen,
its president, pointed out that the value of our
trade wit11 Persia lay in the fact that we were able
to supply her with articles which she was unable
to produce herself, whilst taking fsom her r,zw
materials, chiefly of a costly nature, such as gums,
drugs, spices, and dye-stuffs. H e also drew attention to the fact that Persia is not yet sufficiently
developed t o produce enough raw material to
pay for the value of her imports. This makes it
quite clear that before Persian Mekran can be made
a profitable field for commerce her puschasiilg
power must be increased by the full developinent of
her internal resources.
Pish " palm mats, dates,
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and dried fish, will not buy the co~ninoditiesof the
West, for which all over Persia there is an everincreasing demand, and in order to produce this
purchasing power i t will be necessary for the
husbandmen of Mekran to import and cultivate
the valuable plants of the gums, spices, and dyestuffs, which already form such a large item in the
material resources of the rich province of Kirman.
Indigo already grows wild in Meluan. Henna,
saffron, and madder, should follow it, and the valuable gum-tragacanth, asafetida, and colocynth.
For those plants that need moisture the coast
district can provide up to '70 per cent. and 80 per
cent. of atmospheric saturation. Long-staple cotton
should grow well and compete successfully with the
short-staple cotton of I<llorasan, rice in the flooded
coast-belt, and coffee where it is not subject to
inundation, but where the water-laden sea air might
yield results equal to those of far-famed Mokha.
Inland the climate is dly and stimulating, and suitable for the production of cereals, and also for
sheep-farming, on account of the saline characteristics of a great part of the soil.
The mineral resources of Mekran are probably
very limited, although the fabled and inysterious
mountain of " Iluh-i-l'aftan " in the Saravan Highlands of Northern Persian Baluchistan is reputed
to be rich in the precious as well as the useful
metals. It is, however, not improbable that oil
and sulphur exist in workable quailtities, especially
as Mekran lies in the Southern Persian oil-belt,
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which stretches more or less from the Ilarun River
to the Afghan cc Garmsir." An oil formation
certainly exists in the vicinity of Rint, and traces
of sulphur were distinctly noticeable in the water
of the Gaz River in Biyabaa.
Such, indeed, as I have described them, I believe
to be the resources and possibilities of Persian
Meluan, but tlie future development of the country
on economic lines rests with the Persian Government and with her advisers among the European
nations, and unless the vampire of Persian official
peculation prove too strong for the reborn spirit
of Persian nationality-the latest child among the
nations-it may well come to pass that the land,
into which the Almighty is reputed by its inhabitants to have cast all the refuse left over from the
creation of the world, may at length be reclaimed.
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By Mrs Leslie Milne.

With two Chapters on Shan History and Literature by the Rev.
W. W. Cochrane. With numerous Illustrations.
Demy 8\10.
15s. net.
" In her syrnpnthetic insight and faculty for observing and describing essential things
Mrs Milne follows worthily in the footsteps of those writers who have brought the lnysterious
East and its peoples near to us in recent years; she has shown us the Shans, as Sir George
Scott and Mr Hall Fielding have shown us the Ilurmans, imparting to her picture a
distinctive quality of atmosphere, like that of Lafcadio Hearn's earlier work, and a sense of
critical detachment uncommon in modern travellers."-The
Tjit~esLiterarjl S~$$ppk?rreirt.

. . If lhis is not scieotilic it is at least an essential foundarion for it. Mrs Milne
bns not only lived with the Shans, but she possesses the power of making them livc for us.
Notbing could be better than the chapters on Shan child life from llirtl~to mnrriage.
N o detail is omitted, and the whole is pervaded by a sympathetic interest in and under.
standing of childre11 which nlakes them of great value.
Every chapter is a mine of
infornintion, and Mrs hlilne bas put her material together with so much skill that it ic
difficult to lay down her fascinating book."-Mnnchester Guntulian.

. .

..
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By R. F. Johnston, M.A, (Oxon.), F.R.G.S., District Officer and
Magistrate, Weihaiwei; formerly Private Secretary to the Governor of
Hongl<ong, etc.; Author of "From Peltin to Mandalay." With Map
and Illl~stmtions. Demy avo. 15s. net.
"A really valuable work, a book not only to read and to read carefully, but to possess
Chinese rrlight read this book with as much pleasure
and refer to again and again. .
as Europeans, and probably learn almost as much."-Booh~rran.
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AFRICA. By Rosan~undSouthey. Edited by Frances Slaughter.
With Illustrations. Demy 8vo. 12s. net.
"Miss Southey has the observant eye, the quick ear, and the artistic perception, and she
has used all these gifts with great discrimination andco~isidernbleeffect in this volnn~e. We
know of no story covering the snme ground that has appeared in receut years that has
imprcsscd us so much by i t s sincerity and its accuracy."-Coz~rl journal.
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Francis You~ighusband, K.C.I.E.

By Colonel Sir
With Maps and Illustrations.

Medium 8v0, 21s. net.
" T h e expedition to Lhasa six years ago has already had threc historians, but Sir
Frnncis Younghusband's work is invested with a specinl value which none of its predecessors
can claim. I-Ie was the responsible lcader of the Mission of 1904, and what he h x to say
about it, and about the circumstances which led to its dispatch, hears iht! stamp of final and
indlliputable authority
a full and balanced account of the political aspects of the
Tibetan problem, the motives which led the unveiling of Lhasn, the results of the Mission,
and the questions which still await solution. H i s book, therefore, cor~rtitutesthe most
important contribution yet made to the growing store of literature about l'illet "-7Xr
Tiltles.
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An Account of

t h e Career of William Richardson, from Cabin-Boy i n the Merchant
Service to Warrant Officer in the R o y a l Navy (1780-1817), told in his
own words.
E d i t e d b y C o l o n e l S p e n c e r C h i l d e r s , R , E . , C.B.
Dcnly avo. 10s. 6d. net.
"Worth a dozen of the ordinary memoirs with which the market is flooded. For
it is a enuine 'human docun~ent' a revelation of the thoughts and doings of a ty ical
ICngli% sailorman durin the mabt stirring years in our naval history.
We eave
found the book delinhtfu? readin=."-S@aclafor.
Such excellent stuff, and in such racy, strai~htforwnrdEnglish.
UncommoAl good reading. I t makes u s think of some of C a p t ~ i nMarryat's pictures
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With many Woodcuts a n d
avo. 158, net.
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book covering so wide a ran e of exploration equally well.
full of attractrve information,%ut also of stirrin adventure,
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LABRADOR.

By M r s . L e o n i d a s H u b b a r d , J u n i o r . W i t h Map,
Portraits, a n d other Illustrations. D e m y 8vo. 10s. 6 d . net.
"Graphic narrative and descriptive power and close observation illuminate its
pag.es. It Is distinguished moreover by the fact that Mrs. Hubbard piirsued and
ach~eved,with rare tenaeit;, courape,'and singleness of purpose, a definite objective."-Eurnirrg Shndard.

FROM PEKING T O MANDALAY.

A Journey

from North China t o Burma through Tibetan Ssuch'uan and Yunnan.
By R. F. J o h n s t o n , M.A.,F.R.G.S.,
District Officer and Magistrate,
Wei-hni-wei.
W i t h numerous IlIustrntions a n d Map. D e m y 8vo.
15s. nel.
Written with learning, authority, and enthusiasm.
"No raiae is too high.
Mr. yohnston's work i s one in a thouaand and however many othera may be
,
dh;egarded this should be read a t least by thise who care for t h e judgments of a
man who has broupht to bear in rbmote parts of the Chinese Empire
a full knowledae
of Chinese characters and the Chinese language."-Sprctdor:
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Through the

Ordos, the Gobi Desert, a n d Tibet. By Count De L e s d a i n . With
M a p a n d Illustrations based o n the Author's Surveys a n d Photographs.
Demy 8vo. 12s. net.
" H e gives us an account of the most extraordinary honeymoon the world h a
ever known, and the modesty of the hardened traveller combined with the lucid and
pictures ue style, makes i t one of the most absorbingty interesting books of travel
publishel for a long time!--EYdtr$ng Slondard.

T H E INNER LIFE OF THE UNITED STATES.
By M o n s i g n o r C o u n t Vay d e Vaya and L u s k o d , Author of
"Empires and Emperors."
Demy 8vo. 12s. net.
"An exhaustive study of national qualities and characteristics and represents
'the l ~ a l r e s tof a quiet eye' intent on studying motor forces rAther thpn t h d r
yducts.
Undoubtedly an authofitative contribution to our knowled~eof the
n111:dhtates of to-day."-S,c~daj Tames.
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